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ABSTRACT 
 
Traditionally, employees have been viewed as an enemy to information security (IS) within 
organisations, rather than as an organisational asset that can be harnessed to help protect 
company information.  Existing research is largely fragmented with a distinct lack of theory-
based approaches for the design and evaluation of behaviour change interventions. Furthermore, 
research has largely focussed on employees’ compliance with IS policies and less so, the 
multitude of individual behaviours covered in them. This thesis presents a mixed-method 
approach to changing employees’ security behaviour using theory to inform the design of an 
intervention.  
The thesis identified influencers and barriers to specific security behaviours and developed an 
extended-Protection Motivation Theory model. The model includes information sensitivity 
appraisal as an important influencer for which a new scale (WISA) was developed and 
validated. The model was tested on three specific anti-malware behaviours: usage of anti-
malware software, installing software updates and avoiding suspicious links within emails. The 
testing allowed the identification of the most influential factors for each behaviour and 
demonstrated how these factors differ between behaviours. A nuance that is lost when adopting 
the IS policy compliance approach and was also confirmed by the qualitative findings.  The 
findings from the models informed the design of the behaviour change intervention.  
Components of the model were utilised in an intervention to promote email security behaviour. 
The intervention comprised of a motivational component, together with a volitional component 
based on implementation intentions to help translate good “intentions” into good “security 
actions”. The study found significant improvements in objective performance on email 
legitimacy tasks that were more sustainable with the addition of implementation intentions. 
Response efficacy was an identified barrier, demonstrated to influence anti-malware behaviours 
and was malleable to significant change during the intervention. 
The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed together with 
suggestions for future research. 
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Organisations are under constant attack from internal and external threats that put the integrity, 
availability and confidentiality of their information at risk. Reports indicate that 90% of large 
organisations and 74% of small businesses experienced a security breach in the last year (PwC, 
2015). The implications of security breaches are wide-ranging from service disruption to 
reputational damage alongside potentially high financial costs incurred from the data breach. 
Figures indicate that the cost of a worst case security breach is between £1.46m-£3.14m for a 
large organisation and £75-£311k for a small organisation (PwC, 2015). Effective defence of 
organisations’ information and systems is of upmost importance if it is to optimally function as 
a 21st century organisation.  
Organisations adopt technical, procedural and human defences to protect against security 
threats. The technical countermeasures include firewalls and intrusion-detection systems. 
However, information security cannot be achieved solely through technological solutions 
(Herath & Rao, 2009b; Schneier, 2000; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012). Organisations 
adopting a combination of technical, procedural and employee behaviour to protect their 
information systems assets and resources are considered to be more effective (D’Arcy & Hovav, 
2007; Li, Zhang, & Sarathy, 2010; Schneier, 2000; Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005; 
Vance et al., 2012).   
Traditionally, employees have long been considered to be a weak link in the security chain 
(Dhillon & Moores, 2001; Mitnick, 2003; Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 
2005; Vroom & von Solms, 2004) as their behaviour is estimated to account for a large portion 
of security breaches. PwC (2015) found that 75% of large organisations and 31% of small 
businesses experienced a security breach that was staff-related and that 50% of the worst 
breaches were due to human error. Figures from the Ponemon Institute (2015) indicate that 25% 
of data breaches were due to employee (such as human error) behaviours, 29% were due to 
system glitches and the remaining 46% were due to malicious attacks (including organisational 
insiders). 
There is a need to understand the role of employees as an organisational asset and as a key 
contributor to the defence of organisational information security. As such, research has moved 
towards understanding what motivates employees’ protective security behaviour (e.g. Herath & 
Rao, 2009a, 2009b; Ifinedo, 2011, 2014; Vance et al., 2012), and the role unusable systems, 
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policies and procedures play in insecure practice (e.g. Albrechtsen, 2007; Bartsch & Sasse, 
2012; Beautement, Sasse, & Wonham, 2009; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010).  
Although employees have been identified as one of the most significant vulnerabilities in the 
information security of organisations, research to date is fragmented and little attention has been 
given to designing theoretically-based and empirically-validated behavioural interventions to 
improve their behaviour. 
This chapter will outline what is meant by information security and how the thesis approaches 
understanding more about the role of employees within the context of information security.  
1.1 | INFORMATION SECURITY AND CYBER SECURITY 
Information security and cyber security are not easy terms to define. This is further complicated 
by their interchangeable use within research and the media. von Solms & van Niekerk (2013) 
argue that that while there is significant overlap in these concepts, they are not the same thing.  
Information security, as defined by the ISO (2005), is viewed as the maintenance of the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and is known as the “CIA triad” of 
information security. The aspects of the CIA triad are explained as follows: 
 Confidentiality – ensuring that data is kept private and its access is restricted. Not all 
information is of equal sensitivity and information considered sensitive needs a higher 
level of confidentiality.   Integrity – ensuring that data is consistent, unaltered, accurate and trustworthy over its 
life span and accessed only by authorised personnel.   Availability - data access is available when required and the computer systems that store 
and process the data must function as needed.  
von Solms & van Niekerk (2013) argue that what distinguishes cyber security from information 
security is that the former places greater emphasis on the human element as an asset to be 
protected and a cause of vulnerabilities  They argue that these assets can be both tangible (e.g. 
infrastructure) and intangible (e.g. an individual’s wellbeing). They posit that information 
security is the protection of information and the technologies that store it, whereas cyber 
security is the protection of those that function within cyberspace, including people and 
organisations. They conclude with the following definition of Cyber Security: 
“The protection of cyberspace itself, the electronic information, the ICTs that 
support cyberspace, and the users of cyberspace in their personal, societal and 
national capacity, including any of their interests, either tangible or intangible, 
that are vulnerable to attacks originating in cyberspace” [pg. 101] 
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The greater emphasis on the human element in cyber security definitions also corresponds with 
the increased focus on the human element as a source of security concern. Historically, 
computer security was concerned with the protection of information through technological 
means. However, in the last 10-15 years, attention has been given to the socio-technical side of 
cyber security exploring the interplay between end-users and security.  
1.2 | CYBER SECURITY IN THE UK AND THE WORKPLACE 
In 2010, the UK government placed cyber security as a Tier 1 priority, and on developing the 
UK’s Cyber Security Strategy, outlined a four-year plan to help protect businesses and 
individuals from the many threats in cyber space (Cabinet Office, 2011). The increased focus 
and attention on the need for a more secure UK cyberspace is promising. An important aspect of 
the strategy is to ensure the public have the basic skills and knowledge to protect themselves 
from cyber security threats and that businesses are more cyber security focussed in their 
operation.  
Although the focus and priority of cyber security has increased in the last few years, 
historically, numerous laws have been put in place that govern individuals and organisations in 
their use of data and computers. The Data Protection Act (DPA; 1998) is of upmost interest to 
this thesis as it covers the information security of personal data stored by organisations. To 
ensure compliance with the Act, organisations that store and process personal information must 
conform to the eight principles outlined within the DPA. Breaches of the DPA can have severe 
repercussions for organisations, who can be fined up to £500,000 by the Information 
Commissioners Office, the governing body of the DPA.  
1.3 | INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY 
Within organisations, the information security (IS) policy is an internal document that outlines 
how the organisation plans to ensure the availability, integrity and confidentiality of its 
information. The document specifies roles and responsibilities of its employees and the 
organisational procedures to ensure information security. Whitman (2004) highlights the aspects 
of a good information security policy:  
‘[It should]  outline individual responsibilities, define authorized and unauthorized 
uses of the systems, provide venues for employee reporting of identified or 
suspected threats to the system, define penalties for violations, and provide a 
mechanism for updating the policy’ [pg. 52] 
There are a number of standards and guidelines for information security management with the 
International Organisation for Standardization (ISO/IEC 27002:2013) standard being the most 
widely recognised and is increasingly used for defining information security practice in the 
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workplace. The standard provides best practice recommendations for information security 
management and guidelines in the following areas:  
Table 1. ISO 27002: 2013 standard 
ISO 27002:2013 standard 
Information security policies 
Organisation of information security 
Human resource security 
Asset management 
Access control 
Cryptography 
Physical and environmental security 
Operations security 
Communications security 
System acquisition, development and maintenance 
Supplier relationships 
Information security incident management 
Information security aspects of business continuity management 
Compliance 
 
This standard demonstrates the number of areas organisations must comply with should they 
wish to be certified by the ISO. The fourteen areas demonstrate the potentially vast amount of 
security behaviours that employees may be expected to perform.  
However, organisations differ in the content of their policies as there is no “one size fits all” 
approach and a risk assessment should be used to decide which level of security is needed for 
their organisation  (ICO, 2014). The expected security-related behaviours to be performed by 
employees will, therefore, differ between organisations as will the required level of information 
security.  However, research has started to investigate some security behaviours required by 
employees and home users. 
1.4 | SECURITY BEHAVIOURS 
Security behaviours involve protective behaviours and the use of security technology. There is a 
lack of consensus on recommended security practices for home users and in the workplace. 
However, consideration of recent reports provides an indication of consistently recommended 
actions within government reports, research studies and survey instruments:  
 Account security/authentication (e.g. use of strong passwords, password 
management, password change frequency) (Coventry, Briggs, Blythe, & Tran, 2014; 
Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Cyberstreetwise, 2015; Furnell & Moore, 2014; Ion, 
Reeder, & Consolvo, 2015) 
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 Use of security software (e.g. anti-virus, firewalls) (Coventry et al., 2014; Crossler & 
Bélanger, 2014; Cyberstreetwise, 2015; Furnell & Moore, 2014; Ion et al., 2015)  Running the latest version of software/operating systems (Coventry et al., 2014; 
Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Cyberstreetwise, 2015; Furnell & Moore, 2014; Ion et al., 
2015)  Anti-phishing/Scam prevention (e.g. staying informed about risks, identifying 
phishing emails) (Coventry et al., 2014; Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Furnell & Moore, 
2014; Ion et al., 2015)  Privacy protection (e.g. cookies, control of personal information) (Coventry et al., 
2014; Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Furnell & Moore, 2014; Ion et al., 2015)  Browser protection (e.g. check HTTPs, secure websites, logging out of websites) 
(Coventry et al., 2014; Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Furnell & Moore, 2014; Ion et al., 
2015) 
There are numerous safeguards individuals can put in place to protect themselves, however, 
these reports provide some basic hygiene behaviours that are useful for security protection. 
Behaviour in the workplace is much more complex as there are multiple assets, devices, 
locations, and threats that make information security behaviours more difficult to manage. 
Furthermore, some of those behaviours outlined above that are important for consumers may be 
automated by IT so may not require employee intervention. 
Security behaviour in the workplace is largely conceptualised as a IS policy compliance 
behaviour, with less known about the behaviours that lead to compliance. IS policies differ 
depending on the organisation’s security maturity and their protection needs. Despite these 
differences and lack of knowledge on specific behaviours, attention has been drawn to types of 
security behaviour in the workplace.    
1.5 | TYPES OF EMPLOYEE SECURITY BEHAVIOUR 
Stanton et al. (2005) explored end user security behaviour through 110 interviews with IT 
professionals, managers and employees. The interviews led to the development of a two-factor 
taxonomy of security behaviour varying across two dimensions (intentionality and technical 
expertise) resulting in six categories of user behaviour. 
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Figure 1. Two-factor taxonomy from Stanton et al. (2005) 
 Basic Hygiene: behaviours that that require little to no technical expertise but have 
clear intention to protect information assets and systems (e.g. locking work computer 
when leaving station)  Aware Assurance: behaviours that require more technical expertise (e.g. recognising a 
backdoor program on a work PC)  Naïve mistakes: when there is no clear intention to do harm but the behaviours require 
minimal expertise (e.g. using a weak password)  Dangerous tinkering: when there is no clear intention to do harm but the behaviours 
require expertise (e.g. setting up a gateway that inadvertently allows outsider access)  Detrimental misuse: clear intention to do harm but behaviours require minimal 
expertise (e.g. using the work email to distribute spam)  Intentional destruction: clear intention to do harm but behaviours require technical 
expertise  
The work of Stanton et al. (2005) shows that there are different forms of employee behaviour 
with associated security outcomes. These can be divided into three forms of behaviour; positive 
protection-motivated behaviours (i.e. basic hygiene and aware assurance), negligent behaviours 
(i.e. naïve mistakes and dangerous tinkering) and negatively damaging behaviour (i.e. 
detrimental misuse and intentional destruction).   The current thesis is interested in the positive 
and negligent behaviour of employees. Negatively damaging behaviour is often explored in 
relation to malicious organisational insiders and is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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Positive and negligent behaviours are largely explored in relation to the IS policies of 
organisations. However, understanding the behaviours depicted within these policies has 
received less attention. Posey et al. (2010) identified protection-motivated behaviours through 
interviews with security professionals and employees. They argue that these are volitional 
behaviours that seek to protect the information security of the employee’s organisation. They 
identified 67 behaviours that they clustered into 14 categories; these included those behaviours 
identified earlier on pages 4 and 5 which are important for consumers’ behaviour. However, 
they also identified a number of behaviours that are important for organisational security such 
as co-worker reliance (e.g. reminds his/her co-workers of information security guidelines and 
protocols adopted by their organisation), immediate reporting of suspicious behaviour (e.g. 
immediately reports a co-worker’s negligent information-security behaviour to the proper 
organisational authorities), and equipment location and storage (e.g. keeps the laptop or other 
electronic devices issued to them by their organisation with them at all times).  
The review and study by Posey et al. (2010) indicated that there is a vast array of security 
behaviours that employees may be expected to perform. A combination of or lack of 
engagement in these behaviours may contribute to a successful security breach. Research, 
therefore, needs to address individual security behaviours in the workplace.  
1.6 | RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of this thesis is to develop and evaluate an intervention to improve the security 
behaviour of employees. Two research questions derived from existing behavioural information 
security research were explored using a mixed-method approach across four organisational 
studies: 
1. What influences and prevents different security behaviours in the workplace? 
2. Does a theoretically-grounded intervention using motivational and volitional 
approaches lead to and sustain security behaviour change? 
1.7 | RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The specific objectives of thesis were to: 
 examine internal and environmental factors that motivate the different behaviours 
contributing to information security compliance (Study 1 & Study 3, Chapter 3 & 5);  identify barriers to security behaviours and consider them within the organisational 
context (Study 1, Chapter 3);  develop a qualitatively-driven framework to explain how factors influence information 
security behaviours (Study 1, Chapter 3); 
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 understand how employees appraise the sensitivity of work information by developing 
and validating a scale to measure this (Study 2, Chapter 4);  explore an extended Protection Motivation Theory (PMT)-model (driven by the 
qualitative work and existing literature) to identify factors that influence three specific 
anti-malware behaviours (Study 3, Chapter 5);  use the findings from the extended model to inform the motivational component of a 
behaviour change intervention (Study 3 & 4, Chapter 5 & 6);  assess the feasibility of an intervention that combines motivational and volitional 
components to promote anti-malware behaviour (Study 3 & 4, Chapter 5 & 6). 
1.8 | THESIS APPROACH TO ADDRESSING RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
OBJECTIVES 
 
Figure 2. Thesis structure 
The thesis seeks to adopt a motivational and volitional approach to understanding and changing 
behaviour. Studies 1 through to 3 seek to understand what motivates security behaviour in the 
workplace. Study 4 seeks to combine the findings from studies 1 to 3 into an intervention 
designed to motivate employees to engage in protective security behaviour, and the intervention 
is further enhanced by providing volitional strategies to help translate motivation into actual 
behaviours.  
Motivational and  
volitional intervention   
 
Exploring  
security motivations  
& barriers 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Chapter 6 
Study 4 
Chapter 7 
General Discussion 
Chapter 3 
Study 1 
Chapter 4 
Study 2 
Chapter 5 
Study 3 
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1.9 | OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
Overall, the thesis adopted a multi-method approach by first qualitatively exploring multiple 
security behaviours that contribute to IS compliance and factors that influence engagement or 
disengagement in these protective actions (study 1). The thesis then explored one specific factor 
in depth, information sensitivity, and developed a new scale to measure employees’ appraisal of 
it (study 2). The third study explored three specific anti-malware behaviours to identify factors 
that explained intentions to engage in them (study 3). These findings informed the final study to 
design and assess an intervention that combines motivational and volitional components to 
promote anti-malware behaviour (study 4). The following sections of the introduction provide 
an overview of each study and their key findings.  
1.9.1 | STUDY 1 (CHAPTER 3) 
This study explored the underlying behavioural context of information security in the 
workplace, exploring how individual and organisational factors influence the interplay of the 
motivations and barriers of security behaviours. Using Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour, two consistently used models within behavioural information 
security research, the study explored factors from these models on behaviours that contribute to 
IS policy compliance. Alongside this, the study explored potential differences in organisational 
citizenship behaviours and psychological ownership between two companies. Two 
organisations took part, in which ten from each were interviewed and the data was analysed 
using framework analysis. The analysis indicated that there were seven themes pertinent to 
information security: Response Evaluation (response costs, perceived benefits and response 
efficacy), Threat Evaluation (threat models, severity, information sensitivity appraisal, and 
susceptibility), Knowledge (of security risks and protective actions), Experience (of security 
breaches and work experience), Security Responsibility, and Personal and Work Boundaries. 
The findings suggest that these differ by security behaviour and by the nature of the behaviour 
(e.g. on- and offline). Additionally, the study provided greater insight into how these factors 
may be conceptualised in a workplace setting and in the context of security. Levels of 
psychological ownership and organisational citizenship behaviour were not found to differ by 
organisation. Furthermore, the study indicated that PMT was an adequate theory to study 
security behaviour and led to the development of an extended PMT-model based on the 
qualitative findings and existing research to explore security behaviours in future studies of this 
thesis.  
1.9.2 | STUDY 2 (CHAPTER 4) 
The sensitivity of information is often discussed in relation to information security; however, 
study 1 raised the issue of a lack of a clear definition of information sensitivity. Furthermore, a 
lack of consensus in research has resulted in an absence of scales measuring how individuals 
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appraise information sensitivity so Study 2 developed and validated a new scale to measure 
employees’ information sensitivity appraisal: the Workplace Information Sensitivity Appraisal 
(WISA) scale. Furthermore, the study aimed to explore sensitivity differences for company 
information pertaining directly to living individuals (Personal, Health, Financial & Lifestyle) 
compared to information that is organisationally-focused (IP, day to day, commercial & HR). 
The factorial, content, discriminant and criterion-related validity were assessed. The final scale 
comprises of five subscales: Privacy, Worth, Consequences, Low proximity interest by others, 
and High proximity interest by others. The WISA scale, alongside its five subscales, was found 
to have strong factorial validity which was confirmed across 8 target information types.  The 
scale was found to have strong content validity and good criterion-related validity as it was 
found to significantly predict security behaviour. Finally, the scale was found to have adequate 
discriminant validity as 3 of 5 aspects of the WISA scale were found to be unrelated to 
organisational citizenship behaviour. Financial information was found to have the highest 
ratings for overall sensitivity followed by health and HR. They were also found to be the highest 
for 3 of the 5 sensitivity subscales, namely privacy, worth and consequences. Information about 
individuals (e.g. personal, health and lifestyle) was significantly considered to be of more 
interest to employees’ high proximity interest groups (i.e. family and friends) in comparison to 
organisational-focussed information. For low proximity interest, the opposite effect is apparent 
with organisational-focussed information perceived to be of interest (e.g. IP, day to day, 
commercial) to low proximity groups (i.e. criminals, fellow employees & business competitors). 
Finally, the findings indicate that employees who work with a particular information type did 
not rate that information any more sensitive than employees who do not work with that 
information.  
1.9.3 | STUDY 3 (CHAPTER 5) 
Study 3 sought to understand whether security behaviours are influenced by different factors by 
assessing an extended-PMT model based on findings from existing research and study 1. By 
exploring a subset of security behaviours with employees (anti-malware behaviours), the study 
shed further light on the complications of adopting a policy-compliance approach in security 
research. Anti-malware behaviours have been relatively under-explored in existing behavioural 
information security research and exploring three distinct behaviours allowed comparison of 
their determinants.  
The three anti-malware behaviours that were explored were; scanning USB sticks with anti-
malware software (AMS security), installing software updates when prompted (SU security), 
and not clicking on suspicious links in emails (ES Security). The original PMT model was 
explored: threat appraisal (severity and susceptibility), and coping appraisal (response costs, 
self-efficacy and response efficacy). In an extension of PMT, psychological ownership, security 
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breach experience, organisational citizenship behaviour, responsibility and WISA were also 
explored in relation to the three behaviours.  
Revising PMT using regression analyses allowed additional factors to be added to the model to 
provide greater insight into the influencers of anti-malware behaviours and identify which 
factors can explain most variance in the target behaviour. For AMS security, self-efficacy, 
response efficacy, response costs, WISA (consequences) and responsibility were found to 
significantly predict motivations to scan USB sticks for malware. For SU security, response 
efficacy, response costs, susceptibility and responsibility were found to significantly predict 
motivations to install software updates when prompted by devices. Finally, for ES security, self-
efficacy, response costs, susceptibility and security breach experience at work were found to 
significantly predict motivations to not click on links within suspicious emails.  
1.9.4 | STUDY 4 (CHAPTER 6) 
The final study evaluated an intervention based on the findings of study 3. The intervention 
aimed to improve employees’ email security behaviour, in particular being cautious with links 
within emails. The intervention was composed of motivational and volitional components.  The 
motivational components were informed from study 3 in which self-efficacy, security breach 
experience at work, susceptibility, response costs and response efficacy were found to influence 
behaviour. The motivational component was primarily self-efficacy based, aiming to enhance 
employees’ ability to detect phishing emails through enactive mastery, performance 
accomplishments and vicarious experience. Persuasive information also targeted the remaining 
influencial factors. The volitional component was based on implementation intentions, to bridge 
the gap between intentions and actual behaviour. A randomised control trial was adopted to 
assess the effectiveness of the intervention in which 59 participants were randomly allocated to 
one of four conditions; a combination of PMT and implementation intentions, PMT only, 
implementation intentions only and a control group. Participants self-report email security 
behaviour, objective phishing detection ability and self-report perceptions of their threat 
appraisal (severity and susceptibility) and coping appraisal (response efficacy, response costs & 
self-efficacy) were assessed at baseline, post exposure and at 1-week follow-up. The study 
found that those exposed to the combined intervention and the motivational-only had 
significantly better objective performance compared to the control group at post-exposure. The 
combined intervention had sustained performance compared to control after 1-week but there 
was a significant reduction in performance for the PMT-only group.  This suggests that the 
motivational intervention alongside the goal setting led to sustained performance at 1-week 
follow-up compared to a control group. Further analyses revealed that these observed 
differences were for participants’ overall accuracy in detecting genuine and phishing emails and 
approaching significance for participants’ genuine precision detection ability but no effect on 
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phishing precision ability. Moreover, the study found no effect of the intervention on self-report 
email security behaviour. The study found that there was a significant improvement in some 
components of threat and coping appraisal perceptions regardless of condition. Response 
efficacy was the only perception to change significantly as a result of the intervention in which 
those exposed to the motivational components had significant increases in their perceptions of 
response efficacy. 
1.10 | ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
1. Demonstrated that internal factors appear to play more of a role in determining security 
behaviours than environmental factors (Study 1, Chapter 3) 
2. Demonstrated that internal factors play differing roles for different security behaviours 
(Study 1 & 3, Chapter 3 & 5) 
3. Showed that the behaviours that comprise IS policy compliance are influenced by 
different factors (Study 1 & 3, Chapter 3 & 5) 
4. Developed and validated a new scale to measure information sensitivity appraisal in the 
workplace that predicts security behaviour (Study 2, Chapter 4) 
5. Identified which factors from the extended PMT-model best predict three individual 
security behaviours (Study 3, Chapter 5) 
6. Motivational intervention leads to enhanced objective security behaviour on email 
legitimacy tasks (Study 4, Chapter 6) 
7. Demonstrated the benefits of a combined motivational and volitional intervention for 
sustaining behaviour change effects for objective email security behaviour (Study 4, 
Chapter 6) 
8. Demonstrating that implementation intentions are an appropriate technique to sustain 
security behaviour and response efficacy perceptions (Study 4, Chapter 6) 
9. Identified response efficacy as a barrier to security behaviour uptake (Study 1, Chapter 
3) and a key determinant of motivation to perform security behaviours (Study 3, 
Chapter 5) and that response efficacy can be improved through motivational 
interventions and sustained through implementation intentions (Study 4, Chapter 6) 
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2 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Work from this chapter has contributed to the following publications: 
Blythe, J.M., & Coventry, L. (2012). Cyber Security Games: A New Line of Risk. In 
Entertainment Computing-ICEC 2012 (pp. 600–603). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Blythe, J.M. (2013). Cyber security in the workplace: Understanding and promoting 
behaviour change. In Proceedings of CHItaly 2013 Doctoral Consortium (pp. 92–
101). 
Coventry, L., Briggs, P., Blythe, J.M., & Tran, M. (2014). Using behavioural insights to 
improve the public’ s use of cyber security best practices. Summary report for the 
Government office for science. 
This chapter focuses on the existing literature exploring security behaviour within the 
workplace. The chapter is split into four sections to provide greater clarity of the research 
problem. The first section (2.1) discusses approaches to conceptualising security behaviour  in 
existing research; the paradigms adopted will be evaluated and reviewed on their contributions 
to understanding what motivates behaviour. The second section (2.2) discusses research 
exploring what influences and prevents security behaviour . The psychological principles behind 
security behaviours will be reviewed and issues with existing research will be discussed in 
relation to organisational security behaviour. The third section (2.3) focusses on behaviour 
change and the approach to be adopted in this thesis. The final section (2.4) focuses on existing 
experimental literature exploring attempts to change security behaviour . The studies will be 
evaluated and theoretical approaches to behaviour change will be outlined.  Taken together, the 
four sections identify the gap in the literature of why employees behave securely or insecurely, 
and shortcomings in previous attempts to improve the human element of organisational security.  
2.1 | APPROACHES TO STUDYING AND CONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY 
BEHAVIOUR 
Before understanding what motivates employees to behave securely, it is necessary to outline 
how security behaviour is measured, conceptualised and explored within research.  
The quantitative studies in this domain focus on what leads employees to comply with their 
organisation’s IS policy. These studies often test theoretical models, analysing hypothesised 
relationships with regression analyses and modelling.  The majority of studies except Ng, 
Kankanhalli, and Xu (2009) and Workman, Bommer, and Straub (2008) define security 
behaviour as “intention to comply with the IS policy” and use this as an outcome measure. 
However, there is a lack of focus on specific behaviours in the workplace and those which do 
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focus on single behaviours tend to focus on private use of technology rather than workplace use 
(e.g. Crossler, 2010; Gurung, Luo, & Liao, 2009; Lee, Larose, & Rifon, 2008; Zhang & 
McDowell, 2009). Organisational studies that have focussed on specific security behaviours in 
the workplace have often been qualitative (e.g. Albrechtsen, 2007; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010), 
and thus have not hypothesised relationships.   
The continued use of and focus on policy compliance can be attributed to the adoption of 
behaviour change models and theories from health psychology, where medical compliance was 
once one of the most frequently researched forms of health behaviour. However, shifts in 
research approaches led to more focus on medical adherence than compliance as the former is 
thought to provide more conceptual clarity about an individual’s self-regulation and 
independence whereas compliance focuses on obedience to rules and procedures (Leventhal, 
1993). Learning lessons from health approaches and applying them to security may, therefore, 
provide better alternatives to conceptualising and understanding behaviour. Currently, the usage 
of compliance in information security may not be suitable as there are a number of issues with 
organisational research that conceptualises security behaviour as “IS policy compliance”.  
Firstly, IS policy compliance implies that information security is an individual behaviour.  
However, the picture is not clear-cut as research by Posey (2010) found 67 protective 
behaviours in the workplace.  
Secondly, this approach assumes that employees have knowledge of the content of their 
organisation’s IS policy and awareness of their roles and responsibilities for information 
security. Whitten (1999) refer to this as an abstraction property in which security policies may 
be unintuitive and alien to users. Research has also noted difficulties for participants taking part 
in studies using an IS policy compliance approach. Sommestad, Karlzén, and Hallberg (2015) 
found that some participants had difficulties when answering at the abstraction level of overall 
policy compliance rather than questioned about a particular security behaviour. This abstraction 
problem also means that participants may adopt different frames of reference when answering 
questions depending on what is most salient to them in relation to information security. For 
example, one participant may think about passwords while another may think about using anti-
virus software. Therefore, in the absence of a direct behaviour within questions, employees’ 
frame of reference may vary making comparisons difficult.  
Thirdly, organisations differ in their approaches to their IS policy. There is a lack of consensus 
about the content of these policies so there will be diversity in the behaviours that are depicted 
within them. Furthermore, companies vary in the way they deploy and manage their policies 
which is complicated by newer forms of security documents that complement the IS policy (e.g. 
home working policies, BYOD). Approaches to information security management will also vary 
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across organisations. Different levels of security maturity and legislative obligations (e.g. Data 
Protection Act (1998)) mean that there are differences in the policies across organisations.  
These findings may account for the inconsistent findings using the IS policy compliance 
approach. A meta-analysis by Sommestad, Hallberg, Lundholm, and Bengtsson (2014) 
exploring variables that influence compliance with IS policies found that they explained little 
variance and when used in multiple studies, there was considerable variation.  
Finally, IS policies are rarely updated and they lag behind the evolving cyber threat landscape 
(Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff, 2009) so the behaviours outlined within the policies may not the most 
desirable for combating newer security threats.   
The implications of this paradigm are wide-ranging - from measurement difficulties to concerns 
for the theoretical underpinnings of these studies. A number of studies exploring what motivates 
and causes individuals to comply with their policies have identified behavioural determinants 
important for information security compliance. However, these determinants may not predict all 
the behaviours that comprise compliance. For example, factors such as social pressures may 
have more of an influence on password behaviour than preventative anti-virus behaviour. It is, 
therefore, important to understand how factors might differ in their influence on specific 
behaviours. Some research (e.g. Fishbein & Cappella, 2006) has also emphasised the 
importance of assessing the degree to which behavioural determinants influence specific 
behaviours and how they may vary depending on the behaviour and the population under 
investigation. However, previous studies have not explored these differences in employee 
information security behaviour. It is, therefore, important to explore the individual behaviours 
required for full compliance rather than generic compliance.  
2.2 | FACTORS INFLUENCING SECURITY BEHAVIOURS  
Existing research investigating what influences individuals’ engagement in security behaviours 
has used theories from psychology and other disciplines to identify drivers of security.  Studies 
may utilise components from behavioural theories or may study the whole theory in isolation in 
an attempt to explain as much variance as possible in the outcome variable (e.g. intention to 
perform behaviours, engagement in actual behaviours or attitude towards behaviours). Using 
models from behaviour change literature is useful to understand the processes that underpin 
security behaviours. By identifying the causes of secure and insecure behaviour, interventions 
can be designed to promote secure behaviour based on the strength of the relationships between 
the theoretical constructs, models and the security behaviour of interest. Furthermore, 
consideration of what determines secure or insecure practice allows a better understanding of 
what prompts and regulates the behaviour within the workplace setting.  
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Models from health psychology are particularly relevant as health behaviours are similarly 
sensitive to that of security behaviour. Within health, individuals have to undertake many 
preventative behaviours (Kasl & Cobb, 1966) such as sanitising hands in hospitals to prevent 
contamination. Similarly, in information security, individuals have to take preventative action 
(such as running their anti-virus scanner) to prevent their organisation experiencing a security 
breach.  
Many models within psychology aim to understand the causes of individuals’ behaviours and 
ultimately find ways to stimulate positive behaviour change. This review discusses those which 
have previously received the most attention within the information security domain. These 
theories will be discussed along with research that has demonstrated their efficacy for behaviour 
change.   
2.2.1 | THEORIES OF BEHAVIOUR CHANGE USED IN SECURITY RESEARCH 
This section outlines theoretical models that are consistently used within behavioural IS 
research. Weinstein, Rothman, and Sutton (1998) note that there is a distinction between 
continuum theories and stage theories of behaviour. Continuum theories posit factors along a 
continuum that contribute to the prediction of an action and according to continuum theories, 
the factors and the actions are considered to be the same for everyone. Stage theories, on the 
other hand, are a specific set of stages which an individual must progress through. The current 
section will focus on continuum theories of behaviour as they explain factors that influence and 
motivate behaviours.  Lebek, Uffen, Breitner, Neumann, and Hohler (2013) conducted a 
literature review on employees’ information security behaviour across 113 publications and 
found that four commonly used theories were the Theory of Planned Behaviour, General 
Deterrence Theory, Protection Motivation Theory and the Technology Acceptance Model. This 
literature review corroborates their findings but also adds the Health Belief Model as a 
commonly adopted paradigm and discusses these theories in depth and identifies overlapping 
concepts between theories. 
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2.2.1.1 | The Theory of Planned Behaviour 
 
Figure 3. Theory of Planned Behaviour 
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA; Fishbein, & Ajzen, 1975) and the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (see Figure 3; TPB; Ajzen, 1991) are examples of continuum theories and are widely 
used to explain the relationship between attitudes and behaviour. These models contain 
attributes of value-expectancy theory that aim to explain and predict attitudes towards objects 
and actions, and in these cases security actions. Value-expectancy posits that attitudes are a 
function of beliefs and values (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Expectancy refers to beliefs about how 
well a person can perform a task or activity, and value refers to the incentives or reasons for 
performing that task or activity. An individual’s attitude towards behaviour is the result of the 
perceived likelihood of outcomes associated with the behaviour and the expected value or 
evaluation of those outcomes. The overall desirability of the behaviour is based on the sum of 
the expectancy and value of outcomes. The TPB (Ajzen, 1991) suggests that intention drives 
behaviour and that intention is in turn driven by attitude, subjective norms and an individual’s 
belief in their competence to perform that behaviour (perceived behavioural control; PBC).  
The TRA and TPB have identical attitudinal and social norm-related components and posit 
behavioural intention as preceding behaviour. The TPB (Ajzen, 1991) extends the TRA by 
adding PBC as a variable that affects intention towards behaviour and is the individual’s 
perception of how easy it is to perform the behaviour, PBC can also act as a predictor of actual 
behaviour. Ajzen added PBC as the TRA did not account for behaviours that were not under 
volitional control. The addition of PBC allows an understanding of how people deal with 
situations where they may lack volitional control over behaviour by accommodating non-
volitional elements in behaviours (Ajzen, 2002). However, research has debated the 
distinctiveness of PBC from self-efficacy (Manstead & Eekelen, 1998) with some research 
(Terry, 1993) arguing that self-efficacy is based on internal control factors whereas PBC is 
concerned with more external constraints. Other research has found self-efficacy to predict 
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intention (but not behaviour) and PBC to predict behaviour (but not intention) in the context of 
exercise (Terry & O’Leary, 1995).  
The TPB further distinguishes between three types of salient beliefs: behavioural, normative, 
and control. These beliefs play a significant role in determining the three influencers of 
intention; attitude, subjective norms and PBC respectively. Behavioural beliefs are the expected 
consequences of performing the behaviour. The second type of beliefs is normative beliefs and 
these are about the views of significant others. The third is control beliefs and these are about 
the presence of factors that may impede or enable performing the behaviour.  
Research has shown the predictive power of TPB constructs on intention and behaviour with 
ranges from 39% for intention and 27% for behaviour (Armitage & Conner, 2001) and 50% for 
intention and 29% for behaviour (Hagger, Chatzisarantis, & Biddle, 2002). The addition of PBC 
has been found to add 6% to the prediction of intention independently of variables shared with 
TRA in a meta-analysis by Armitage and Conner (2001). Recently, a review of over 200 studies 
exploring health behaviours found that intention and PBC explained 19% of the variance in 
behaviour and subjective norms while attitude and PBC explained 44% of the variance in 
intention (McEachan, Conner, Taylor, & Lawton, 2011).  
Taylor et al. (2006) in a review of TRA, TPB and other health models to study and predict 
health-related behaviour change found no evidence that interventions based on TRA and TPB 
theories has contributed to either improved or reduced negative health outcomes in the UK, over 
and above that achieved by other theories or non-theory-based interventions. Recent discussion 
on the continued usage of TPB has discussed the utility of the model as it is not a casual model 
so provides little in the way of informing behaviour change and that its continued usage and 
interest is due to its correlational components (Sniehotta, Presseau, & Araújo-Soares, 2014). 
However, Conner (2014) argued that the model may be useful for examining the impact of 
interventions on components of the TPB, for longitudinal studies exploring the determinants of 
intentions, and for targeting these determinants within interventions.  
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2.2.1.2 | Protection Motivation Theory 
 
Figure 4. Protection Motivation Theory  
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) was developed by Rogers (1975) to explore the effects of 
persuasive messages and risk perceptions. The model was initially developed to explain fear 
appeals but has been further revised by Rogers (1983, 1984) to propose that we protect 
ourselves using threat and coping appraisals.  
It is a core theory in understanding individuals’ threat and coping appraisal processes and its 
links to motivating people to undertake adaptive (protection motivation) or maladaptive action. 
Maladaptive actions are those that place an individual at risk; this includes behaviours that lead 
to negative consequences (such as not encrypting a USB stick) or the absence of protective 
behaviours, which may eventually result in negative consequences. High intrinsic or extrinsic 
rewards of engaging in the maladaptive behaviours heighten the likelihood of undertaking 
maladaptive coping.  Adaptive actions, in contrast, are protective behaviours that mitigate the 
threat stemming from threat and coping appraisal. According to PMT, information elicits either 
adaptive or maladaptive responses by influencing the threat and coping appraisal components. 
The sources of such information are either environmental (e.g. observational learning, verbal 
persuasion) or intrapersonal (e.g. prior experience).  
Threat appraisals consider the factors that increase or decrease the chances of making an 
adaptive response by assessing the severity of the situation and perceived susceptibility to the 
threat. Coping appraisal considers the response efficacy (beliefs that adopting a particular 
behavioural response will be effective in reducing threats) and self-efficacy (belief in one's 
ability to execute the recommended courses of action successfully) of making an adaptive 
response. An individual’s protection motivation stems from both the threat appraisal and the 
coping appraisal. Protection motivation is a mediating variable functioning to arouse, sustain 
and direct protective actions (Boer & Seydel, 1996).  
  
20 
 
Threat and coping appraisal are also part of the health belief model (Rosenstock, Strecher, & 
Becker, 1988) and the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992), both of which explain 
how people appraise and respond to threats.  
Milne, Sheeran, and Orbell (2000) in a meta-analysis of PMT found the average correlation 
between protection motivation (intention) and future behaviour was .40, a moderately strong 
relationship. Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, and Rogers (2000) in a meta-analysis of 65 studies using 
PMT found that the overall effect size was moderate (d=.52) for the prediction of over 20 health 
behaviours. Coping appraisal has been found to have the strongest associations with protection 
motivation (Bui, Mullan, & McCaffery, 2013; Floyd et al., 2000; Milne et al., 2000; Plotnikoff 
et al., 2010). Components of PMT have also been found to be useful in designing health 
interventions (Hodgkins, Sheeran, & Orbell, 1998) and persuasive fear appeals and high-
efficacy messages produce the greatest behaviour change (Witte & Allen, 2000).  
2.2.1.3 | Health Belief Model 
 
Figure 5. Health Belief Model 
The Health Belief Model (HBM; see Figure 5) is another continuum theory based on risk 
perception that attempts to explain and predict health behaviours. The most recent version of the 
model identifies two considerations in an individual’s intention to adopt behaviour in response 
to a threat: their perception of the threat (perceived susceptibility and perceived severity) and 
evaluation (perceived benefits and perceived barriers) of the required behaviour to resolve the 
threat. In addition, behaviour is modified by internal (e.g. symptoms) and external (e.g. the 
media) cues to action. The original model has been amended to include the additional factors of 
health motivation (Becker, 1974) and perceived control (Becker & Rosenstock, 1987). 
A meta-analysis of 18 studies by Carpenter (2010) found that perceived barriers and perceived 
benefits to be the strongest predictors of behaviour but perceived severity was weak. However, 
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they cautioned against the continued use of the model to explore direct effects and suggested 
that future research should examine possible mediation and moderation between its core 
components. 
Taylor et al. (2006) in a review of research adopting HBM found no evidence that HBM-based 
interventions have contributed positively to improved health outcomes in the UK. The HBM has 
also been found to be a less powerful predictor of intention and behaviour compared to TRA 
and was least powerful in predicting outcomes when compared to TRA and social cognitive 
theory in a meta-analytic review (Zimmerman & Vernberg, 1994). A recent meta-analysis by 
Jones, Smith, and Llewellyn (2014) of 18 studies investigated interventions based on HBM to 
improve health adherence and 83% of these made improvements and 39% of studies showed 
moderate to large effect sizes. While the meta-analysis indicated that HBM was effective in 
driving behaviour change, the authors were cautious about the utility of the model as only 6 of 
the studies explored the model in its entirety.  
Davinson and Sillence (2010, 2014) have shown HBM to be useful for analysing qualitative 
data around security and financial transactions and has provided some support for driving anti-
phishing security behaviour.  
2.2.1.4 | Deterrence Theory 
In the context of security, theoretical considerations of deterrence are important for 
discouraging computer abuse at work. Unlike erroneous or accidental behaviours that can lead 
to a security breach, misuses of information systems are knowingly performed and violate the 
organisational IS policy. These can be malicious (e.g. stealing confidential information) and 
non-malicious (e.g. circumventing a security process to save time and effort for productivity). 
Deterrence theory is a prominent theory within criminology which posits that people make 
decisions about committing a crime (or breaking organisational rules and procedures) based on 
the benefits and costs. It focuses on formal sanctions such as the legality of acts and argues that 
the higher an individual’s perceived certainty, severity and swiftness of the sanctions following 
the act, the more they are deterred from it (Gibbs, 1975).  
Formal sanctions in the workplace will be described in the IS policy of the organisation which 
may include disciplinary action. Sanctions can also be informal and include shame and social 
disapproval (Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996).  When sanctions are less certain and severe, employees 
may not fully comply with the IS policies because they do not expect to be punished by their 
organisation. 
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2.2.1.5 | Technology Acceptance Model 
 
Figure 6. Technology Acceptance Model  
An important consideration when disseminating a piece of security software across an 
organisation is the extent to which it will be accepted and used by employees. There has been a 
wealth of research and support of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) developed by 
Davis (1989). Based on the TRA, the model attempts to explain why a user will accept or reject 
technology. Initially developed to explain organisational users’ behaviour, the model has been 
adopted to explain regular users’ adoption intentions and behaviour. The model posits that the 
perceived usefulness of the system and perceived ease of use are two important beliefs that 
influence an individual’s attitude towards the system. Perceived usefulness (PU) is defined as 
“subjective probability that using a specific application system will increase his or her job 
performance within an organisational context” (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989)(p.985). 
Perceived ease of use (PEU) is defined as “the degree to which a person believes that using a 
particular system would be free from effort” (Davis et al., 1989) (p.985). Like TRA, TAM 
argues that usage is determined by intention which is in turn influenced by attitude and 
perceived usefulness. Studies adopting TAM either explore the effect of perceived usefulness 
and perceived ease of use directly on intention or look at the mediating role of attitude on 
intention with little variation in explanatory power between the two approaches (Dillon & 
Morris, 1996). 
Meta-analyses have indicated that TAM is a valid and robust model (King & He, 2006), 
however, other reviews have warned against using the model outside of its validated setting as 
PEU and PU have weak relationships with actual usage (Turner, Kitchenham, Brereton, 
Charters, & Budgen, 2010).  
2.2.2 | THEORY OVERVIEW 
Lebek, Uffen, Breitner, Neumann, and Hohler (2013) conducted a literature review on 
employees’ information security behaviour across 113 publications and found that four 
commonly used theories were the Theory of Planned Behaviour, General Deterrence Theory, 
Protection Motivation Theory and the Technology Acceptance Model. Table 2 shows the use of 
these theories in organisational and consumer research.  
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Table 2. The most commonly explored theories and their usage in organisational and consumer 
behavioural information security research 
  Organisational Studies Consumer Studies 
Th
eo
ry
 
Protection 
Motivation 
Theory 
Crossler, Long, Loraas, & 
Trinkle, 2014; Herath & Rao, 
2009b; Ifinedo, 2011; Pahnila, 
Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007; 
Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila, 
2014; Vance et al., 2012 
C. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; 
Chenoweth, Minch, & Gattiker, 
2009; Crossler et al., 2014; 
Crossler, 2010; Gurung et al., 
2009; D. Lee et al., 2008; 
Mwagwabi, McGill, & Dixon, 
2014; Woon, Tan, & Low, 2005; 
L. Zhang & McDowell, 2009 
Theory of 
planned 
behaviour / 
Theory of 
reasoned action 
Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & 
Benbasat, 2010; Ifinedo, 2011, 
2014; Pahnila et al., 2007; 
Siponen et al., 2014 
Burns & Roberts, 2013; Y. Lee & 
Kozar, 2008; J. Zhang, Reithel, & 
Li, 2009 
General 
deterrence 
theory 
Aurigemma & Mattson, 2014; 
Cheng, Li, Zhai, & Smyth, 
2014; Cheng, Li, Li, Holm, & 
Zhai, 2013; D’Arcy & Devaraj, 
2012; D’Arcy, Hovav, & 
Galletta, 2008; Herath & Rao, 
2009b; Pahnila et al., 2007; 
Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 
2010 
 
Technology 
acceptance 
model 
 Dinev, Goo, Hu, & Nam, 2009; 
Dinev & Hu, 2007; Herath et al., 
2014; Kumar, Mohan, & 
Holowczak, 2008; Y. Lee & 
Kozar, 2008; Shropshire, 
Warkentin, & Sharma, 2015 
 
These psychological theories share overlapping constructs but with different conceptualizations 
(Michie et al., 2005). So whilst studies may adopt different theories, the underlying constructs 
under investigation may be the same.  
Table 3 illustrates the similarities in the underlying concepts offered by these theories which is 
then used a basis to structure the rest of the literature review. Additional factors necessary for 
understanding behaviour in the workplace but not covered in the behavioural models are 
presented in the table and will be discussed in the literature review.  
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Table 3. The most commonly explored theories and overlapping constructs in behavioural information security research 
 Categorisation for literature review 
Section 
Threat 
evaluation  
Coping 
evaluation Internal influencers Environmental influencers 
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Protection Motivation Theory 
(2.2.1.2)  X X X X X X               X 
Health Belief Model (2.2.1.3) X X  X X X      X         X 
Theory of planned behaviour 
(2.2.1.1) / Theory of reasoned 
action (2.2.1.1) 
    
X 
(TPB)  X      X        X 
General deterrence theory 
(2.2.1.4)                X X     
Technology acceptance model 
(2.2.1.5)       X X       X    X  X 
Important factors not covered in 
behavioural models       
 
 X X X X  X X   X  X  
  
25 
 
2.2.3 | THREAT EVALUATION  
There are many threats to organisations’ information resources such as insider threats, hackers 
and malware. When an employee perceives a threat to the organisation’s information assets, 
they evaluate the threat based on the degree of severity of the threat and their perceived 
susceptibility to it.  
2.2.3.1 | Threat Evaluation: Perceived Severity 
Perceived severity is the assessment of the seriousness of a security threat and its associated 
consequences. Weinstein (2000) highlight the importance that it is independent of an 
individual’s perception of the likelihood of a threat. Ifinedo (2011) defines it in the context of IS 
compliance and focusses on the severity towards one’s organisation’s information. Other 
definitions go beyond focussing purely on consequences towards data and systems. For 
example, Ng et al. (2009) argue that the consequences can have implications for the employees’ 
job or organisation as the loss of availability, confidentiality and integrity of information can 
negatively affect the organisation and can also disrupt the employees’ work. If it resulted as a 
consequence of an employee’s behaviour, they might be held responsible for the cause of the 
security breach. Severity perceptions arising from security threats can, therefore, have 
consequences that directly affect the employee and their organisation. Not all research focuses 
on these differences in severity implications for employees and organisations.  
The research investigating perceived severity in an organisational context has demonstrated 
mixed findings.  Research has found a significant relationship between perceived severity and 
employees’ intentions to comply with their organisations’ information security policy. Herath 
and Rao (2009b) found an indirect role as severity significantly influenced security breach 
concern which in turn was found to influence employees’ security policy attitude. Others have 
found significant positive relationships between severity and compliance intention (Siponen et 
al., 2014; Vance et al., 2012). Ifinedo (2011) however did not find a direct relationship and they 
attribute this to potential differences in how severity is explored within different models. They 
argue that it may have an indirect relationship with security compliance which may account for 
its supportive indirect role with other factors in studies by Herath & Rao (2009).    
Studies have supported the direct role of severity in consumers’ anti-spyware adoption 
(Chenoweth et al., 2009; Gurung et al., 2009; Liang & Xue, 2009) and securing home wireless 
networks (Woon et al., 2005). Research exploring other security behaviours in consumers has 
been more mixed as research by Lee, Larose, and Rifon (2008) found that severity did not affect 
anti-virus protection behaviours. Crossler (2010) found opposing effects as perceived severity 
influenced consumers’ backing up data behaviours but this relationship was negative which they 
argue may be due to the behaviour and threat under investigation.  Zhang and McDowell (2009) 
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found that severity did not relate to students’ intentions to adopt password protection strategies 
(i.e. updating passwords frequently, using strong passwords and unique passwords for different 
accounts). The findings of these studies suggest that severity perceptions and their influence 
may differ by type of security behaviour which may explain the lack of support in some studies.  
Other research has indicated an indirect relationship between severity and security behaviour, in 
line with the findings by Herath and Rao (2009b). Ng et al., (2009) explored severity in the 
context of being cautious with emails that have attachments with employees. They found that 
severity did not have a significant effect on security behaviour but had moderating effects on 
other variables which influence security behaviour. They found that it increased the effect of 
cues to action and general security orientation (their predisposition towards security) but 
reduced the effect of perceived benefits and self-efficacy. This suggested that when severity 
perceptions are high, perceived benefits and self-efficacy are not as important in driving one’s 
decision to undertake security behaviours.  
A limitation of the existing research in the workplace is that it generally does not focus on 
severity of specific security threats but rather uses items that refer to the broad term “security 
threats”. Only a few studies of consumers focus on the specific security threats in their items 
such as viruses (Lee et al., 2008; Ng et al., 2009), wireless hacking (Woon et al., 2005) and 
spyware (Gurung et al., 2009; Liang & Xue, 2010).   
In summary, severity appears to play a role in consumers’ security behaviours and employees’ 
compliance with information security policies. Some research suggests that it may play a direct 
role in security (Chenoweth et al., 2009; Gurung et al., 2009; Siponen et al., 2014; Vance et al., 
2012) or play a more indirect role and moderate the effect of other factors on security (Herath & 
Rao, 2009b; Ng et al., 2009) such as combining with susceptibility to influence perceived threat 
and subsequently security behaviour (Liang & Xue, 2010; Mwagwabi et al., 2014). Despite the 
support of a role for severity in driving security behaviour, there appear to be inconsistencies in 
whether it plays a direct role or indirect role. Future research needs to explore specific threats in 
the context of work and further understand the direct or indirect role of severity on behaviour.  
2.2.3.2 | Threat Evaluation: Perceived Susceptibility  
Perceived susceptibility is the second component of an individual’s threat evaluation as outlined 
in PMT and HBM. Aiken, Gerend, Jackson, and Ranby (2012) note that the terms perceived 
risk, susceptibility and vulnerability are often used interchangeably in literature but refer to the 
subjective likelihood of being a victim of a threat, independent from their perceptions of the 
severity of the threat. This thesis will use the term perceived susceptibility, as vulnerability has 
different connotations within computer security.  Perceived susceptibility is an individual’s 
assessment of the probability of threatening events (e.g. threats towards security). Employees 
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may have differing perceptions of the likelihood of different threats, for example, they may feel 
they are more likely to be a victim of a malware attack than having their account compromised.  
There has been less research exploring the role of susceptibility on security behaviour. Research 
has supported the positive relationship between perceived susceptibility and compliance 
intention (Ifinedo, 2011; Siponen et al., 2014). Other research exploring an indirect relationship 
between susceptibility and security breach concern level has not found a significant relationship 
(Herath & Rao, 2009b). Recently, Crossler et al., (2014) found that susceptibility did not 
influence intention or actual compliance to BYOD policies.  
Research on consumers’ behaviour has also found a relationship with the use of virus protection 
behaviours (sum of using anti-virus software, installing OS updates, setting up email filters and 
installing a firewall) (Lee et al., 2008). However, other research found it did not play a role in 
password protection behaviours (Zhang & McDowell, 2009). There have also been mixed 
findings for its role in anti-spyware software usage. Some research has not found a relationship 
for use of anti-spyware software (Chenoweth et al., 2009; Gurung et al., 2009) whereas other 
research supported an indirect role of susceptibility when combined with severity as it 
influenced individuals’ perceived threat for using anti-spyware software (Liang & Xue, 2010) 
and complying with password guidelines (Mwagwabi et al., 2014).   
Other research suggests conflicting findings. Ng et al., (2009) also found that susceptibility 
influenced security behaviour in the context of being cautious with email attachments. Other 
research by Woon et al. (2005) found that perceived susceptibility was not significantly related 
to enabling security measures on home wireless networks. Other research, however, has found 
that susceptibility negatively affected consumers backing up data behaviours (Crossler, 2010).  
Like severity, the body of research exploring security in the context of work do not focus on 
specific security threats within their items and use the broad term “security threats” (Herath & 
Rao, 2009b; Ifinedo, 2011; Siponen et al., 2014). Unlike severity, the research supporting a 
direct role or indirect role of susceptibility has been less consistent.  
2.2.4 | COPING EVALUATION 
Coping evaluation is how an individual responds to threatening situations considering their 
ability to enact recommended courses of action successfully (self-efficacy), expectations of the 
efficacy of the action in reducing the threat (response efficacy) and costs associated with taking 
the course of action (response costs).  
2.2.4.1 | Coping Evaluation: Self-efficacy 
Research has explored end-users’ beliefs in their capabilities to undertake security actions.  Self-
efficacy is one such capability and can be defined as an individual’s beliefs about their 
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competence to cope with a task and exercise influence over the events that affect their lives 
(Bandura, 1977). In a security context, employees who have high security-related capabilities 
and competence are presumed to be more likely to follow security practices as they are more 
effective in learning how to follow them and being able to perform the appropriate behaviour.  
The importance of self-efficacy for behaviour can be demonstrated by its occurrence in many 
behaviour change theories including PMT, HBM and emphasised heavily in SCT. The 
TPB/TRA also explores a construct similar to self-efficacy which is Perceived Behavioural 
Control. 
Bandura (1997) posits that there are four sources of an individual’s self-efficacy which can 
account for differences in individuals’ levels of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997). The first is past 
accomplishments or past experience (enactive mastery);  Bandura argues that employees who 
have succeeded in job tasks are likely to have more confidence in completing similar job tasks 
than those who have been unsuccessful in the past. Success raises an individual’s mastery 
expectations of task performance, while failure lowers these expectations. Therefore, within 
security, prior experience of conducting security tasks at home or in the workplace should lead 
to higher levels of confidence in employees’ ability to undertake security tasks. Bandura argues 
that our beliefs about self-efficacy are specific to particular situations so while employees may 
have high self-efficacy for one security behaviour, it may not necessarily transfer to other 
security behaviours.       
Another source of self-efficacy is vicarious experience that suggests that individuals can build 
their levels of self-efficacy by observing others perform the behaviour. In the workplace, if 
managers and colleagues are behaving securely, employees can learn through observation, 
which will increase their security self-efficacy. Research suggests that this source of 
information is weaker than mastery experience in helping to build self-efficacy beliefs 
(Bandura, 1997). A third source of self-efficacy is verbal persuasion which is convincing 
people that they have the ability and can cope with specific tasks. Coaching is a form of verbal 
persuasion used in organisations to increase self-efficacy and is often used in training 
employees. Positive persuasion is likely to work in encouraging and empowering employees to 
behave more securely, whereas negative persuasion can weaken self-efficacy. 
The final source of self-efficacy is emotional cues or physiological states in which the 
individuals’ self-efficacy is influenced by their physiological (such as high heart rate) and 
emotional states (such as anxiety) in relation to the tasks. Negative states are heightened through 
people’s expectations to fail and can lead to lower levels of self-efficacy. People are likely to 
expect success when they are experiencing positive arousal rather than negative.  
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Given the importance of self-efficacy for job performance and motivation, and computer use it 
is unsurprising that its role has been consistently supported in IS compliance research. 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Crossler et al., 2014; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Ifinedo, 2011, 2014; 
Sommestad et al., 2015; Vance et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2009).  
Support has also been found for a relationship between self-efficacy/PBC and virus protection 
behaviours (Lee et al., 2008), using a personal firewall (Ng & Rahim, 2005), being cautious 
with email attachments (Ng et al., 2009),  anti-spyware adoption (Gurung et al., 2009; Lee & 
Kozar, 2008; Liang & Xue, 2010; Sriramachandramurthy, Balasubramanian, & Hodis, 2009), 
enabling security measures on home wireless networks (Woon et al., 2005) and complying with 
password guidelines (Mwagwabi et al., 2014).  
Rhee, Kim, and Ryu (2009) focussed solely on the role security self-efficacy plays on various 
security outcomes and to identify potential determinants of high or low self-efficacy. For 
experiences of security incidents, they found a negative relationship with self-efficacy 
suggesting that experience of a security threat may lower individuals’ levels of self-efficacy for 
security. They found that self-efficacy was a significant determinant of students’ use of security 
protection software, engagement in security conscious care behaviour and intention to 
strengthen their security efforts (e.g. learn more about security, add additional security 
measures).  
Overall, the existing research suggests that self-efficacy is an important determinant of security 
behaviour by consumers and within the workplace.  
2.2.4.2 | Coping Evaluation: Response Efficacy 
Response efficacy is belief in the benefits of the behaviour  (Rogers, 1983), and includes 
individuals’ outcome expectancies with regards to security actions. It is a key component of an 
individual’s coping appraisal within PMT. In the case of security, this is the belief that 
performing security behaviours is an effective way to reduce security breaches. On the other 
hand, if an individual has less belief in the effectiveness of the action, they are less likely to 
adopt it.  Evaluation of outcome expectancies is a component of many different behaviour 
change theories but they offer different conceptualisations. The HBM refers to “perceived 
benefits” which is an individual’s assessment of the efficacy of engaging in the behaviour in 
reducing threats (Janz & Becker, 1984). SCT refers to outcome expectancies which are the 
individual’s belief that the behaviour will lead to a desirable outcome. People place different 
expectations or values on behavioural outcomes that can be either positive or negative (Bandura, 
1986). Enacting behaviour is more likely to happen when individuals expect the behaviour to 
maximise positive outcomes and minimise negative outcomes.  
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Response efficacy has received less attention in information security research to date compared 
to other potentially influential factors. However, research has supported a positive relationship 
between attitude toward security policies (Herath & Rao, 2009b) and intention to adopt anti-
spyware software (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010). Crossler (2010) found 
that response efficacy was significantly related to consumers backing up data behaviour and  
studies have shown it to relate to anti-spyware usage (Gurung et al., 2009; Liang & Xue, 2010), 
compliance with password guidelines (Mwagwabi et al., 2014), adopting password protective 
behaviours in students (Zhang & McDowell, 2009) and enabling security measures on home 
wireless networks (Woon et al., 2005).  
The influence of response efficacy on IS policy compliance intention has been somewhat mixed. 
Some studies have supported a positive relationship between response efficacy and intention to 
comply with security policies (Ifinedo, 2011; Wall, Palvia, & Lowry, 2013), and to predict 
intentions in addition to actual compliance with BYOD policies (Crossler et al., 2014). Other 
research on IS compliance intention has been unsupportive (Siponen et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 
2009) and two studies have indicated a negative relationship with compliance intention (Vance 
et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2009).  
Ng et al., (2009) found that perceived benefits significantly influenced individuals’ email 
security behaviour. They also found that perceived benefits were moderated by perceived 
severity as it reduced the effect of perceived benefits and self-efficacy. When severity is high, 
benefits and self-efficacy are not as important in driving security behaviour.  
Despite the lack of research exploring response efficacy in the workplace, research has been 
supportive of its relationship with security behaviours. However, recent literature reviews by 
Sommestad et al. (2014) on security compliance found that response efficacy was one of the 
worse predictors of compliance and IS misuse based on the effect sizes. However, they attribute 
this to variation in the findings of the four response efficacy studies in their review (Sommestad 
et al., 2014).  
There appears to be some support for response efficacy on security behaviours in consumers. 
However, its relationship to employees’ security behaviour is still unclear. This may be due to 
the abstraction problem of using overall policy compliance as a single behaviour, as users may 
feel it easier to provide an estimation of security effectiveness for specific security behaviours 
than an overall behaviour. Other research has also discussed participant difficulty in answering 
questions at this level (Sommestad et al., 2015).  Overall, further research is needed to 
understand the role of response efficacy on driving specific security behaviours in the 
workplace.  
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2.2.4.3 | Coping Evaluation: Response Costs 
Response costs refer to beliefs about how costly performing the recommended security 
behaviour will be. These costs may include monetary expense, time, and effort expended in 
behaving securely or other negative consequences, which result from performing the security 
behaviour. If an individual perceives that considerable resources will be required to carry out 
the action, they will be unlikely to follow through with the behaviour. Conversely, if few 
resources are required, the behaviour may be adopted. In other words, when an employee 
considers executing a behaviour, they conduct a cost-benefit analysis.   
The HBM refers to response costs as “perceived barriers” which it views as the potential 
obstacles or negative aspects of engaging in behaviour (Janz & Becker, 1984).  
Research findings are inconclusive on the role of response costs. Herath & Rao (2009b) found 
support for a negative relationship between response costs and compliance intention whereas 
Ifinedo (2011) and Crossler et al. (2014) did not find support for response costs. Mixed findings 
have also been reported between response costs and anti-spyware adoption (Chenoweth et al., 
2009; Gurung et al., 2009; Liang & Xue, 2010). Ng et al., (2009) found no support for response 
costs in employees’ email security behaviour. Additionally, Crossler (2010) found that response 
costs did not relate to the backing up behaviour of consumers. However, an older study by 
Woon et al. (2005) found response costs to be significantly related to determining if 
participants’ enabled security measures on their home wireless network.  
Response costs role in password behaviours is also inconclusive. Zhang and McDowell (2009) 
found that response costs had a significant negative relationship with intentions to engage in 
password protective behaviours but Mwagwabi et al. (2014) did not. 
Despite the lack of support for response costs in quantitative research, the notion of the costly 
aspects of engaging in security behaviours within the workplace is well-documented in 
qualitative research. For example, the compliance budget proposed by Beautement, Sasse, and 
Wonham (2009) supports the role of response costs as they found that individuals and 
organisations place different values on the cost and benefits of behaviours with IS policies. 
They argue that an employee’s choice to comply or not comply is determined by the perceived 
costs and benefits of compliance. Employees consider the potential cost towards the 
organisation and themselves.  
Out of all the constructs within an individual’s coping appraisal, response costs is the one which 
has the most disparity of findings despite the wealth of qualitative research suggesting the costly 
nature of security has a negative influence on security behaviour (Albrechtsen, 2007; 
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Beautement et al., 2009; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010).  Further research is required to understand 
the role of response costs in preventing the uptake of security behaviour in the workplace.  
2.2.5 | INTERNAL INFLUENCES 
2.2.5.1 | Internal Influences: Attitude 
Attitude is defined as the individual’s positive or negative feelings toward engaging in a 
specified behaviour. In the context of security, this is towards behaving securely or compliance 
to the IS policy.  
The TPB posits that attitude is determined by individual’s beliefs about the consequences 
arising from the behaviour and an assessment of the desirability of the outcome. Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) expectancy-value model explains how attitudes are formed. Attitudes develop 
from beliefs about a behaviour (e.g. changing passwords) which are attributes (e.g. cognitive 
load) associated with the behaviour.  Individuals form an attitude by linking these beliefs to a 
certain outcome such as the cost incurred by doing the behaviour (e.g. mental effort). This 
attitude towards the behaviour is automatically acquired based on the positive or negative 
evaluation of the belief. Behaviours, which are associated with more desirable consequences are 
favoured more than those which are linked to undesirable consequences, and consequently, have 
a more favourable attitude. In understanding an individual’s or populations attitude towards a 
behaviour, research explores the salient beliefs of the target group before attempting to change 
attitudes (Ajzen, 1991).  
Individuals that have a positive attitude toward behaving securely are more likely to intend to 
behave securely. The influence of attitude on security compliance intention has been 
consistently supported in research (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Ifinedo, 2011; 
Pahnila et al., 2007; Sommestad et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2009). Support has been found for a 
relationship between attitude and; anti-spyware adoption (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Lee & Kozar, 
2008) and online privacy protective strategies (Yao & Linz, 2008; Burns & Roberts, 2013), 
updating anti-virus software (Ng & Rahim, 2005) and firewall adoption (Kumar et al., 2008; Ng 
& Rahim, 2005). Anderson and Agarwal (2010) found attitude to significantly relate to 
intentions to perform security-related behaviour to protect the internet (as a form of citizenship) 
and to perform security behaviours to protect their own computer. They also found that an 
individual’s attitude was influenced by their concern regarding security threats, their perceived 
citizen effectiveness (a form of response efficacy towards helping to secure the Internet) and 
their self-efficacy.  
Based on the wealth of research supporting the role of attitude, it appears to be an important 
determinant of security behaviour.  
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2.2.5.2 | Internal Influences: Knowledge, Awareness, and Experience 
2.2.5.2.1 | Knowledge and Awareness 
Employees cannot be vigilant against security threats or behave securely if they lack awareness 
of the risks or they lack knowledge and necessary skills to undertake effective security actions. 
Knowledge is a basic necessity for undertaking security behaviours and despite the wealth of 
practice that focuses on improving users’ knowledge of security risks and behaviours, 
individuals remain unmotivated despite having the required knowledge and skills to protect 
themselves and their organisation (Kang, Dabbish, Fruchter, & Kiesler, 2015). Empowering 
users with required security knowledge is necessary for behaviour change but may not lead to 
an actual and sustained change in the long-term.  
Aytes and Connolly (2004) assessed how much students knew about Cyber security and 
explored their awareness of risky security behaviours. They were interested in risky behaviour 
in three areas; password usage (such as sharing passwords), data backup and email-usage (such 
as not scanning email attachments for viruses). Despite the user group considering themselves 
to be highly knowledgeable and competent, they engaged in multiple risky behaviours 
indicating that knowledge is a poor predictor of students’ actual levels of risky behaviour.  
Furman, Theofanos, Choong, and Stanton (2012) explored knowledge, awareness and skills of 
end-users. By conducting in-depth interviews with 40 participants, they were able to identify 
myths and misconceptions around security. The majority of participants rated themselves as 
moderately knowledgeable to expert about computer security.   Participants were familiar with 
security icons, trust marks and security terms but when further questioned were often unable to 
elaborate or provide clearer definitions.   Overall, they found that while users were concerned 
about computer security and rated themselves to be knowledgeable they lacked the necessary 
skills to protect themselves.   
Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, and Jerram (2014) conducted a survey to explore 
the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours in relation to eight policy areas (importance, principles 
and rules of security, password management, email and internet usage, reporting security 
incidents, consequences of behaviour and training) across three government organisations.  
They found that employees had high and appropriate knowledge (measured by participants 
stating whether a statement was true or false) of information security rules and password 
security. However, their knowledge of wireless technology security was lacking.  
Dinev and Hu (2007) looked at differences in IT experts and non-IT experts on intentions to 
engage in anti-spyware behaviours. They found that the influence of subjective norms on 
intention was significant for the IT group but not for the non-IT group. They argue that because 
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the IT group may have greater awareness surrounding spyware, they are more likely to discuss it 
within their social groups that may, therefore, lead to a greater influence from subjective norms. 
The findings of this study suggest that professional background and experience of individuals 
may play a role in influencing perceptions of subjective norms, and consequently engage in 
security behaviour. 
Overall, the research suggests that knowledge may play a more indirect role in security 
behaviour. While it appears to be a necessary precursor, in isolation, it does not lead to secure 
behaviour.  
2.2.5.2.2 | Experience 
Experiences can be both negative and positive, and can potentially influence security behaviour 
in different ways. Negative experiences include breaches in security such as a virus infection or 
a personal account being hacked. These can result in many negative emotional states for the user 
such as frustration, annoyance and embarrassment. They can also have more severe 
consequences such as the potential for financial loss and identity theft. Experiencing such 
situations may heighten awareness of security threats and, therefore, led to adoption of security 
software or change in an individual’s security behaviour.  Experience is not just limited to 
threats but also the experience of protective security responses.   
Within behaviour change, experience is studied as an individual’s past behaviour. The well-
known statement that “past behaviour is the best predictor of future behaviour” has been shown 
to have strong empirical support.  Ouellette and Wood (1998) conducted a meta-analysis of 
existing research exploring past and future behaviour in different behavioural domains. They 
found that past behaviour was an important predictor of future behaviour and was comparable to 
that of other frequently studied behavioural influencers. Its impact on future behaviour was 
slightly weaker than intention’s impact but it had a similar influence to that of attitude and had 
better predictive strength than behavioural control and subjective norms. They argue that past 
behaviour influences future behaviour through two processes. The first is in relation to habitual 
behaviour since the process of enacting the behaviour becomes automatic, requiring less 
decision making and conscious deliberation and secondly, the frequency of the past behaviour 
influences the habit strength of the future behaviour. They also argue that past behaviour may 
have a minimal direct effect on future behaviour when conscious decision making is required 
but rather will interact with attitudes and subjective norms to influence intention and 
subsequently, future behaviour.  
Within PMT, experience is one source of intrapersonal information which influences 
individuals’ threat and coping appraisal and can be defined as ‘‘feedback from personal 
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experiences associated with the targeted maladaptive and adaptive responses” (Floyd et al., 
2000), p. 409).  
Few studies have explored security breach victimisation experiences and its influence on 
motivating individuals to undertake security actions. Lee et al. (2008) explored student’s virus 
experiences and their intentions to adopt virus protection measures. They asked participants to 
rate the frequency of having been infected with a virus from downloading a file and from 
opening an email attachment. They found that there was a significant relationship between prior 
virus experience and intentions to engage in anti-virus protective behaviours. Individuals who 
had a computer virus are therefore more motivated to protect themselves. However, other 
research has found direct influence of experience on motivation. Anderson and Agarwal (2010) 
and Harrington, Anderson, and Agarwal (2006) found that personal experience of security 
violations and knowledge of people they know being affected by viruses did not influence 
attitude or intention measures for users protecting their own computer. 
Undesirable experiences relating to proactive security behaviours are problematic as individuals 
may be less likely to engage in the security behaviour again to avoid experiencing a similar 
situation. Vaniea, Rader, and Wash (2014) found that negative experiences influenced users’ 
future software update behaviour. When users have a bad experience with a piece of software, 
they will base future update decisions for this software on this experience and refrain from 
installing the update.  
Experience of security threats and security behaviours, therefore, appears to influence current 
behaviour.  
2.2.5.3 | Internal Influences: Memory and Cognition  
All security behaviours will be influenced by the cognitive abilities of the user, however, none 
more so than those relating to passwords which research has shown to have high memory 
demands on people.  
In the workplace, password-composition policies govern the complexity required by users’ 
passwords. Inglesant and Sasse (2010) discuss the features of password policies that place 
pressure on users and those features that can help reduce cognitive burden. The demands placed 
on users include the password strength and character restrictions, frequency of password 
changes, and the number of passwords they are required to remember. 
Inglesant and Sasse (2010) in their study on password use found organisational differences in 
employees’ cognitive burden due to the restrictions set by their organisations. They found that 
difficulties arose when policies required unique, strong passwords, changed frequently and for 
them to differ significantly from previous passwords. Further restrictions which created a 
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burden on employees included being locked out of services for 2 hours during a password reset. 
Overly restrictive password policies, therefore, led to employees’ maladaptive behaviour such 
as writing down passwords.  
Given the average number of accounts individuals have passwords to manage for is around 8 
(Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011) and have on average 25 accounts protected (Florêncio & 
Herley, 2007), it is not surprising that motivation to rehearse and encode a password will be low 
due to the effortful process of transferring information from short term memory to long term 
memory (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).  
Passwords are more easily remembered if the account is frequently used, as repetition and 
maintenance of rehearsal of the password will lead it to be stored in long-term memory.   
Forgetting passwords can cause problems for users; they will have to dedicate time to resetting 
the passwords which in the workplace setting can lead to users locked out of their work system 
for a period of time (Inglesant & Sasse, 2010), thus affecting their productivity.  
Due to the many demands placed on users’ memory, coping mechanisms are adopted to help 
overcome the cognitive issues including choosing passwords which have some personal 
characteristics (such as birth dates) (Brown, Bracken, Zoccoli, & Douglas, 2004), short in 
length (Brown et al., 2004), writing down passwords (Inglesant & Sasse, 2010), and more 
commonly, password re-use (Florêncio, Herley, & Oorschot, 2014; Grawemeyer & Johnson, 
2011). All of these benefit the user’s ability to authenticate themselves but lead to further 
security vulnerabilities as one compromised account can result in other accounts being 
comprised if the login credentials are the same.  
To overcome the cognitive demands on users, alternatives to passwords have been developed 
with varying degrees of success such as graphical authentication systems - Passfaces (Valentine, 
1998), Déjà vu (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000), VIP (De Angeli et al., 2002) and Passpoints 
(Wiedenbeck, Waters, Birget, Brodskiy, & Memon, 2005) to name a few. Those systems relying 
on recognition over recall are considered to be more effective, as they have fewer cognitive 
demands and take advantage of a user’s ability to recall with or without a cue rather relying on 
pure recall (Nicholson, Coventry, & Briggs, 2013).  Graphical authentication systems have been 
found to be more memorable than passwords but these advantages may not be sustainable (e.g. 
Chiasson, Forget, Stobert, Van Oorschot, & Biddle, 2009). Furthermore, these systems may be 
subject to observation attacks (Tari, Ozok, & Holden, 2006; Wiedenbeck, Waters, Sobrado, & 
Birget, 2006).  
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2.2.5.4 | Internal Influences: Personality 
Recent research has started to explore personality and security behaviours. A wealth of research 
on personality has led to the development of many different theories and measurement of 
personality. One of the most commonly used is the five-factor model (McCrae & Costa, 1987) 
which represents a hierarchy of the personality traits; openness, extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and neuroticism. Despite the number of different conceptualisations and 
suggested factorial structures of personality, the big five structure has received consistent 
support (Barrick & Mount, 1991). 
McBride, Carter, and Warkentin (2012) explored the big five personality traits in relation to 
participants’ intentions to violate information security policy situations as depicted in scenarios 
such as disregarding the mandatory encryption procedure. Participants were asked to rate the 
degree to which they would act the same as the character. They found that open and neurotic 
individuals were less likely to intend to violate the policies than extroverted individuals.  
Halevi, Memon, and Nov (2015) recently explored conscientiousness in relation to spear 
phishing. They used a targeted phishing message that appealed to conscientiousness and found 
that the conscientiousness level was significantly higher for those that fell for the phishing 
attack compared to those that did not. The phishing message appealed to efficiency and order by 
asking participants to review their time sheet by clicking on a link provided in the email. 
Wording within the email was intended to motivate conscientiousness individuals to act on the 
email. This study suggests that a person’s personality may heighten their susceptibility to 
targeted phishing attacks.  
Shropshire, Warkentin, and Sharma (2015) explored the role of conscientiousness and 
agreeableness on the intention-behaviour gap on individuals’ adoption of security software. The 
software provides the user with recommendations for various activities to improve their safety 
level. They found that the personality types moderated the relationship between intention and 
actual use of the software. Conscientiousness had a medium sized moderating effect whereas 
agreeableness had a small/medium effect. The findings of the study suggest that personality 
may play a moderating role between intention and behaviour and may account for individual 
differences in why some motivated individuals go on to enact behaviours while others do not.  
Jeske, Coventry, and Briggs (2013) looked at the role of impulse control in the context of 
nudging users into making better security decisions. By manipulating the presentation of 
wireless networks (such as the order and/or the colour (red, amber, green) of the Wi-Fi name), 
they explored if they could nudge users to click on secure WI-FI. They found that individuals 
who self-reported as IT novices and had diminished impulse control made poorer security 
decisions. They found that they were able to nudge individuals with poor impulse control. The 
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effect for individuals with high impulse control was relatively small as they make better security 
decisions without needing to be nudged.  
2.2.5.5 | Internal Influences: Psychological Ownership 
Psychological ownership is defined as a state in which individuals experience a possessive 
connection with targets they feel are “theirs” (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003). These feelings 
of ownership can occur regardless of whether or not the individual legally owns the object, 
including objects used by employees that are the property of their organisation (Pierce et al., 
2003). These targets can be physical items such as work computers and non-physical targets 
such as ideas and creative works. Higher levels of psychological ownership towards a target can 
lead to increased feelings of responsibility towards it, leading to enhanced protective strategies 
(Dipboye, 1977; Korman, 1970). In the context of work, if employees perceive that they own 
the data they create and/or their work computer they may engage in more security behaviours to 
protect it. Previously the notion of psychological ownership and computer security has only 
been studied in home users (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010). They found that psychological 
ownership of one’s computer was significantly related to intention to perform security-related 
behaviour, indicating that individuals who feel that their devices belong to them are more 
protective of them. Research has also shown psychological ownership to be important for 
driving technology uptake behaviour in the workplace (Paré, Sicotte, & Jacques, 2006). 
Feelings of ownership towards devices and data in the workplace may increase the likelihood of 
protective strategies to maintain their integrity, availability and confidentiality. Further research 
is required to explore its potential role in employee security behaviour.  
2.2.6 | ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES 
2.2.6.1 | Environmental Influences: Social Influences 
Employees are influenced by their immediate work environment and the individuals within this 
environment. Employees’ perceived social influences are the extent to which an individual’s 
behaviour is influenced by what relevant others (e.g. colleagues, management, subordinates) 
expect him/her to do and the extent to which the employee believes others are performing the 
behaviour. If an individual believes that relevant others are following security actions or 
perceive that others expect them to follow the actions, they are more likely to undertake the 
security actions.  
The role of social influences on behaviour is emphasised in some behaviour change theories. 
The TPB argues that beliefs in whether peers and people of importance to the person think they 
should engage in the desired behaviour influences the degree to which the individual will 
perform the behaviour. Social learning theory posits that normative beliefs increase intention to 
perform behaviour. As discussed earlier, the role of others is important for building self-efficacy 
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through vicarious experience and verbal persuasion of others. We learn through observation of 
others which is demonstrated in Bandura’s well known BoBo Doll study (Bandura, Ross, & 
Ross, 1961). In security, if management and colleagues think security behaviours are necessary 
(normative beliefs) and perform them (descriptive norms); the employee is more likely to 
perform the desired behaviour. Employees may learn through vicarious experience by observing 
other employees or management engaging in security actions which also enhances their levels 
of self-efficacy and their perceptions of social pressure norms. The influence of social norms is 
also likely to be mediated by the extent to which the employee identifies with the company (e.g. 
Hogg & Terry, 2000). Social influence in the work environment is, therefore, an important 
determinant of encouraging security behaviours but may also provide an understanding of how 
norms may influence insecure practice.  
Research has used a number of different constructs to explore the role of social pressures on 
security behaviour. Some research focusses on the role of normative beliefs (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b; Pahnila et al., 2007; Siponen et al., 2010; Sommestad et al., 
2015) or subjective norms (Ifinedo, 2011, 2014), both of which focus on the individuals 
perception of what they think important people (e.g. management) expect of them. Whilst other 
research focuses on descriptive norms/peer behaviour which is the perception of the actual 
behaviour of others such as fellow employees (Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b). The research base 
consistently supports the role of these different components of social influences on IS 
compliance intention in the workplace with the exception of a few studies. For example, 
subjective norms were not found to relate to policy compliance (Zhang et al., 2009) and 
intentions to engage in anti-spyware behaviours (Dinev & Hu, 2007). Research exploring 
consumer behaviour has also supported the role of subjective norms in intention to adopt anti-
spyware software (Lee & Kozar, 2008) and updating anti-virus software, backing up data and 
using firewalls (Ng & Rahim, 2005).  
Social influences, therefore, appear to be an important determinant of security behaviour.   
2.2.6.2 | Environmental Influences: Organisational Culture  
There are many different perspectives and definitions of organisational culture, however, it can 
be regarded as the shared beliefs, norms, values and learned ways that have developed through 
the organisation’s history (Brown, 1998) and is often referred to as “the way we do things 
around here” (Schein, 1985). Organisational culture is an important determinant of the 
effectiveness of an organisation, influencing the practice and performance of the organisation 
and its employees.  
There are many different theories and models of organisational culture; however the work of 
Schein (1985) has received lots of attention and provides a good basis for understanding the 
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complexity of organisational culture. Schein (1985) suggested that there are three levels of 
culture. The first is artefacts which are the visual representations of culture and include dress 
codes, rituals (e.g. meeting practices) and award ceremonies. These are observable to outsiders 
but not necessarily easily understood. Below these surface level artefacts are the espoused 
values of the organisation which include the goals, strategies and philosophies of the 
organisation. They are the values the organisations wish to be known for and are expressed in 
the mission statements of the organisation and advocated by the leaders of the organisation. 
Finally, there are the hidden basic assumptions about the organisation which reflect the shared 
values and are not necessarily visible to employees as they are so widely shared they are largely 
unaware of them. They are referred to as unwritten rules and exist largely at the unconscious 
level but they provide the best understanding of why things happen within an organisation. 
Schein used the iceberg metaphor to explain culture with artefacts and espoused values above 
the waterline, representing the observable values, behaviours, practices and discourse, and 
below the waterline are the influential unconscious values and behaviours.   
Given the importance of an organisation’s culture for influencing employees’ behaviour, it is of 
particular significance to information security. An effective information security culture is one 
where security behaviours and security norms are embedded within the basic assumptions and 
values of the organisation. An organisation that values the integrity and confidentiality of 
information which is reflected in the philosophies of the organisation and advocated in the 
leadership and management will have a more effective security culture. Furthermore, if the 
basic assumptions within the organisation also reflect the values of information security, 
employees will be more likely to engage in security behaviours as they reflect the overall 
information security culture.  
A number of research papers discuss the importance of developing an information security 
culture in organisations (such as Furnell & Thomson, 2009; Lacey, 2010; Thomson, von Solms, 
& Louw, 2006). In their review of literature exploring information security culture from 2000 to 
2013, Karlsson, Astrom, and Karlsson (2015) found that the existing literature has largely 
focused on understanding what information security culture is, the roots/factors that contribute 
to information security culture and cultivating/changing security culture. They found no studies 
comparing security cultures and the potential differences on information security. They also 
found that a large body of the existing literature was descriptive or theoretical in nature and 
there were few papers on theory testing or studies looking at intervention. In particular, studies 
exploring the links between culture and information security relied heavily on survey 
methodology with a lack of other forms of research methods.  
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Despite the wealth of literature discussing information security culture, there are relatively few 
studies exploring the link between culture and end-users’ security behaviour. These studies 
highlight a link between freedom to express opinions and try new ideas and security behaviour 
(Connolly, Lang, & Tygar, 2015). Other research has supported the role of top management 
support (D’Arcy & Greene, 2014; Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, & Ford, 2006), security-related 
communication (D’Arcy & Greene, 2014) and computer monitoring in the workplace (D’Arcy 
& Greene, 2014) for security culture.  
Organisational climate is often explored in relation to organisational culture. Climate focusses 
on employee perceptions and evaluations of their work environment including policies, 
behaviour, practices and goal attainment in the workplace (James & James, 1989) and provides 
a context for understanding employees’ attitudes and behaviour (Schneider, Bowen, Ehrhart, & 
Holcombe, 2000). It is often explored at the individual-level of psychological climate (Parker et 
al., 2003) and when aggregated or clustered to group-level is considered to be part of the 
organisational climate. Meta-analytic reviews such as Parker et al. (2003) have shown 
psychological climate to be associated with some organisational variables including work 
attitudes, motivation and performance in meta-analytic reviews. Climate differs from culture as 
it focuses on employees’ perceptions of the work environment. Where culture is often referred 
to as ‘the way things are done around here’, climate is ‘how it feels to work here’ and considers 
the experiences of working in the organisation.  
Despite the lack of research exploring links between culture/climate and security behaviours in 
the workplace, the current literature indicates that support and commitment from top 
management (Chan, Woon, & Kankanhalli, 2005; D’Arcy & Greene, 2014; Goo, Yim, & Kim, 
2013; Knapp et al., 2006), supervisor practices (Goo et al., 2013), security communication 
(D’Arcy & Greene, 2014; Goo et al., 2013), co-worker socialisation (Chan et al., 2005) and 
security enforcement/monitoring (D’Arcy & Greene, 2014; Goo et al., 2013) may be important 
at the individual-level for information security culture/climate within the workplace. However, 
this research is relatively in its infancy (Karlsson et al., 2015) and further research is required to 
explore its role in information security in more depth.   
2.2.6.3 | Environmental Influences: Perceived Punishment and Detection 
Within the workplace, employees’ unacceptable behaviour can often be dealt via reprimands 
from management or other formal sanctioning procedures such as disciplinary action. 
Organisations’ IS policies often dictate the consequences of non-compliance and as such, 
research has been dedicated to exploring whether fear of sanctions promotes policy compliance.  
Research exploring whether the threat of sanctions deters misuse has mixed findings and has 
mainly been explored in the context of employees’ intention to misuse computers or circumvent 
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security procedures. Some studies have focussed primarily on formal sanctions in the 
workplace. Formal sanctions refer to those which are outlined within the IS policy which may 
include disciplinary action or other official procedures for dealing with policy violations.   
Some studies have supported formal sanction severity (Aurigemma & Mattson, 2014; Cheng et 
al., 2013; D’Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b) whereas other research did 
not support its role in IS misuse or compliance intention (Johnston & Warkentin, 2015; Siponen 
& Vance, 2010).  
Certainty of formal sanctions also has mixed findings. Herath and Rao (2009b) found it played a 
positive role in employees’ IS policy compliance intention and Li et al., (2010) found the same 
for Internet policy compliance intention, however studies exploring its role in IS misuse have 
largely been unsupportive (Aurigemma & Mattson, 2014; Cheng et al., 2013; D’Arcy et al., 
2008; Siponen & Vance, 2010). Recently, Cheng et al. (2014) did support its role in intentions 
to use the internet for personal usage.  
Potential differences could be due to measurement of the IS misuse behaviour, the majority of 
those studies not supporting a relationship between perceived certainty have used scenarios and 
asked participants if they would intend to act in the same way as the character depicted (Cheng 
et al., 2013; D’Arcy et al., 2008; Siponen & Vance, 2010) and often create composite variables 
from multiple scenarios depicting different issues that may mask potential effects. Those studies 
supporting the role of perceived certainty on IS policy compliance intention (Herath & Rao, 
2009a, 2009b) and intentions to use the internet for non-worked related purposes (Cheng et al., 
2014) have used broad items to measure this motivation.  Studies adopting scenarios depict 
specific IS misuse behaviours (e.g. modifying data without authorisation) whereas those using 
intention items focus on broad and less specific security/misuse behaviours. This may, 
therefore, account for the disparate findings as detection certainty may differ depending on the 
specific insecure behaviour. For example, people may have a higher detection certainty if they 
modified data on a system (as the modification may get recorded) than if they shared their 
password with a colleague. Subtle differences in detection certainty in relation to specific IS 
misuses have not been explored in literature to date but rather those studies using broad 
measures may suffer from abstraction difficulties. Further highlighting the need for specifcity in 
IS behavioural research.  
In their review of GDT, D’Arcy and Herath (2011) argue that compliance and IS misuse may 
not be two sides of the same coin and that there may be different antecedents for both types of 
behaviour as one is positive and desirable while the other is negative and undesirable. This may 
be particularly important for perceived certainty as literature using a compliance approach (e.g. 
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(e.g. Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b) has supported its role whereas those studies looking at IS 
misuse have not supported its role.   
Other research has explored the role of informal sanctions which refer to sanctions that are not 
covered explicitly in the IS policy such as disapproval of colleagues/peers but may occur as a 
result of an employee’s insecure behaviour.  Siponen and Vance (2010) found that certainty and 
severity perceptions of informal sanctions (e.g. loss of respect, jeopardised promotion 
prospects) did not significantly predict intentions to perform information security policy 
violations. D’Arcy and Devaraj (2012) also found informal (social desirability pressure and 
moral beliefs) sanctions to directly and indirectly influence individuals’ intentions to misuse 
technology.  However, Li et al. (2010) explored informal sanctions in the context of subjective 
norms and found that it did not significantly relate to compliance intention to internet use 
policy. 
Johnston and Warkentin (2015) argue that existing research does not distinguish between formal 
and informal sanctions. When exploring these separately, they found that informal sanction 
severity and certainty were found to be significant determinants of compliance intention with 
protective strategies whereas formal sanction severity and certainty were non-significant. The 
authors suggest that the potential to lose the regard of colleagues (informal sanction) is a more 
significant motivator to engage in security behaviours as informal sanctions are less discrete 
compared to formal sanctions.  
As little research has explored the role of informal sanctions, there is less support for its 
potential role in deterring IS misuse. For formal sanctions, there is a wealth of research 
exploring sanction severity and detection certainty, with literature suggesting that employee’ 
perceptions of sanction severity are more effective in deterring misuse than their perceptions of 
the likelihood of getting caught. This suggests that detection mechanisms such as computer 
monitoring only work if backed with severe sanctions.  
A major assumption of studies adopting the deterrence approach is that employees are aware of 
formal sanctioning procedures outlined within IS policies or that they are aware that their 
behaviour is illicit in the eyes of the policy compliance approach. There appears to be a lack of 
studies addressing whether employees are aware of the sanctions of insecure behaviour.  
2.2.6.4 | Environmental Influences: Rewards/Incentives 
The role of rewards and incentives for influencing behaviour stems from early work on 
behaviourism. Skinner’s work on operant conditioning showed that people’s behaviour could be 
shaped through positive reinforcement, where a desirable stimulus is presented as a 
consequence of an individual enacting a behaviour (Skinner, 1938). The importance of rewards 
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for behaviour and motivation is part of other well-known theories including social cognitive 
theory (Bandura, 1997), and self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985).   
Organisational reward systems are often in place within organisations; such as performance-
related pay and bonuses. Rewards can be tangible and include money or material goods such as 
prizes whereas intangible rewards include praise, recognition and achievements.  They are 
largely explored in relation to employees’ intrinsic motivation and job performance.  Meta-
analyses on incentives in the workplace have found them to have moderate effects on employee 
job performance (Condly, Clark, & Stolovitch, 2003). However, their influence on motivation is 
less clear (Pierce & Cameron, 2003) particularly those relating to performance-contingent 
rewards.  
Deci, Koestner, and Ryan's (1999) meta-analytic review found performance-contingent tangible 
rewards led to decreases in individuals’ intrinsic motivation but positive feedback or intangible 
rewards resulted in enhanced motivation. Other research has found that tangible rewards can be 
useful for intrinsic motivation when the rewards meet progressively demanding (but attainable) 
standards rather than a constant required task performance (Pierce & Cameron, 2003). A recent 
meta-analysis by Cerasoli, Nicklin, and Ford (2014) indicated that rewards are a better predictor 
of the quantity of performance whereas intrinsic motivation is a better predictor of quality of job 
performance. They conclude that they are not necessarily antagonistic and that motivation and 
incentives are best considered simultaneously. 
The role of incentives or rewards for security-related performance is understudied. Security is 
often seen as a secondary task in job performance (Beautement et al., 2009) so behaviours are 
unlikely to be covered within an employee’s performance-contingent rewards. The limited 
research has been unsupportive of their role.  Posey, Roberts, and Lowry (2011) found that 
tangible rewards such as financial incentives were a weak source of employees’ motivation to 
protect information security but intangible rewards such as management support were a strong 
source. Siponen et al. (2014) also found rewards of compliance did not significantly relate to 
compliance intention. Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbasat (2009) found that rewards 
(combination of tangible and intangible) were only important for compliance in employees with 
a longer organisational tenure. The literature suggests that intangible rewards may be important 
for driving security behaviour. However, the influence of tangible or intangible rewards on 
employees’ performance needs further investigation.  
Rewards have mainly been studied in relation to perceived maladaptive rewards, i.e. the benefits 
of engaging in risk-taking behaviour such as the rewards of writing down passwords are a 
reduction in cognitive demand and saving time. PMT posits that rewards decrease the likelihood 
of an adaptive response but increase maladaptive coping. Rewards are often understudied in  
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PMT research as there is a lack of conceptual difference between rewards for maladaptive 
behaviour and the response costs for the adaptive behaviour (Abraham & Sheeran, 1994). 
Research exploring the rewards of maladaptive behaviour has found that intangible rewards 
(e.g. saving work time) significantly negatively affected compliance intention (Vance et al., 
2012). Posey, Roberts, and Lowry (2011) looked at both tangible and intangible maladaptive 
rewards and found that intangible (e.g. personal gratification and satisfaction) rewards 
negatively affected motivation to protect information assets. They found that tangible 
maladaptive rewards had no relationship to motivation. The research suggests that intrinsic 
rewards from engaging in maladaptive risk-taking behaviour negatively influence engagement 
in security behaviour.  
2.2.6.5 | Environmental influences: Positive Organisational Behaviour 
2.2.6.5.1 | Organisational Commitment 
Organisational commitment is an employee’s identification with and/or loyalty towards an 
organisation (Morrow, 1993). It can be considered to be the degree to which they have a 
positive relationship with their organisation and is a stable indicator of employees’ intentions to 
remain in a job (Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982). Organisational commitment has been 
differentiated into three forms that reflect different psychological states (Meyer & Allen, 1991). 
Affective commitment refers to the emotional attachment employees feels towards their 
organisation; continuance commitment when employees evaluate the costs and gains associated 
with leaving the organisation and normative commitment which refers to moral obligations 
employees may have towards their organisation. Of the three forms, affective commitment has 
been shown to significantly relate to performance, attendance and organisational citizenship 
behaviour (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002). As organisational commitment 
is a positive form of organisational behaviour and has positive links towards occupational 
performance, individuals with greater commitment may be more likely to engage in security 
actions.  
The relationship between commitment and security has been relatively understudied. High 
organisational commitment has been found to relate to greater security behaviour and less 
engagement in counterproductive behaviours (Stanton, Stam, Guzman, & Caledra, 2003), 
abiding to acceptable use policies and discussing these policies with colleagues (Stanton & 
Mastrangelo, 2004) and intending to comply with IS policies (Herath & Rao, 2009b). These 
studies suggest that commitment may play some role in security, particularly for appropriate 
and acceptable use of IS systems. However, the research is relatively in its infancy and its links 
to security behaviours merit further investigation.   
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2.2.6.5.2 | Organisational Citizenship Behaviour 
Organisational citizenship behaviours (OCB) are positive organisational behaviours defined as 
‘discretionary contributions that go beyond the strict job description and that do not lay claim 
to contractual recompense from the formal reward system’ (Organ, 1988). They go beyond an 
individual’s job performance and relate to behaviours that contribute to the optimal functioning 
of the organisation. These individuals “go above and beyond” the minimum requirements of 
their job role and as such, organisations benefit from increased productivity, efficiency and 
customer satisfaction when employees engage in OCB (Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & 
Blume, 2009).  
Williams and Anderson (1991) distinguish between two forms of OCB. The first is 
organisational citizenship behaviour towards individuals (OCB-I) which are behaviours targeted 
at fellow employees within the workplace. The second is organisational citizenship behaviours 
towards the organisation (OCB-O), those which directly benefit the organisation. The 
importance of OCB has been demonstrated in occupational psychology literature and has been 
found to have many positive consequences for organisations such as higher unit sales 
(Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1997) and increased job performance (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & 
Ahearne, 1998). The role of OCB in the security context has remained unexplored. However, it 
would be expected that individuals who engage in discretionary behaviours may contribute to, 
and engage in more security-related actions. Further research on the role of OCB in information 
security is required.   
2.2.6.6 | Environmental Influences: Design and usability of security 
 “When security gets in the way, sensible, well-meaning, dedicated people develop hacks and 
workarounds that defeat the security” (Norman, 2009) 
The design and usability of security systems is a necessary pre-exquisite for ensuring that users 
can perform security tasks. When systems are unusable, users will circumvent the process or 
find workarounds to the system to perform their job (Adams & Sasse, 1999), or adopt less 
secure practices that are more usable.  
Whitten and Tygar (1999) define usable security as a set of priorities in which the expected user 
is; “(1) reliably made aware of the security tasks they need to perform; (2) are able to figure 
out how to successfully perform those tasks; (3) don’t make dangerous errors; and (4) are 
sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it.” (p. 2). 
Early work by Whitten and Tygar (1999) on the issues surrounding usability and security 
mechanisms are still of importance today. Their paper “Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt” highlighted 
important issues on the state of play of security software design and usability for consumers. 
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They argued that design standards for consumer software are not sufficient for security which 
they demonstrated through a user study of email encryption. Since their early work, there has 
been increased interest in usable security from researchers and practitioners, and a body of work 
has been dedicated to designing solutions so that they are more usable, particularly in 
authentication research.   
Therefore, the design of security is important in driving appropriate and correct security 
behaviour in users. However, in isolation, usable security is not enough to fully understand the 
complexities surrounding poor security behaviour as despite usable security, users still behave 
insecurely. Initially, studies of usability and anti-spyware found a link between usability and 
perceived behavioural control but not of their intention to use it (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Lee & 
Kozar, 2008), and at best it may play an indirect role via attitude (Kumar et al., 2008).  
More recently, support has been found for role of perceived ease of use and perceived 
usefulness on intentions to adopt an email authentication service (Herath et al., 2014) and 
security software (Shropshire et al., 2015).  
Perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use appear to be important for protective actions that 
involve software usage. However, contradictory evidence is found in the small amount of 
research exploring their role on attitudinal and motivational components of security software 
usage.  
2.2.6.7 | Environmental Influences: Persuasion and Deception  
The role of persuasion in influencing individuals into engaging in insecure behaviour is best 
understood in connection with the success of social engineering.  Social engineering is 
particularly problematic for organisations and is considered a major security threat (Mitnick & 
Simon, 2003). Social engineering techniques rely on human interaction and involve non-
technical methods of intrusion from attackers.  They adopt social persuasion techniques to target 
the human element in security (Applegate, 2009).  
There are many social engineering methods used to try and trick individuals. These include 
tailgating, baiting, pretexting and phishing to name a few. Phishing emails are one of the most 
common forms of cyber social engineering as attackers can cheaply and easily distribute 
millions of emails but require a very small return to achieve substantial benefits. To understand 
the success of social engineering tactics, it is necessary to explore how people are persuaded and 
deceived into behaving insecurely.  
One of the most prominent theories of persuasion is the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) that posits that individuals’ attitudes can be changed through 
persuasive communication, and is of particular relevance to phishing emails. When presented 
  
48 
 
with persuasive information, individuals engage in some level of elaboration. According to 
ELM, there are two routes to persuasion: the central route and the peripheral route which are 
moderated by the ability and motivation of the individual (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The central 
route involves greater elaboration and cognitive effort than the peripheral route and often 
involves extensive thinking and diligence. When receiving a phishing email, those who process 
it using the central route may carefully examine the information in the message (e.g. the 
perceived legitimacy of message content), scrutinise the email (e.g. examine the authenticity of 
links and the sender email) and consider other heuristics that could indicate a phishing email. 
When individuals do not elaborate on information, they will go down a peripheral route in 
which they rely on simple heuristics such as the communicator credibility or message content. 
As such, individuals’ peripheral route may be fooled by the email content (e.g. a false urgency 
or a promise of reward) and the false representation of legitimate companies (e.g. logos of 
mimicked companies). The peripheral route relies on mental shortcuts, not requiring actively 
thinking about the information and as such, relies on superficial factors. The two routes are not 
mutually exclusive and are often used in combination. However, individuals who largely use a 
peripheral route when using email are more likely to be phished as they do not engage in 
necessary relevant thinking (e.g. phishing detection). On the opposite side of this, an extremely 
persuasive phishing email could engage central route processing but still lead individuals to act 
on the email.  
Message credibility plays an important role in the peripheral route to impact persuasion (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986). Attackers impersonate large organisations that users will know; through 
impersonation they are relying on the credibility and reputation of the company to persuade the 
user. Furthermore, the use of a business logo, signatory and copyright may enhance the 
credibility of the message (Wang, Chen, Herath, & Rao, 2009). As research has found that 
personalization/spear-phishing emails also leads users to click on links (Halevi et al., 2015; 
Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & Menczer, 2007; Rocha Flores, Holm, Svensson, & Ericsson, 
2014) and more so than emails which are not personalized (Rocha Flores et al., 2014), the 
presence of personalisation, therefore, enhances the perceived credibility of the message. Other 
research has found that the sender’s email address influences trust in the email (Dhamija, Tygar, 
& Hearst, 2006; Karakasiliotis, Furnell, & Papadaki, 2006; Kumaraguru, Acquisti, & Cranor, 
2006; Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, & Rao, 2011), which is problematic as they can be 
easily spoofed. Wang et al. (2009) argue that an authentic looking sender email address is one of 
the features of assessing information credibility in emails. Perceived credibility will, therefore, 
determine the persuasiveness of a phishing email.  
A second important contribution to research on social engineering is theories of deception.  One 
of the prominent theories is the interpersonal deception theory (Buller & Burgoon, 1996), 
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however Wang, Herath, Chen, Vishwanath, and Rao (2012) argue that it focuses on face-to-face 
communications so its applicability to phishing is limited and relies on many channels of 
communications (including body language and speech patterns). They use the Theory of 
Deception (Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal, & Zualkernan, 1992) as it is more appropriate for less-
interactive and non-face-to-face communications such as email phishing, and focuses less on the 
interplay between deceivers and targets, but provides more consideration on the level of the 
individual in the cognitive processing of deceptive information (Grazioli, 2004).  
The theory focuses on the information processing involved in deceiving and detecting 
deception. When receiving an email, individuals first compare assurance and trust cues (e.g. 
email phishing heuristics) with their expectations about these cues and when there is an 
inconsistency between the observed cues and what is expected, activation raises suspicion and 
directs attention to the cues. Individuals then use their domain-specific knowledge (e.g. 
evaluating multiple phishing heuristics) to assess the genuineness of the cues. Individuals then 
form an overall deception assessment resulting from one strong assessment (e.g. the link in the 
email is clearly illegitimate) or the result of several weaker ones combined (e.g. the sender 
email does not match the address, the attachment is a zip archive and the content is creating a 
sense of urgency). An individual’s competence at identifying deception cues is indicative of 
better detection performance (Grazioli, 2004) so individuals with greater knowledge of what to 
look for in phishing emails are better at detection.  
Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, and Rao (2011) found that when individuals receive a 
relevant email (e.g. from a service provider they use), they will focus disproportionality on 
emotional triggers (e.g. urgency cues) and will ignore deception indicators (e.g. the source, and 
grammar and spelling elements within emails), which will increase susceptibility. Focusing on 
these latter elements will not lead to elaboration whereas focusing on urgency cues does 
influence elaboration as it garners greater information processing resources from the user, 
triggering elaboration and reducing susceptibility. Individuals who do not enter elaboration 
may, therefore, be more likely respond to the email. Further research by Wang et al. (2012) 
found that those with greater scam knowledge paid more attention to deception indicators and 
consequently have a lower chance of getting phished. Individuals with greater knowledge pay 
less attention to emotional triggers and rely more on deception indicators, suggesting that 
knowledge and ability play an important role in determining how individuals react to persuasion 
and deceptive messages. This is supported by other research that has found that individuals with 
greater knowledge and experience with social engineering threats are less likely to fall for 
phishing emails (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2007; Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, & 
Downs, 2010). 
  
50 
 
2.2.7 | SUMMARY OF FACTORS INFLUENCING SECURITY BEHAVIOUR 
Overall, research suggests that users’ security behaviour is influenced by a range of factors that 
are both internal and external to the individual.  
The literature included research from consumers’ behaviour to understand further what may 
motivate security behaviour. However, employees’ behaviour is more complex within the 
workplace setting as it is influenced by their organisation and working environment. Despite the 
wealth of studies that explore the factors that influence employees’ intentions to comply with 
their organisation’s IS policy, there are only a few studies in which the determinants of the 
individual security behaviours within the policy are explored (Ng et al., 2009; Workman et al., 
2008). There is, therefore, a need to explore the research gap to identify determinants of specific 
security behaviours in an employment sample rather than continued use of globalised indicators 
of employees’ security behaviour.  
Additionally, while the existing research has provided a promising baseline for understanding 
security behaviour in the workplace it is unclear which factors (e.g. internal and environmental) 
are most important for security at work and whether the organisational context plays a role in 
determining these factors. The existing literature has largely focussed on the factors for the 
prediction of attitudes, intentions or behaviours. However, more understanding is needed for 
what may influence these factors within the workplace and how they may interplay in 
determining levels of different security behaviours.  
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2.3 | BEHAVIOUR CHANGE  
Section 2.1 explored literature addressing the influencers of secure and insecure behaviour. As 
discussed, many of these studies have adopted behavioural models that focus on behaviour at 
the individual level such as PMT, TPB, HBM and SCT. There has, however, been less use of 
these theories for driving security behaviour change. The question is, what predictors to target 
in an intervention? (Conner, 2014). For instance, if self-efficacy consistently predicts security 
behaviour, interventions and systems can be designed to best maximise users levels of self-
efficacy.  
Despite investigating factors that influence behaviour, research has been limited in using the 
findings in behaviour change interventions. They have been primarily dedicated to 
understanding the causes of security behaviour, which is important, but leaves a gap of where 
this knowledge has been used to actually change security behaviour. There are many approaches 
to behaviour change which include focussing on the behaviour as an agent of change (e.g. 
Diffusion of innovations; Rogers, 2010), integrated research-driven frameworks (e.g. behaviour 
change wheel; Michie, van Stralen, & West, 2011) or combining knowledge from behavioural 
economics and psychology (e.g. MINDSPACE; Dolan, Hallsworth, Halpern, King, & Vlaev, 
2010).  However, as this thesis is interested in intervening at the individual level, it is important 
to consider the body of work on behaviour change processes for intervening at this level. 
Consequently, other behaviour change approaches will not be discussed in-depth. 
2.3.1 | MOTIVATIONAL AND VOLITIONAL APPROACHES  
PMT, TPB, and HBM as discussed in section 2.2.1 are examples of motivational theories that 
place behaviour change on a continuum and view intention as the best predictor of subsequent 
behaviour and that levels of the determinants of intention give rise to high or low engagement in 
the desired behaviour. However, research exploring the link between intention and behaviour 
indicates that intentions are insufficient in predicting actual behaviour, accounting for 1/3 of the 
variance in actual behaviour – an issue referred to as the “intention-behaviour gap” (Sheeran, 
2002).  
Motivational theories may only explain the first part of behaviour change (motivating people to 
intend to change), with more attention needed on the second part (aiding intenders into 
behaviour change). Motivational approaches do not explain how intentions are translated into 
action and are not sufficient in creating large changes in behaviour (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). 
The lack of translation into actual behaviour is because while many people may intend to act; 
they may fail to follow through with their intentions. Therefore, in isolation, a motivational 
intervention may not lead to desired and sustained behaviour change (Hagger et al., 2002). 
Attention has therefore been drawn to understanding the volitional processes involved in 
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enacting and maintaining behaviour and bridging the intention-behaviour gap. For example, one 
of the reasons people fail to enact behaviour is due to poor self-regulation strategies, and one 
such strategy is planning (Abraham, Sheeran, & Johnston, 1998). 
Theories which consider the volitional processes in translating intentions into actions are “stage-
based” in which movement through a stage is influenced by different variables (Weinstein, 
1988). These models have moved away from the limitations of other social cognition models as 
they do not focus solely on intentions as the most proximate predictor of behaviour but consider 
the transition from motivation to actual behaviour engagement.  
One of the most commonly used is the transtheoretical model (TTM; Prochaska & DiClemnte, 
1983). The model is distinguished by six mutually exclusive stages that posit change as a 
process that unfolds rather than as a discrete event. Individuals progress through each stage, 
although relapse and multiple attempts are recognised. Individuals are categorised into one of 
six stages: 
1. Pre-contemplation is where people do not intend to take action in the near term and 
may be unaware that their current behaviour is problematic.  
2. Contemplation is where people intend to change their behaviours in the short term and 
are beginning to assess the costs and benefits of their continued behaviour.  
3. Preparation is where people intend to take action soon, have a plan of action and are 
beginning to take small steps towards behaviour change.  
4. Action is where people have made modifications to their behaviour but as action is often 
equated with behaviour change, individuals must maintain the behaviour.  
5. Maintenance is where the person has been able to sustain the behaviour and is working 
towards preventing relapse.    
6. Termination is where the individual has zero temptation to revert to the old behaviour. 
The TTM also identifies ten processes of change and strategies which individuals use when 
progressing through stages (Prochaska, Velicer, DiClemnte, & Fava, 1988). The TTM is a 
dominant model in health psychology and has received significant empirical support (Sutton, 
2001). However, its use in understanding security behaviour alongside other stage theories has 
remained relatively underexplored. The TTM will be used within the final intervention to assess 
participants’ readiness to change their security behaviour.  
The Health Action Process Approach (HAPA; Schwarzer, 1992), Rubicon Model of Action 
Phases (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987) and the Precaution Adoption Process Model 
(Weinstein & Sandman, 1992) are other examples of stage theories. They all differ in the 
number of stages proposed and what strategies help individuals transition through stages. 
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However, a central component of all these stage theories is that there are two main stages to 
behaviour change: a motivational stage and a volitional stage. The motivational stage contains 
the motivational elements of models such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour and Protection 
Motivation Theory, focussing on the determinants that led individuals to intend to enact the 
desired behaviour (such as enhancing threat and coping appraisal). Following the formation of 
an intention, individuals must then form a goal and consequently, a commitment to follow 
through with behaviour change. This is called the volitional stage and focusses on the initiation 
and maintenance of behaviour change through the use of self-regulatory processes such goal 
setting and planning.  
2.3.2 | IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS 
Implementation intentions are a volitional technique that has been used in behaviour change to 
help translate intentions into action. They are a planning technique to identify behaviours that 
will be performed in specific critical situations (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) and take the form 
of “if-then” statements; a type of action plan. The “IF” component is where the individual 
specifies the situational cues or critical situations that will prompt the behaviour (e.g. IF I leave 
my workstation…). The “THEN” component is the goal-directed response which is in line with 
the overall desired behavioural change (…THEN I will lock the work computer) and is to be 
cognitively associated with the situational cue. If-then statements allow a strong association 
between the situational cue and the specified response and are quite stable over time (Gollwitzer 
& Oettingen, 2011).  Unlike goal intentions that specify desired future behaviour, the strength of 
implementation intentions lies in the specificity of the plan by detailing when, where and how 
the individual will perform the behaviour (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). The critical situation 
then becomes highly salient to the individual, reducing the likelihood of missed opportunities to 
enact the desired behaviour (Webb & Sheeran, 2004). Implementation intentions are a useful 
self-regulatory strategy for managing the critical situations that lead to undesired habitual 
responses. They can break down unwanted habits and promote new, wanted behaviours. When a 
person attempts to alter their existing behaviour, implementation intentions are useful to link the 
new behaviour with the situation that previously led to the habitual behaviour (Adriaanse, de 
Ridder, & de Wit, 2009; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006).  For example, an employee who knows 
they are unlikely to lock their computer when they leave their desk may use the following plan 
to help counteract that habitual response: “If I am tempted not to lock my computer, then I will 
remind myself it does not take long to log back in”.  
Implementation intentions have been shown to be effective in bridging the intention-behaviour 
gap for a variety of health-related behaviours (Hagger & Luszczynska, 2014). Meta-analyses of 
94 studies have shown them to have a medium to large effect size (d=.65) for goal attainment 
(Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Whilst there is a plethora of research exploring and 
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demonstrating the impact of implementation intentions on behaviour change, they have largely 
been comprised of populations drawn from non-occupational groups, mainly students (e.g. 
Arden and Armitage; 2012; Milne et al., 2002) or the general public (e.g. Brewster, Elliott, & 
Kelly, 2015; De Vet, Oenema, Sheeran, & Brug, 2009), with less research exploring their 
applicability within the workplace setting. There is no research which has explored 
implementation intentions in the context of security behaviour in the workplace, however 
research has shown them to be effective for pro-environmental behaviour (Holland, Aarts, & 
Langendam, 2006), health and safety training attendance (Sheeran & Silverman, 2003) and anti-
smoking behaviour in the workplace (Armitage, 2007).  
As discussed, an intervention combining motivational components accompanied by volitional 
strategies will lead to greater behaviour change than the sole use of one of the behaviour change 
techniques. Combined interventions have shown to be effective in driving behaviour change 
(Chatzisarantis, Hagger, & Wang, 2010; Hagger, Lonsdale, & Chatzisarantis, 2012; Milne et al., 
2002; Prestwich, Ayres, & Lawton, 2008) 
A central aim of this thesis is to develop and evaluate an intervention to improve the security 
behaviour of employees based on behaviour change principles. The thesis seeks to adopt a 
stage-based approach to designing an intervention that combines motivational (using continuum 
theories) and volitional approaches (implementation intentions).  
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2.4 | RESEARCH EXPLORING BEHAVIOUR CHANGE FOR SECURITY 
Changing users’ security behaviour and decisions has been largely understudied. The majority 
of attempts have focussed on designing better systems and software so that they are more 
usable. While usable systems are essential for reducing the burden to users, the previous section 
has shown that there are a number of influencers of secure and insecure behaviours that are 
independent of software/system design. This section of the literature review focuses on research 
that has attempted to influence users’ security behaviour - both in consumers and within the 
workplace rather than literature focussing solely on usable security. In particular, it will 
concentrate on the growing body of literature utilising psychological knowledge to motivate 
users to behave more securely and those that target the processes underlying and regulating 
security behaviour.  
Despite efforts to understand the security behaviour of employees, there has been little attention 
dedicated to improving this behaviour. The security domain is inundated with papers and 
reports highlighting the importance of awareness campaigns and information security training in 
the workplace and survey literature has positioned this approach to improve motivation but not 
actual behaviour. There is a large research gap between experimental studies that address the 
effectiveness of interventions and approaches to improving actual security behaviour.  
Taking a policy-compliance approach, methods in the workplace have largely focussed on 
training, education, and awareness campaigns to improve compliance with the companies’ IS 
policy. These approaches have taken a number of different forms including presentations, 
newsletters, video games, and posters. Topics covered in training and awareness programs can 
include social engineering, password security, security on the internet, phishing emails and clear 
screen policy (Bauer, Bernroider, & Chudzikowski, 2013) along with other topics and 
behaviours that may be covered in the companies’ IS policies.  
Information security training has been considered to be different from other forms of training as 
it relies on persuasion (Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011) and not merely education; it is designed to 
influence behaviours and persuade employees to take a particular course of action rather than 
purely focusing on awareness building and skill acquisition. For effective behaviour change in 
the workplace, training and awareness campaigns need to be theoretically-grounded to be 
effective. Unfortunately, reviews have indicated that this is largely not the case in existing 
approaches for IS security training. For example, Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) reviewed the 
existing literature on IS security training and concluded that previous approaches have been 
largely non-theoretical and anecdotal, with the majority of approaches lacking empirical 
evidence and a theoretical grounding. For interventions to be effective and of high quality, they 
must be based on theory so that they can provide an explanation of how and why they work. 
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Similarly, approaches also need to provide empirical evidence of their efficiency so that they 
can demonstrate whether their approach works in practice. Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) 
argue that training approaches within the IS domain often take a pedagogical approach to 
improving employee compliance and of the 23 studies reviewed in their study, only 4 were 
found to have a theoretical underpinning and only 2 of these provided empirical evidence.  
To overcome the previous issues in IS training approaches, Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) 
developed a training program using persuasive communication to increase e-mail encryption. 
They found that persuasive communication can successfully improve policy compliance 
behaviour of employees. Furthermore, they suggest that IS training should use methods that 
enable learners’ systematic cognitive processing of information and should adopt learning tasks 
that are of personal relevance to the learners. This study is one of the few that have a theory-
based grounding and provides empirical evidence demonstrating the utility of adopting theory-
based IS training. 
Training approaches to behaviour change may be more appropriate for security behaviours that 
require a level of skill such as detecting phishing emails. The training aims to equip individuals 
with necessary skills to undertake security actions. However, not all security behaviours are 
skill-based so the appropriateness of training for specific security behaviours needs 
consideration.  
Reducing susceptibility to phishing emails is an area of research where training has been shown 
to be effective. Kumaraguru et al. (2009) conducted a real-world evaluation of “PhishGuru”, an 
email embedded training system that trains users with strategies to avoid falling for phishing 
emails. The system works by sending simulated spear-phishing emails to users. Those who fall 
for phishing emails are then presented training in the form of comics. By being embedded in the 
phishing email, it provides a highly salient training system that is linked to the individual’s 
current insecure behaviour. They found that the training led to retained knowledge after 28 days 
and additional training messages resulted in decreases in disclosing information to phishing 
attempts. However, participants could be more cautious simply because they feel they are being 
monitored by their organisations as research has shown that perceived monitoring influences 
security behaviour (D’Arcy & Greene, 2014). Other approaches adopting embedded training in 
simulated phishing emails have been found to be somewhat effective but only a small 
percentage of victims (12.65%) go on to take part in the training (Jansson & von Solms, 2011).  
Training and awareness promotion in isolation is not sufficient for behaviour change. A wealth 
of research indicates that users and employees do not behave securely despite having the 
necessary knowledge and skills. Recent research has shown that there is no difference in the 
security behaviour of experts and non-experts despite experts having better mental models of 
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the internet (Kang et al., 2015). This suggests that knowledge in isolation cannot explain 
secure/insecure behaviour. Other research has shown that despite taking part in training, users 
still behave insecurely. Kearney and Kruger (2013) found 69% of those users who disclosed 
their passwords in their phishing study had completed the security training in the past. 
Approaches that combine training alongside behaviour change principles may lead to actual and 
sustained behaviour change for security.  
The following sections of this literature review have been broken down into recurring 
approaches that have been investigated to promote security behaviour. These are self-efficacy 
manipulations, fear appeals, serious games, message framing and persuasive communication. 
2.4.1 | SELF-EFFICACY MANIPULATIONS 
Within the existing research that has utilised training or educational approaches to improve end-
user security behaviour by using principles of enactive mastery through directly training the 
user and then requiring them to practice the behaviour. However, there are few studies which 
discuss the theoretical underpinnings in relation to self-efficacy. 
Wirth, Rifon, LaRose, and Lewis (2007) designed an intervention based on PMT to increase 
self-efficacy and protective online safety behaviours with 547 high school students through 
enactive mastery. The interactive programme covered safety issues focusing on potentially 
dangerous encounters through emails, social networks, surfing and financial transactions. They 
were provided with the option of “show me how” to train them how to protect themselves 
against a particular issue. They found that those exposed to the enactive mastery intervention 
had higher levels of self-efficacy compared to those who were not exposed. However, there was 
no main effect of the self-efficacy intervention on intentions to engage in protective behaviour 
except for intentions to use privacy settings in browsers. Overall, the intervention increased 
levels of self-efficacy and had some influence on students’ motivation to adopt protective 
behaviours.  
Shillair et al. (2015) used PMT to enhance security behaviours of internet users. They were 
interested in the role of personal responsibility for security. They believed that people who have 
a higher sense of personal responsibility for security are more likely to undertake security 
behaviours. Individuals with high self-efficacy view security as their responsibility whereas 
those with low self-efficacy may diffuse responsibility onto other sources (such as their IS 
policy). They were interested in whether manipulating responsibility perception alongside 
enactive mastery training would lead to greater intentions to engage in the security behaviours 
compared to using persuasive threat messages (providing simple suggestions that they could 
cope with the security threat). They found that those exposed to the vicarious experience 
treatment had significantly higher coping self-efficacy than those within the persuasion 
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condition. It had no direct effect on intentions in isolation but when combined with the 
responsibility manipulation it improved intentions.  
Boehmer, LaRose, Rifon, Alhabash, & Cotten (2015) also looked at experimentally 
manipulating personal responsibility to increase protective behaviours (reading privacy policies, 
changing passwords, changing browser privacy settings, reading licencing agreements for 
software, changing IM settings, backing up files and verifying the identity of websites). They 
did not manipulate self-efficacy but looked at the influence of existing levels on the effects of 
the responsibility manipulation. Like the Shillair et al. (2015) study, participants were exposed 
to a responsibility manipulation; in which they were either persuaded that online security is their 
personal responsibility or is shared responsibility. They were interested in the effects of this 
manipulation on intentions and also the potential role that existing levels of self-efficacy and 
safety involvement may play.  
They found that framing the message towards personal responsibility led to increases in 
intentions to engage in security behaviours. The effect was greatest for individuals with high 
existing levels of online safety involvement and high self-efficacy, and that high involvement 
users exhibited greater protective behaviours. The manipulation did not work for individuals 
with low self-efficacy and low involvement: the authors position these as potentially the most 
vulnerable group. They found that they had lower security intentions when presented with a 
personal responsibility manipulation suggesting that they were discouraged from behaving 
securely. The findings suggest that this novice group may be easily discouraged when presented 
with security information that informs them to take responsibility for security online as they 
also lack self-efficacy to undertake the behaviours.  The findings indicate the need to tailor 
interventions to participants existing self-efficacy perceptions as there is potential for negative 
effects.  
2.4.2 | FEAR APPEALS  
 “Fear appeals are persuasive messages designed to scare people by describing the terrible 
things that will happen to them if they do not do what the message recommends” (Witte, 1992, 
p. 329). Fear appeals traditionally target aspects of individuals’ threat appraisals by using 
statements of the severity of threats and their potential susceptibility to the threat. The appeals 
may also target coping appraisal with statements of response efficacy and self-efficacy.  Witte 
and Allen's (2000) meta-analysis of fear appeal literature found that fear appeals produce 
moderate effects for fear arousal and large effects for perceived severity and susceptibility. They 
also found that the stronger the fear appeal, the greater effect it had on attitude, intentions and 
behaviour change.  
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Johnston and Warkentin (2010) looked at fear appeals and adoption of anti-spyware. The fear 
appeal sought to target the severity (e.g. potential to affect computer performance) and 
susceptibility (e.g. providing likelihood statistics) of the security threat and statements about 
coping with threat and the efficacious of such coping approaches. They found that following 
exposure to the fear appeal, there was a significant increase in severity, susceptibility, self-
efficacy and response efficacy for those exposed to the fear appeal.   
Recent work by Johnston and Warkentin (2015) compared three fear appeals covering password 
theft, data theft from not logging out and USB theft within multiple government organisations 
and their effect on changing passwords, logging out and USB protective behaviour. They argue 
that existing fear appeals focus on threats to information, data and systems and these lack 
relevance to the individual and this is often the conventional approach in IS fear appeals. They 
add sanctioning rhetoric to account for the threats to the human asset as they posit that threats to 
non-human assets (e.g. data) lack robustness to the user since they lack descriptions of threats of 
a personal nature. They explore this personal relevance in the context of sanctions, which they 
argue directly affects the individual and thus can enhance the personal relevance of threat 
appeals (“enhanced fear appeals elements”). They found that there was a significant difference 
for all PMT constructs (severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy, response efficacy) and additional 
constructs for sanction rhetoric (formal/informal sanction severity, formal/informal sanction 
severity and sanction celerity) between those exposed to the fear appeal and a control group 
who experienced no fear appeal. They also found that there was a significant difference in 
compliance intention with those in the fear appeals groups, which significantly indicated greater 
intention to engage in protective security behaviour. The study does not report any inferential 
statistics comparing the three types of fear appeal to ascertain any potential differences in PMT 
constructs and intention.  
Jenkins, Grimes, Proudfoot, and Lowry (2013) used just-in-time fear appeals to reduce 
password re-use. Their system detected when users were reusing an existing password (using 
keystroke dynamics when a user generates the passwords – e.g. a re-used password is routinely 
processed information so will have a faster typing flow than when creating a new password) and 
then presented them with the fear appeal.  The fear appeal emphasised that re-using a password 
puts the user at risk of being hacked (perceived susceptibility). The mention of being hacked is 
to influence perceived severity of re-using a password. The fear appeal concluded by saying that 
to protect themselves, they must choose a unique password – influencing the response efficacy 
of the user. For the behaviour change manipulation, 88.41% of those who received the fear 
appeal created unique passwords compared to 4.45% of users in the control. The findings 
suggest that a just-in-time fear appeal was a useful approach to reduce insecure behaviour.  
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Vance, Eargle, Ouimet, and Straub (2013) explored static and interactive (visual password 
meter) fear appeals on selecting strong passwords which they compared to a control and a non-
fear appeal password meter. They found that those exposed to an interactive fear appeal selected 
stronger passwords than those in the static fear appeal treatment, control and those who received 
a password meter. There were no differences between those receiving the static fear appeal or an 
interactive password meter compared to the control group. Their findings provide strong support 
for the addition of interactivity in fear appeals on enhancing their effectiveness.  
Overall, the evidence for the use of fear appeals to influence security behaviours appears to be 
promising with studies demonstrating changes in PMT constructs (severity, susceptibility, self-
efficacy, response efficacy; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010, 2015), changes in intentions and 
actual behaviour (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & Polak, 2015; Jenkins et al., 2013; Vance et 
al., 2013) and recent findings showing that the addition of interactivity and just-in-time fear 
appeals can lead to better password behaviour (Jenkins et al., 2013; Vance et al., 2013).   
2.4.3 | SERIOUS GAMES  
Serious games may be useful for behaviour change as they provide entertainment to the user 
with the potential for changing user behaviour through learning and skill development.  
A systematic literature review by Connolly, Boyle, MacArthur, Hainey, and Boyle (2012) 
exploring the empirical evidence of serious games in other domains have found mixed results. 
Some reoccurring outcomes were improved knowledge acquisition and affective and 
motivational outcomes. A few studies have looked at the effects of serious games behaviour 
change, which were varied in their methodologies and focus, but suggested that they may be 
useful to change behaviour.  
Games have been used in the context of security with varying levels of success. Anti-phishing 
training has received much attention in research in an attempt to help users identify phishing 
heuristics at the email level. Anti-phishing Phil teaches users how to identify illegitimate URLs 
through four rounds that become increasingly difficult. Sheng and Magnien (2007) found that 
participants trained with anti-phishing Phil were better at identifying fraudulent websites than 
individuals who read an anti-phishing tutorial or read existing online training. 
Game designs based on behaviour change are in their infancy, however, Davinson and Sillence 
(2010) used risk manipulations (targeted via heightening perceived susceptibility) based on the 
HBM alongside anti-phishing Phil to promote secure behaviour. Participants were randomly 
allocated to one of four conditions in which they were given training or no training and a low 
threat or high threat message. Those in the low threat condition were presented with an “at low” 
risk message, which stated they were 20% at risk of being a victim of fraud. Those in the high 
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threat condition were told they were at an 80% at risk of victimisation. Participants were led to 
believe that the risk message reflected their baseline scores, however, in reality they were 
randomly allocated to low or high-risk message regardless of their actual baseline security 
behaviour.  They found that the use of anti-phishing Phil had no effect on secure behaviour at 1-
week follow-up which could be due to the lack of tailored messages relating to their baseline 
behaviour as giving high threat messages to people who already behave securely may lead them 
to dismiss the threat and subsequently reduce their behaviour. Their measure of security 
behaviour was also quite broad and they did not discuss the effect on specific security 
behaviours that were measured (including the behaviour that was directly trained within the 
anti-phishing Phil paradigm i.e. identifying suspicious URLs). They also found no main effect 
of risk warning score between the two types. However, they found that it increased intentions to 
behave more securely regardless of the level risk of presented and that follow-up security 
behaviour was significantly higher than baseline. This suggested that users only need 
information generically regarding their susceptibility rather than seemingly tailored.   
Other games have largely been training-based such as cyber-CIEGE (Irvine, Thompson, & 
Allen, 2005) in which the game player takes the role of a decision maker for a fictional 
organisation and they are required to make choices regarding procedural, technical and physical 
security.  
Research has argued that serious games could be improved by utilising best practice from 
behaviour change literature (Blythe & Coventry, 2012). Furthermore, caution has been 
suggested for the potentially intrusive nature of these games and the logs of user behaviour that 
they collate and store (Blythe & Coventry, 2012).  
2.4.4 | MESSAGE FRAMING AND PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION 
Research has also been dedicated to looking at the effects of message framing and persuasive 
communication on improving security behaviour.  
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) looked at influencing undergraduate students’ attitudes and 
descriptive norms towards performing security behaviour (a broad non-specific measure) 
through manipulation of goal-framing and self-view. They manipulated the message framing by 
presenting participants with either a positively focussed message that discussed the benefits of 
performing security behaviours or a negatively-focussed message that discussed the severity and 
probability of security threats.  
They also manipulated a participant’s self-view, which aimed to focus an individual’s attention 
on themselves or others. This involved priming an individual towards an independent or 
interdependent view. For the independent view, they were primed to think of themselves as 
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distinct and separate from others (e.g. a conscientious cybercitizen). The inter-dependent view 
was that they were told to think of themselves as part of a larger group (e.g. a community of 
cybercitizens). By manipulating self-view, the aim was to influence levels of subjective and 
descriptive norms as the closer a referent group is perceived to be, the more salient norms are. 
Those primed with an inter-dependent should have reported higher subjective and descriptive 
norms than those primed with an independent self-view. They further posit that those given an 
interdependent view respond more to prevention-focused messages.   
They found that there was no significant interaction of self-view and goal framing on attitudes 
towards protecting one’s own computer or the Internet. However, its effects were approaching 
significance for their influence on subjective norms. Further analyses found that those primed 
with the independent self-view with a promotion focused message had significantly higher 
levels of subjective norms compared to those with the same self-view but a prevention-focused 
goal. There were no differences in subjective norm for those within the interdependent self-view 
for either goal frame.  
The authors conclude that positively framed messages may be more persuasive in the context of 
security as existing approaches typically focus on loss aversion and prevention such as fear 
appeals. Furthermore, they posit that these positively-framed messages may have greater 
effectiveness in combination with an independent self-view manipulation. Additionally, they 
argue that attitudes may be harder to influence than an individual’s subjective norms in the 
context of security.   
Shropshire, Warkentin, and Johnston (2010) also explored message framing for technology 
uptake and found that negative message framing is more powerful in encouraging users to adopt 
detective technologies (e.g. biometric keyboard) than preventive technologies (e.g. adaptive 
email filter) in undergraduate students.  
Unlike Anderson and Agarwal (2010) and Shropshire et al. (2010) who focus on influencing 
positive security behaviour, Barlow, Warkentin, Ormond, and Dennis (2013a) were interested in 
reducing employees’ password sharing by discouraging neutralizations. These are employees’ 
rationalisations of their insecure behaviour, for example, they may share their password with a 
colleague because they rationalise that it will allow them to get the job done quicker and no one 
is being harmed as a result of their actions. They found that the deterrence-focused and 
neutralization-focused communications both resulted in significantly lower violation intentions 
compared to scenarios where no focus was given. There was no significant difference between 
the two forms of communication suggesting they were equally effective. There was also no 
significant effect of the negative or positive framing of the scenarios on intentions compared to 
the no framing scenario suggesting that neither was more effective in reducing violation 
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intentions. The authors conclude that organisations should focus on neutralisation mitigation in 
their information security efforts in addition to communications focussing on deterrent sanctions 
as they are both equally effective in reducing neutralizations.   
Shepherd, Mejias, and Klein (2014) conducted a longitudinal study in the workplace to 
investigate the effectiveness of persuasiveness communication on reducing internet abuse. 
Participants were presented with messages reminding them of the acceptable use policies (AUP) 
in their organisation. Based on deterrence theory, they were interested in comparing the effects 
of a mild AUP (reminding users that the systems are for business use only) and a severe AUP 
(emphasising sanctions for non-compliance). They used employees’ data by logging their 
website usage. They found that when using a mild AUP message that non-work internet traffic 
decreased from 55% to 43% whereas the severe AUP message decreased from 72% to 39%. At 
2-week follow-up, non-work traffic had increased but was still lower than pre-treatment levels 
for the severe AUP but for the mild message, it had increased to levels of that at pre-treatment. 
The findings suggested that the more severe AUP was better at reducing internet abuse and had 
better longevity than the mild AUP message.  
Overall, there is little research on the influence of message framing on security behaviour. The 
existing research has indicated mixed findings. Anderson and Agarwal (2010) suggested that 
positively framed messages may be more effective for influencing attitudes and subjective 
norms in the behaviours of home users. However, they use a very broad term of “security 
measures” and additional research has found that negative message framing does have an effect 
on different types of security behaviours more than others, with a greater influence on adopting 
detective technologies than preventive technologies (Shropshire et al., 2010). Recent research 
by Barlow et al. (2013) within the workplace has found that neither negative nor positive 
message framing had a greater effect on deterring employee violation intentions but other recent 
research by Shepherd et al. (2014) found that negative framing based on deterrence led to 
decreases in internet abuse. The role of message (positive or negative) framing for motivating 
security behaviour requires further research to understand its potential role in driving behaviour 
change.  
2.4.5 | SECTION OVERVIEW 
The existing experimental research for security behaviour change is a start. There is a lack of 
research exploring the effectiveness of theory-based studies with experimental evaluation within 
the workplace. Studies with occupational samples have been supportive of the influence of 
theory-based training, fear appeals and message framing. More research is needed on the design 
of interventions that are theory-based with a contextual understanding of the occupational 
setting and their efficacy validated through experimental studies which will be taken up in 
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chapter 6. More attention is also needed looking at the role of volitional strategies in security 
behaviour change.  
There are some limitations with the current literature base. Firstly, only a few studies are 
conducted in a workplace setting (Barlow et al., 2013; Jansson & von Solms, 2011; Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2015; Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Shepherd et al., 2014). The majority of research has 
explored behaviour change in the context of end-users but, has largely relied on student samples 
(Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Boehmer et al., 2015; Boss et al., 2015; Davinson & Sillence, 
2010; Sheng & Magnien, 2007; Waddell, McLaughlin, LaRose, Rifon, & Wirth-Hawkins, 2014; 
Wirth et al., 2007). Research has shown the bias of using student samples in research and the 
lack of generalizability to the general population (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  
There is also a need for more stringent evaluation of behaviour change interventions. The 
ACMA (2011) in their review of Cyber-security educational campaigns found that was a lack of 
evaluation and absence of measures put in place before, during and after the initiatives they 
identified to help assess impacts.  
Randomised Control Trials (RCT) are considered to be the gold standard way to evaluate a 
behaviour change intervention as they provide valid and reliable evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of the intervention. An RCT design allocates participants to an experimental 
condition and control condition (which is not exposed to any form of treatment), reducing 
confounding variables as participants experience all the same factors of the intervention (except 
differing treatments/control). Randomization is also an important component of an RCT as it 
reduces selection bias. The importance of RCT and evaluation of interventions are 
recommended by the Behavioural Insights Team (Haynes, Service, Goldacre, & Torgerson, 
2012) and the Medical Research Council (Craig et al., 2009). RCTs will be used in the 
evaluation of the intervention developed in this thesis.  
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3 CHAPTER 3: EXPLORING THE DETERMINANTS OF INFORMATION 
SECURITY BEHAVIOURS: AN ELICITATION STUDY OF BEHAVIOUR 
CHANGE FACTORS WITHIN THE WORKPLACE 
 
Work from this chapter has contributed to the following publications: 
Blythe, J.M. (2013). Cyber security in the workplace: Understanding and promoting behaviour 
change. In Proceedings of CHItaly 2013 Doctoral Consortium (pp. 92–101). 
Blythe, J.M., Coventry, L., & Little, L. (2015). Unpacking security policy compliance : The 
motivators and barriers of employees ’ security behaviors. In Eleventh Symposium on 
Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2015) (pp. 103–122). USENIX Association. 
3.1 | INTRODUCTION 
The literature review demonstrated that there are a number of factors that may influence the 
degree to which an employee may undertake protective action. An over-reliance on a policy 
compliance paradigm for exploring security behaviour in existing organisational research means 
that we do not yet fully understand individual behaviours and their influencers. The question of 
whether all security behaviours are equal and influenced by the same or different influencers 
remains unanswered. This has resulted in the first step of this thesis to explore and understand 
what motivates individual security behaviours that contribute to information security policy 
compliance. Protection Motivation Theory and the Theory of Planned Behaviour are two 
important behavioural theories that have been used to explain compliance behaviour but little is 
known about their potential utility in understanding specific security behaviours in the 
workplace. Of particular importance to PMT is employees’ perceptions of security threats and 
appraisal of protective actions to mitigate these threats. TPB is concerned with appraisal of their 
attitude, perceived behavioural control and influence of subjective norms on these protective 
behaviours. Eliciting these perceptions for individual behaviours will help understand how they 
may differ by behaviour; identify areas for further exploration and ultimately, interventions to 
promote behaviour change. To this end, the current study adopted a qualitative method to 
explore the two theories using semi-structured interviews to address the following research 
questions:  
RQ1. What are the causes of employees’ secure and insecure behaviour across different 
security behaviours? 
RQ2. What are the potential barriers to security actions? 
RQ3. What differences exist in employees’ psychological ownership and organisational 
citizenship behaviour?  
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This rest of this chapter will present justification for the approach before presenting details of 
the study.  
3.1.1 | QUALITATIVE METHODS FOR SECURITY 
Qualitative methods are a useful approach for understanding security from the perspective of the 
participant. They are used less often in behavioural organisational IS research and this lack of 
adoption could be due to the potentially intrusive nature of information security research and 
concerns for the reputation of recruited organisations (Kotulic & Clark, 2004). These methods 
afford an in-depth understanding of the reasons for specific behaviours and warrant more use 
within organisational research.  
Existing qualitative studies have been exploratory and inductive in nature, aiming to generate 
data pertinent to a research question that is not necessarily attached to a particular theory or 
paradigm (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Albrechtsen, 2007; Beautement et al., 2009). This 
approach has often taken the form of semi-structured interviews which allow exploration of key 
issues and themes in relation to the research question under study.  However, there has been 
little research using a deductive approach. Elicitation studies are one form of a deductive 
approach used within behaviour change literature and are a proposed stage in some behaviour 
change models. For example, in the context of the TPB, the purpose of an elicitation study is to 
determine the beliefs (behavioural, normative, and control) of a target population (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980). They are considered a valuable part of understanding behaviour (Downs & 
Hausenblas, 2005) as interviews with the target population ensure that beliefs and attitudes are 
data driven rather than pre-determined by previous research and the research team’s 
preconceptions of the target group. Other behaviour change models recommend elicitation 
stages for questionnaire development, for instance, Protection Motivation Theory (PMT;  
Rogers, 1975) and the Integrated Behavioural Model (IBM; Montaño & Kasprzyk, 2008). The 
current study is interested in the interplay of factors that are part of these behaviour change 
models for security behaviours. A deductive approach was, therefore, considered more 
appropriate as it will allow an understanding of how these factors may differ for individual 
security behaviours but also allow additional factors to emerge from the interviews that may not 
have been covered by these models.  
Such an approach has proved useful to others. For example Searle, Vedhara, Norman, Frost, and 
Harrad (2000) utilised components of protection motivation theory in a qualitative application 
to investigate parents’ perspective of children’s compliance to wearing eye patches.  It has also 
been used to analyse existing qualitative data, a recent study by Davinson and Sillence (2014) 
explored financial-related security behaviour in an interview setting using the HBM to analyse 
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the data. They found the application of a behaviour change model in a qualitative setting to be 
useful in guiding understanding of factors influencing security behaviour in financial settings. 
Elicitation of behavioural determinants using theoretical models as a basis is an important 
approach in behaviour change as it ensures that underlying attitudes and beliefs are identified 
from the population under investigation. However, this approach has remained relatively 
untapped in the information security domain. A deductive approach for understanding 
components of PMT and TPB is therefore more suitable approach to address the research 
questions.  
3.1.2 | SECURITY AS A SENSITIVE TOPIC 
A qualitative approach may be a useful for understanding the behavioural context of 
information security; however it relies on honest and open discussions with participants. Within 
the workplace, employees have designated roles and responsibilities for undertaking their 
primary work tasks. Security, however, can be considered a secondary task (West,  2008). With 
primary tasks, employees have a clear understanding of how to perform and complete their job 
duties. However, secondary security tasks can be considered to be much more nebulous.  These 
task differences are further elaborated in the work of Gross and Rosson (2007) who argue that 
employees’ security management lacks the affordances of normal work tasks such as 
boundaries, constraints, specific goals and resources. Security is not multifaceted, time-bound or 
goal-oriented, and employees lack feedback on their efforts for performing security actions. 
Employees may have general awareness of security and practices but lack detailed knowledge 
(Gross & Rosson, 2007). Employees may therefore find it difficult to discuss security as they 
may view it secondary to their primary job tasks. Furthermore, security can be considered to be 
subject to social desirability bias as it is directly linked to an individual’s job performance and 
failure to comply with security practices can have disciplinary consequences towards 
employees. Researchers may find it difficult to elicit honest responses about compliance. For 
these reasons, security can be considered a sensitive issue and alternatives for approaches to 
engage employees are required to aid discussion of security practices and behaviours.  
Vignettes may be a suitable tool to help engage participants with sensitive cyber security 
discussion in interviews. Vignettes are versatile and can be used for a number of purposes 
including icebreakers to build rapport, elicit attitudes and beliefs about a topic, compare group 
differences and investigate topics that are sensitive to respondents (Barter & Renold, 1999). 
They have been used for a variety of sensitive issues including health and wellbeing-related 
concerns, such as suicide, relationship violence and drug taking (Hughes, 1998).  Vignettes can 
be presented in many forms such as videos but are typically in written format and often take the 
format of short stories presenting a fictional scenario in which the story places the behaviour of 
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the character in a concrete context and allows the researcher to explore participants’ views on 
the issues arising from the scenario. Vignettes are useful for exploring attitudes and beliefs 
towards behaviours and can be used to compensate for lack of personal experience of the 
behaviour under question. They can generate data untapped by other methods such as interviews 
and questionnaires allowing them to be used in isolation or in conjunction with other data 
collection techniques (Renold, 2002).  
3.1.3 | BEHAVIOUR CHANGE FACTORS IN THE WORKPLACE 
Security behaviours are protective actions that secure information and systems and can be best 
understood using theories that explain why individuals are motivated to protect themselves. 
PMT and TPB are two of the most commonly used theories in behavioural information security 
research (Lebek, Uffen, Neumann, Hohler, & Breitner, 2014). However, they have been widely 
studied quantitatively for understanding IS policy compliance and protective security 
behaviours in consumers. There has been little qualitative research exploring their utility for 
specific security behaviours in the workplace and how they may be moderated at the individual-
level within an organisational context. The current study, therefore, seeks to explore factors 
from these models qualitatively for a set of behaviours that comprise information security 
compliance to identify how they may be optimised to maximise security behaviour. These 
factors are shown in Figure 7: 
 
 
Figure 7. A combined model of behaviour change factors to be explored qualitatively  
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3.1.4 | ORGANISATIONAL INFLUENCERS ON BEHAVIOUR 
Information security research presently gives little attention to the antecedents of behaviour in 
organisations. Research principally uses general behaviour change theories (such as the TPB 
and PMT) to explain behaviour but these are not workplace-specific. Using existing behaviour 
theories will help to provide a clearer picture of the complexities surrounding what causes 
secure and insecure behaviour in the workplace. However, there may be organisational factors 
that are not covered by these models which may be important. Behaviour becomes more 
complex under the constraints of different environments so greater consideration is needed on 
potential organisaitonal factors that may influence employees’ behaviour. The study of 
organisational behaviour explores how employees behave within the workplace and may 
provide insight into other potential factors. There are many definitions of organisational 
behaviour that focus on the interplay of situated social behaviour that is shaped by the 
communities, beliefs, values and employment systems and practices of the organisation (Clegg 
& Hardy, 1999).  
Two unexplored factors that may be important for security behaviour in the workplace and are 
of interest to this thesis are organisational citizenship behaviour and psychological ownership 
discussed in section 2.2.6.5.2 and 2.2.5.5 respectively. The current study seeks to explore if 
there are differences between the two recruited organisations in these constructs. As discussed 
in the literature review, both are organisational constructs that influence employees job 
performance and may play a role in their security behaviour. Intellectual property is of 
particular interest as employees may experience a connection with this information and perceive 
it as “theirs” (Pierce et al., 2003) and higher levels of psychological ownership towards a target 
leads to enhanced protective strategies (Dipboye, 1977; Korman, 1970). Academic and research 
institutions both work with information that can be considered intellectual property, but may 
have differing organisational procedures pertaining to intellectual property and ownership. The 
two organisations for the current study were chosen as a “close match” in terms of types of job 
and research outputs. Similarly, citizenship differences between the organisations may explain 
potential differences in the qualitative findings. 
3.2 | METHOD 
3.2.1 |  APPROACH 
This study used a semi-structured qualitative approach of vignette based one-to-one interviews 
and employed framework analysis to elicit factors that influence security behaviours. Interviews 
were chosen over focus groups as the topic of security was considered sensitive as it is linked to 
an employees’ job performance.  
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3.2.2 |  PARTICIPANTS  
A purposeful sample of 20 participants were recruited from two organisations (a university & 
industry research institution) from the North of England and South of Scotland. All recruited 
participants were (1) currently in full-time employment, (2) used a computer for work tasks on a 
daily basis and (3) dealt with sensitive information classified under the Data Protection Act 
(1998) or information considered sensitive to their company’s intellectual property. 
3.2.2.1 | Organisation 1 
Organisation 1 was a university based in the North of England.  5 males and 5 females took part 
from this institution, aged between 25-49 years (mean =33.5, SD=9.07). The tenure ranged from 
9 months to 15 years with an average tenure of 3.78 (SD=4.25) years. Of the 10 that took part, 4 
were on permanent contracts while 6 were on temporary contracts. All participants used a 
computer for more than 4 hours daily. Only 1 participant had read the information security 
policy which was in the last 1-6 months. All participants used personally-owned devices in the 
workplace and 9/10 conducted work tasks on their personally-owned devices. 7 of these 
participants also stored personal data on their work devices. 
3.2.2.2 | Organisation 2 
Organisation 2 was an industry research institution based in the East of Scotland. 4 males and 6 
females took part, aged between 26-57 years (mean age of 39.10, SD=10.61), tenure ranged 
from 5 months to 27 years with an average tenure of 11.12 (SD=10.89) years. 8 of those 
participants were on permanent contracts while 2 were on temporary contracts.  9/10 
participants used the computer for more than 4 hours daily while one used the computer for 
three to four hours. 9/10 participants had read the information policy, of which 2 had read the 
policy in the last 1-6 months, 2 had read the policy 6-12 months ago and 5 had read the policy 
more than 12 months ago.  
All participants used personally-owned devices in the workplace, 6 participants conducted work 
tasks on their personally-owned devices and 7 participants also stored personal data on their 
work devices.  
3.2.3 |   MATERIALS  
3.2.3.1 | Questionnaire  
Participants were required to complete a short questionnaire to gather demographic and 
background information about their gender, age, employment sector, tenure, usage of work 
computers and personal devices.  Questions were included that assessed determinants that were 
deemed difficult to explore within the interview context. These were organisational citizenship 
behaviour and psychological ownership.  
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Organisational citizenship behaviour  was measured using the OCB-O questionnaire developed 
by Lee and Allen (2002). The scale consists of 8 items (e.g. Defend the organisation when other 
employees criticise it). All items were measured on a 7 point scale that ranged from 1 (never) to 
7 (always) in which participants indicated the extent to which they perform the citizenship 
behaviours. See  
Appendix A for full scale. 
Psychological ownership was measured using 4 items based on the scale from Anderson and 
Agarwal (2010) in which the target was changed to reflect the work computer and work data. 2 
items measured the subscale of psychological ownership of work data (e.g. I feel a high degree 
of personal ownership for the data stored on the device I use at work). A further 2 items 
measured the subscale of psychological ownership of the work computer (e.g. I sense that the 
device I use at work is MINE). All items were scored on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. Participants were required to indicate the extent to which they agreed 
with the statements. See Appendix B for full scale. 
3.2.3.2 | Information Security Policies Review 
Due to the vast array of behaviours depicted within security policies, a review was conducted of 
25 information security policies available online and revealed 11 behavioural categories with 
expected security behaviours. These behavioural categories are displayed in Table 4. The 
categories represent shared consistency across the policies, while the actual behaviours within 
each sub-category varied depending on the company. This current study will explore what 
influences and prevents security behaviours within these categories, these categories are 
therefore used as a basis for the interview guide.  
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Table 4. Behavioural security categories 
Category Description Example behaviours from policy 
Remote 
working 
Actions for working on mobile 
devices and in external locations 
Avoid accessing sensitive information when 
connected to public Wi-Fi 
Removable 
media 
Portable storage devices that 
can be connected to and removed 
from a computer (e.g. USB 
sticks) 
USB keys and other removable media must 
be encrypted 
User access 
management 
How access controls are 
allocated and managed 
Strong passwords should be used e.g. have at 
least seven characters, include one or more 
numerical digits 
Prevention of 
malicious 
software 
Actions to prevent malicious 
software 
Users must not alter, bypass, disable or 
remove the anti-virus software from computers 
Breaches of 
security 
Steps for recovering and 
reporting security incidences 
Employees must report suspected breaches 
to a nominated point of contact i.e. IT services 
Physical 
security 
Strategies to physically protect 
infrastructures, information and 
information resources 
All personal and sensitive business 
information held in any form (e.g. on paper, 
memory sticks etc.), should be locked away 
when unattended and not left on desks. 
Information 
control 
Responsibility in protection, 
storage and processing of 
information 
Employees must store company information 
on the designated drive and not on the 
computer’s C: Drive 
Software & 
Systems 
Software and system 
acquisition, installation and 
maintenance 
Software must be authorised prior to 
installation 
Acceptable 
usage 
Appropriate usage of 
information systems, email and 
the internet 
Employees must not use their email to 
violate any laws, interfere with network users, 
services, or equipment, or harass other users 
Continuity 
planning 
Outlines prevention and 
recovery from internal and 
external threats 
All users of portable devices for example 
laptops, PDA’s, smart phones and USB 
memory sticks must ensure the information is 
also stored on the network drives. 
Compliance to 
legislation 
Compliance to legislation acts 
such as the data protection act 
(1998) 
Employees must conform to freedom of 
information requests 
3.2.3.3 | Interview guide  
The interview was semi-structured to allow exploration of key issues and themes pertinent to 
the research question while also allowing flexibility to probe the unexpected issues that are 
important to the participant (Hutchinson & Wilson, 1992). As such, an interview guide was 
developed to lead the course of the interview and elicit the behavioural determinants that have 
been investigated in security research. The guide covered the behavioural categories identified 
from a review of information security policies to ensure that the scope of information security 
was covered by the interviews. The behavioural categories (see Table 4) were explored via the 
vignettes and further discussion with participants. For the behaviours discussed, the questions 
within the interview guide were targeted to elicit their potential determinants. See Table 5 for 
explored behavioural determinants and example questions. It was also of interest to explore 
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potential factors that were not covered by the previous research, so further discussion on 
security behaviour not covered by the interview guide was encouraged.  
Table 5. Example questions from interview guide 
Determinant Example elicitation questions 
Self-efficacy If you want to perform these behaviours, how certain are you that you can? 
Experiential Attitude What do you like/dislike about these behaviours? 
Instrumental Attitude What are the advantages and disadvantages of performing these behaviours? 
 
Social pressures Who would encourage/ discourage you to perform these behaviours? 
Response efficacy How effective do you think these behaviours are in reducing threats and why? 
Response cost What are the costs in terms of monetary, time and effort in performing these 
behaviours? 
Perceived 
Susceptibility 
How vulnerable to a threat are you by not performing these behaviours? 
Perceived severity What are the potential consequences of not performing these behaviours? 
3.2.3.4 | Vignettes  
Sixteen vignettes were developed for the current study covering issues related to the security 
behavioural categories identified from the review of information security policies. The vignettes 
were used to provide a safe way to open discussion on security for each behavioural category 
and to encourage honest disclosure from participants.  
These scenarios were designed based on recommendations in previous research. As a result, the 
vignettes remained relatively mundane and avoided unusual events and characters, while also 
appearing realistic to the respondent (Barter & Renold, 1999; Finch, 1987). The vignettes also 
had to provide enough contextual information so that respondents had a clear understanding of 
the situation but be ambiguous enough to ensure that multiple solutions exist (Wason, Polonsky, 
& Hyman, 2002). As such, the scenarios were designed based on common security incidences 
related to the eleven categories identified from the information security policies.  
Additional vignettes were provided for categories that had many sub-categories. Common 
security incidences were identified through security provider’s reports, news reports, and the 
research teams’ knowledge and experience. The vignettes focused on basic security hygiene 
behaviours required by all users (Stanton et al., 2005). The wording of vignettes was 
particularly important to ensure that they did not influence the respondent (Wason et al., 2002) 
and were designed to avoid stating the consequences of the characters action (as the study was 
assessing perceived severity). The vignettes remained ambiguous in whether the behaviour and 
situation portrayed was secure or insecure. Avoiding the consequences of the characters’ action, 
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enabled assessment by the participant of the implications of the characters actions. This 
approach is outlined by Seguin and Ambrosio (2002) who argue that vignettes should have 
unresolved issues and finish at the height of tension in the story. The vignettes were neutral and 
covered behaviours people may not perceive as insecure but are known to be risky from a 
security perspective.  See Figure 8 for an example vignette and Appendix C for all vignettes 
used.   
 
Figure 8. Example cyber security vignette 
3.2.3.5 | Pilot study 
The study was piloted with 8 employees to assess the appropriateness of the methodology and 
the use of vignettes. To evaluate the suitability of the vignettes, 4 participants took part in an 
interview with vignettes while another 4 participated in an interview without the vignettes. The 
pilot found that while the vignettes did not lead to more insecure behaviours disclosed by 
employees; they were useful for exploring participants underlying beliefs and attitudes towards 
security in the workplace. Furthermore, they proved beneficial in understanding employee’s 
awareness and knowledge of particular insecurities and addressing whether participants would 
engage in the behaviour. Based on the pilot, the vignettes and interview guide were taken 
forward to the main study.  
3.2.4 | PROCEDURE 
The full interview guide and procedure can be found in Appendix D. 
Participants who met the criteria for participation were recruited using internal emails in the 
participating organisations. Participants were interviewed individually, in a private room at their 
organisation and on arrival were asked to read an information sheet covering all aspects of the 
investigation, including the purpose of the study and what they were required to do. They then 
provided written informed consent. Participants then completed a demographic questionnaire 
that was followed by a semi-structured interview lasting 45-60 minutes.  
Participants were first introduced to a topic area (see Table 4) in which the researcher provided 
a short description of the topic. Participants were then presented with a vignette related to 
individual behaviours from the topic area and asked to imagine how they would react in that 
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scenario. Following this, discussion centred on how participants currently behave in the 
workplace for each IS policy area. At this point, the interview guide was used to elicit 
behavioural influencers for the behaviours discussed. Participants were then given the 
opportunity to provide any other factors or reasons for their behaviour not covered by the 
interview guide.  
On completion of the study, participants were presented with a debrief sheet that fully explained 
the purpose of the investigation and re-emphasized participants right to withdraw their data. 
Participants were all entered into a prize draw to win a £50 Amazon voucher.   Following 
interview completion, the interviews were transcribed verbatim.   
3.2.5 | ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
The data was analysed in NVivo 9 using the principles of thematic (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and 
framework analysis (Ritchie & Spencer, 2002) and verified by conducting a mini-audit by two 
members of research staff at Northumbria University, who agreed with the theme constructs. 
The current study used the five-step (see Figure 9) procedure set out by Srivastava and 
Thomson (2009).  
 
Figure 9. Framework analysis procedure 
  
Mapping and Interpretation: 
Development of schematic diagram to guide data interpretation 
Indexing and charting: 
Index and use charts to map data and classify under headings 
Identifying a thematic framework:  
Utilise existing framework and identify any themes not anticipated by the framework  
Familiarisation:  
Become immersed in data by transcribing and re-reading transcripts 
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3.3 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.3.1 | PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP AND ORGANISATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 
BEHAVIOUR 
Data was scored and entered into SPSS where independent sample t-tests were conducted to 
investigate differences between the organisations.  
Table 6. Means (and standard deviations) of psychological ownership of data and technology and 
organisational citizenship of employees from the research and education companies 
 Psychological ownership 
of data 
Psychological ownership 
of technology 
OCB-O 
 
Research institution 4.75 (1.01) 4.60 (1.17) 4.85 (.66) 
Education institution 4.35 (.88) 4.35 (.82) 4.28 (.65) 
 
The findings suggest no significant differences were found between the two organisations for 
perceived data ownership (t(18)=-.944, p=.358), perceived technology ownership (t(18)=-.533, 
p=.587) or organisational citizenship behaviours (t(18)=-1.96, p=.066).  
3.3.2 | THEMES 
Seven themes emerged from the framework analysis of the data. Table 7 provides an overview 
of these themes and Figure 10 provides an overview of how these themes may link together and 
influence security behaviour. Response evaluation stems from PMT but with the addition of 
perceived benefits. Threat evaluation also stems from PMT but also gives attention to 
employees’ information sensitivity appraisal and their individual threat models. Knowledge, 
experience, security responsibility and personal and work boundaries emerged from the data and 
did not necessarily confound to PMT or TPB. Security behaviour also emerged as a final theme 
and consisted of three levels of security hygiene. The following sections will be dedicated to 
discussing these themes individually.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
77 
 
 
Table 7. Summary of emergent themes 
Theme Brief description 
Response Evaluation Assessment of security behaviours as characterised by response 
efficacy, perceived benefits and response costs. 
Threat Evaluation 
Appraisal of the threats to information security as influenced by 
individual threat models, susceptibility, severity and information 
sensitivity appraisal. 
Knowledge Knowledge of security risks and protective actions and the sources that contribute to this knowledge 
Experience Previous experience of security including security breaches and 
work experience 
Security Responsibility Whom employees perceive is responsible for security in their 
workplace 
Personal and Work 
Boundaries Boundaries individuals have between personal and work 
Security Behaviour The actions employees take to ensure information security which is 
categorised as either high, medium or low-security hygiene 
 
 
Figure 10. Thematic framework of security behaviour 
 
3.3.2.1 | Response evaluation 
Prior to undertaking a security action, employees evaluate the response and its associated 
outcomes. This is referred to as response evaluation which is characterised by; response 
efficacy, perceived benefits and response costs. See Figure 11 for visualisation of the response 
evaluation theme.  
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Figure 11. Thematic map of Response Evaluation 
3.3.2.1.1 | Response costs  
Security behaviours require different levels of input and effort on behalf of the user. The 
findings from this study indicate that employees appear to make a decision about whether to 
execute a security action, which is based on an appraisal of the costs associated with it. The 
major cost concerning employees is the degree to which security impacts on their job as there 
appears to be a “productivity threshold” regarding security actions. This can lead to a number of 
behavioural outcomes, for instance, the employee circumventing the security process or 
disregarding the security behaviour. This security vs. productivity imbalance was apparent for 
behaviours relating to information access such as password restrictions.  Furthermore, tasks 
such as restarting the work computer for security updates were also seen as impacting on 
productivity. Employees recognise the disturbance these restarts cause to their workflow and 
will subsequently postpone the task until a period of low inactivity or until the end of the 
working day.  
“I will postpone it (the computer), postponing security updates happens a lot 
because they usually time them at really inconvenient times.. it’s like well do you 
want me to do my job?....” [P14, Company 2] 
This security vs. productivity imbalance is also evident in software acquisition procedures. 
Organisations often place restrictions on the software employees can install on their work 
machines, requiring administration rights and authorisation for the installation of new software.  
There were organisational differences in the current study with regards to how the companies 
mandate software acquisition. The university has a very restrictive system where users have no 
administration rights, employees can only install pre-authorised software or seek IT services to 
deploy a computer administrator to install additional software. The research institution, on the 
other hand, had a less restrictive system allowing employees to freely install software. Both 
organisations had the option of allowing employees to install authorised licenced from the 
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company network. The lack of installation restriction meant that employees did not consider the 
licencing agreements of software and would download software without consultation from IT 
including pirated and open access versions.  
There are also monetary and time costs associated with acquiring legitimate software. Official 
procedures for software acquisition are considered “time-consuming” due to the organisational 
process for procuring new software. Furthermore, new software requires allocated budget to be 
able to purchase the product. However, employees recognise that there is not often budget 
available, in which employees express a “don’t bother” attitude that leads to risky software 
acquisition such as the downloading of freeware obtainable online. 
“but because I know it is going to end up as a no anyway I just don’t bother with 
that.. just save yourself the grief and go and get the free thing, that does the job 
equally well without the hassle..” [P14, Company 2] 
Security vs. productivity is the largest response cost that employees are faced with as it directly 
affects “doing their job”. However, there are other response costs employees associate with 
security behaviours. Monetary costs were mentioned less and typically referred to the 
acquisition of software for personal devices such as purchasing anti-virus on their own laptop. 
Cognitive demands were another major cost which occurred as a result of using passwords. 
Passwords are a form of knowledge-based authentication which relies on the user to remember a 
password to validate them as the user. Many online services require passwords with their own 
strength requirements. In addition to this, employees also have their workplace passwords to 
remember which they may be forced to change regularly by their organisation. The result of this 
is that employees have many passwords that they are required to remember, with different 
password requirements resulting in high cognitive demand on the user. 
“Well passwords.. you know actually after many years using computers the 
passwords just get longer and more complicated to remember, most of them are 
just randomly generated letters and numbers which can make them hard to 
remember especially if you.. well especially if you have to change them” [P6, 
Company 1] 
Not all security behaviours have response costs as some actions require minimal time and effort 
on behalf of the users. Specifically, the security behaviours of locking the computer, keeping a 
clear screen and desk policy, and checking physical environments when working in public 
locations were seen as having minimal costs. Employees recognise that these less costly 
behaviours become more of a “habit” to ensure they follow through with the action.  
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“.. there is no real effort on my part and I mean ultimately it is CTRL ALT DEL 
and you have locked your computer and that’s all it is.. so it’s not exactly an effort 
from my perspective.. that’s probably it.. it doesn’t delay me or put a burden on 
what I am doing generally.. I imagine it would be effort.. I would be a little bit 
more resistant if there was a lot more effort.. for me to do stuff…” [P4, Company 2] 
Perceived response costs are part of PMT (Rogers, 1983) and previous research has mixed 
findings with regards to response costs and security behaviours with a number of studies not 
supporting a relationship (Crossler et al., 2014; Crossler, 2010; Gurung et al., 2009; Ifinedo, 
2011; Ng et al., 2009). However, this study supports the negative relationship between response 
cost and compliance intention (Herath & Rao, 2009b), anti-malware software (Chenoweth et al., 
2009) and intentions to engage in password protective behaviours (Zhang & McDowell, 2009).  
The current study suggests that different security behaviours have a different set of response 
costs that are not equally as costly as suggested by the IS policy compliance paradigm. These 
differences in response costs by security behaviour may account for the mixed results in the 
security literature.  The findings also support the “compliance budget” that suggests that 
individuals’ choice to comply or not comply is determined by the perceived costs and benefits 
(Beautement et al., 2009). 
3.3.2.1.2 | Perceived benefits  
Another aspect of an individual’s response evaluation refers to their perceived benefits of 
performing security actions. Overall, it emerged that employees understood the benefits of 
security behaviours regarding protection of information and technology from malicious others, 
and maintaining the confidentiality of data.  
“Again advantages are that you can keep your information secure.. you can be 
confident that.. you’re taking responsibility” [P2, company 1] 
There was also an overall perception of “layers of security” in which the individual security 
actions help contribute to the overall picture of information security.  
“It’s like having a burglary, if you leave your door open it’s like inviting someone 
in but if you put extra locks on, it's deterring them so I think the stronger your 
password is, the more of a deterrent it is to people..”  [P8, Company 1] 
Reassurance in security was another perceived benefit within an individual’s response 
evaluation. Employees gain reassurance that their actions are aiding information security and 
they feel safer in what they are doing.  
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“I like it (anti-virus) because I think it’s important, it gives you an element of 
security that what you are using is safe… so you don’t have to worry as much..” 
[P8, Company 1] 
“.. well I think having it there, whether it’s effective or not just makes me feel just 
a little bit safer..” [P1, Company 1] 
3.3.2.1.3 | Response efficacy   
This sub-theme is an individual’s assessment of the effectiveness of security behaviours. The 
findings from the current study indicated that employees struggle to evaluate the effectiveness 
of security actions as they lack awareness and feedback on security behaviour.  
“I don’t know. Again I’m not a techie so I am not really sure but.. I mean I don’t 
know, if you password protected it whether somebody could still access it, I don’t 
know. I guess they probably could” [P4, Company 1] 
Feedback appears to play an important role when employees evaluate security behaviour. 
Gaining information regarding their security performance allows them to assess how effective it 
is. A lack of feedback about security behaviour indicates that employees cannot develop an 
awareness of the utility of the security action. This indicates that there is an “action-feedback” 
gap in employees’ information security efforts. 
“The one time that I did get a virus on an email.. the computer picked up on it 
straight away and I just rang IT and they came and got rid of it so obviously that is 
protecting the computer.. erm. so yeah.. effective..” [P5, Company 1] 
“They say things that if you don’t notice something has gone wrong that that is a 
sign of effectiveness, that’s what they say so I am gonna go with I think it is 
working (antivirus)..” [P14, Company 2] 
Furthermore, individuals’ estimates of security response efficacy directly relates to their 
perceived susceptibility. As discussed in the “Susceptibility” sub-theme of threat evaluation, 
individuals perceive different levels of susceptibility depending on a physical or cyber security 
threat.  Employees’ response efficacy is capped as there is an overall “sense of insecurity” in 
their actions in which hackers or the IT savvy can still get access, undermining the effectiveness 
of their security efforts. However, they do perceive their efforts as effective against the average 
end user or criminal.  
“I think it’s (encryption) effective.. if someone really wants to find out what is on 
there.. they will find out.. if they are a hacker.. but it’s enough to stop.. like if Joe 
picked it and put it into his computer and it said you can’t read this file because it 
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is password protected or encrypted in some way.. it may be enough to stop him 
and just hand it and say I have found this.. so again I think it is a good enough 
deterrent and as I say if someone for whatever reason really wanted what was on 
that stick.. I am sure they could find ways of cracking the encryption but it is a 
good enough deterrent for 90% of the population..” [P19, Company 2] 
Regarding behaviours that were perceived to be most effective for security, the current study 
also asked participants to pick three security behaviours that they perceived to be most 
important for information security (the findings of which are presented in Table 8).  
Table 8. The perceived effective security behaviours and their frequency, ranked from most 
prevalent to least prevalent 
Category Behaviour Frequency 
Access controls  (n=19) 
Don’t write passwords down 1 
Use strong passwords 11 
Use access controls (physical and online) 3 
Change passwords regularly 4 
Physical security  (n=9) 
Protect physical documents 2 
Physical storage of information 1 
Use ID badges 2 
Use lockable cabinets for physical data 2 
Locking computers 2 
Awareness and 
responsibility 
 (n=7) 
Treat information confidentially 1 
An awareness of security implications 1 
Personal responsibility for security 1 
Awareness of contemporary practice 1 
Don’t share information unnecessarily 1 
Awareness of location of company-issued hardware 1 
Careful of opening files on your computer 1 
Use security 
software 
 (n=6) 
Use anti-virus software 2 
Use firewalls 4 
Removable media  (n=4) 
Use encryption with removable media 1 
Not storing information on removable media 2 
Don’t use removable media 1 
Internet Security  (n=3) 
More cautious and careful online 2 
Don’t download stuff you shouldn’t 1 
Email security  (n=2) 
Non-disclosure of personal details over email 2 
Company 
Procedures 
 (n=2) 
More regular security training 1 
Use IT resources 1 
Business continuity  (n=1) 
Back up data 1 
Personal Usage  (n=1) 
Don’t store personal information on work computer 1 
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The findings show that access control behaviours were perceived to be most important for 
security, followed by physical security behaviours and an awareness and responsibility of 
security. Using security software and security with removable media were also seen as 
important. The findings indicate that while employees struggle to evaluate security actions, they 
do place more importance on some security behaviours over others.  
A large number of models within the behaviour change domain means that these models share 
overlapping constructs however it has been argued that they are more similar than dissimilar 
(Maddux, 1999) in their theoretical underpinnings. One particular overlapping construct is 
outcome expectancy that refers to an individual’s expectations of the outcomes that will follow 
a given behaviour (Williams, Anderson, & Winett, 2005) including the positive and negative 
consequences of acting and not acting. Perceived benefits and response efficacy form part of an 
individual’s outcome expectancies. Perceived benefits in the current study, however, refers to 
individuals’ estimation of the advantages of engaging in security behaviours that may be distinct 
from an individual’s efficacious perceptions. These factors have received little research in 
security.  
The role of response efficacy in email security behaviour (Ng et al., 2009),  intention to comply 
with security policies (Ifinedo, 2011), attitude toward security policies (Herath & Rao, 2009b), 
and intention to adopt anti-spyware software (Chenoweth et al., 2009; Gurung et al., 2009; 
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010) has been supported. However, recent research has not supported 
this relationship (Siponen et al., 2014; Vance et al., 2012) and recent literature reviews 
(Sommestad et al., 2014) on security compliance have found that response efficacy to be one of 
the worse predictors of compliance and IS misuse. This study highlights a potential barrier to 
high response efficacy that may account for the disparity in existing research. Currently, 
employees cannot evaluate their security efforts as they lack feedback on their performance. 
However, they did indicate which behaviours they think are most effective for security with 
those relating to access controls having most perceived utility. PMT argues that response 
efficacy is part of coping appraisal and that higher levels of response efficacy will increase the 
likelihood of engaging in the behaviour. This study suggests that employees do not receive 
feedback or information regarding security actions and the effectiveness of these actions. Lack 
of/low response efficacy may, therefore, be a potential barrier to security behaviour within the 
workplace. 
3.3.2.2 | Threat Evaluation 
Employees undergo an evaluation of the security threats to information and systems. This is 
related to their individual threat models, their information sensitivity appraisal, their perceived 
susceptibility and perceived severity. See Figure 12 for a visualisation of the theme. 
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Figure 12. Thematic map of Threat Evaluation 
3.3.2.2.1 | Information sensitivity appraisal  
It emerged that the information employees work with holds high or low information sensitivity. 
However, the latter was more prevalent in this sample. This appraisal was often based on an 
assessment of the “value” of the information that they deal with which entailed a comparison to 
data with a perceived higher sensitivity such as health-related and financial-related information.   
 “Again, vulnerable in the respect that I could probably do more but at the same 
time, I am not sure what other people could do with the stuff that I leave lying 
around, it’s not highly confidential or anything like that.. its.. I guess there are 
levels of data that need to be kept secure.. I haven’t got peoples’ bank details or 
anything like that..” [P9, Company 1] 
“yeah not a clever one.. having your password written down, in your bag.. again I 
can relate to having to remember passwords all the time can be difficult.. I think 
you have got to think of a better way of giving yourself a reminder than having 
that exposed especially if it has got patient.. at that level healthcare that’s.. you 
couldn’t take any chances with that sort of thing so..” [P12, Company 2] 
Furthermore, employees’ appraisal also involved consideration of the “audience” for the 
information and their preconceptions of who can use the data that they store.     
“It’s not an equally weighted.. it’s not an objective.. there is no objective value to 
this information that somebody has given us.. because to the vast majority of 
people it means absolutely nothing.. it’s pointless and they would not bothered 
even if they were found out” [P2, Company 1] 
This supports research by Adams & Sasse (1999) who found that employees’ perceptions of 
information sensitivity interacted with their perceptions of organisational security. They found 
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that employees rated information about individuals as more sensitive than commercially 
sensitive company information and placed security as a higher priority on some systems than 
others. The current study further demonstrates this appraisal through employees’ evaluation of 
the value and audience of the information they work with in their job.  
3.3.2.2.2 | Susceptibility  
Perceptions of susceptibility to security threats appeared to be an important factor in employees’ 
behaviour. Perceived levels of susceptibility differ across participants and vary depending on 
environmental or online threats.  
Environmental threats to information and systems involve a physical attempt (i.e. offline) to 
infiltrate the information security of organisations which can include the attempts of criminals 
and malicious employees.  Susceptibility to these kinds of threats appears to be low amongst 
most employees as they perceive low threat likelihood. Individuals perceive that environmental 
threats will be malicious others acting in a more opportunistic manner rather than pre-meditated. 
Individuals appear to hold an optimism bias with environmental threats, comparing the 
likelihood of a physical threat to other employees or other organisations.  
“Yeah the physical security I feel fairly protected.. anti-virus, hopefully protected 
by the IT department.. I would say also because of the likelihood of people who 
surround me to come and search through my files is just next to zero so yeah I feel 
very secure” [P3, Company 1] 
“it’s perfectly safe until somebody wants to get in comes along so you know… so 
in that respect it’s probably absolutely safe 99.99% of the time to leave completely 
personal information all over your computer and leave it unlocked because the 
majority of people that come into contact with it will not be interested and not 
want access to it and not want to do anything with it.. so it’s only to protect for 
that minority of times.. for that possibility that somebody might want it and want 
access to it..” [P2, Company 1] 
With regards to cyber threats, employees perceive themselves to be highly susceptible to this 
type of threat. There appears to be an overall sense of insecurity or learned helplessness in 
behaviour online. This is particularly related to employees’ response efficacy of security 
behaviours. Individuals have an estimation of the effectiveness of different types of security 
behaviours and practices. However they feel that “hackers can still get access” and the “IT 
savvy can still bypass security”. Employees understand the importance of implementing 
security behaviours however they feel that their efforts can still be circumvented regardless of 
the level of security that they implement. 
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“I have no idea.. probably they are (passwords) effective if you are going to 
protect yourself against somebody.. if you want to kind of see security from the 
person next to you however in terms of people whose job it is to break passwords.. 
probably not very effective and do realise that there are people  out there whose 
vocation is to break people's passwords and virus people's computers so probably 
not.. I have no idea…” [P3, Company 1]  
“For somebody like me I think your password would be enough to bar me from 
accessing your information, logging into your computer but I think somebody who 
had good sound IT knowledge could probably bypass them and get into other 
people’s information” [P7, Company 1] 
The relationship between levels of susceptibility and engagement in security behaviours has 
mixed support in the literature. Its relationship with IS policy compliance intention has 
consistently been supported (Ifinedo, 2011; Siponen et al., 2014) as has its role in anti-virus 
software usage (Lee et al., 2008). A potential reason for the lack of support in previous studies 
is that their conceptualization of threats is often non-specific and they do not refer to types of 
threat (e.g. Vance et al., 2012).  This study demonstrates that an individual’s threat assessment 
differs depending on an online or offline threat, with online having higher perceived 
susceptibility amongst employees. Previous studies do not make this distinction when assessing 
perceptions of susceptibility. Perceived susceptibility to online threats is closely linked with 
response efficacy, i.e. they do not believe they are protected even if they behave securely.    
3.3.2.2.3 | Threat models 
Employees appear to have different security threat models. This is related to their knowledge of 
security risks, their perceptions of appropriate security actions and perceived likelihood of 
threats. For example, there appears to be a large difference in attitudes towards writing down 
passwords. Some employees perceive this as being highly insecure and wouldn’t engage in this 
behaviour, suggesting that they have more of a concern for physical threats than online threats 
in password security. 
“I am quite conscious that someone can find a scrap of paper that I have written 
with a scrap of paper with important company stuff on so I don’t do that.. even for 
my personal stuff I don’t do it” [P14, Company 2] 
Some employees, on the other hand, may perceive this as being insecure but balance the 
likelihood of an online threat vs. an environmental threat, in which they perceive the latter as 
being less likely so engage in this potentially risky physical behaviour. 
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“I just have like a note.. well.. I have a note with all passwords for all the different 
places where I need stuff, like online because there is too many passwords to 
remember so I need to have them written down somewhere.. “[P1, Company 10] 
Other differences in threat perceptions were noted for working remotely and allowing 
unauthorised users to use work devices, locking work computers, and using encryption on 
removable media. 
3.3.2.2.4 | Perceived severity  
There was disparity in perceived severity of security breaches and the severity of security non-
compliance consequences. Employees were highly aware of the consequences to their 
organisation’s reputation and the potential implications of this. For example, competitors getting 
hold of their company’s intellectual property and breaching legislation such as the DPA (1998). 
“again other than the competitive threat that we are developing something that we 
don’t want the competition to know about and they get access to that 
information.... you know something like that I guess would be of value to the 
competition so that they would then have time to put a counter strategy together” 
[P16, Company 2] 
“I guess anybody can get access to any sort of information, even if they shouldn’t 
and that can lead to all kinds of issues and data protection laws and even just the 
sort of stuff that we have here like student files.. that a student should give you 
their information in the knowledge that only the people who should have access to 
it, have access to it.. so I guess, I mean the issues.. the.. the massive aren’t they.. 
the potential for press, the press could get hold of the fact that the information 
isn’t kept secure so that is all sorts of stuff blown out of all proportion typically..” 
[P9, Company 1] 
The impact towards technology, following a security breach, was also a consequence that 
employees had a high awareness of. This was primarily the consequences of downloading a 
virus or other malicious software to the work machine and the effect this can have on the 
organisation’s network. 
“if it’s a really bad virus it can like infect your computer and I can assume it 
kind… like.. if somewhere like here, I’m not sure how realistic it is but I suppose 
technically it could affect the whole university system which would cause massive 
outrage and whatever, so I think you would get into a lot of trouble for doing stuff 
like that and I think it would have large consequences” [P8, Company 1] 
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Employees’ perceptions of consequences to themselves were relatively mixed as employees 
were not aware of company action if they cause a breach in security. However, employees held 
assumptions about potential consequences that were often disciplinary actions or reduction in 
their own and companies’ productivity. Consequences to others were considered less and 
included dissatisfied service users and distressed service users.  
“I am not aware of the consequences for it.. I mean I am aware of the kind of 
potential problems that you could cause, and the stress you could cause people if 
any information was disclosed about a particular person but I don’t know if I did 
something that caused a problem within the university systems I don’t know what 
action would be taken” [P7, Company 1] 
Previous research has focused on the role of perceived severity in IS policy compliance (Herath 
& Rao, 2009b; Siponen et al., 2014), and anti-spyware adoption (Chenoweth et al., 2009; 
Gurung et al., 2009). The role of perceived severity on anti-virus adoption (Lee et al., 2008), 
being cautious with emails that have attachments (Ng et al., 2009) and other IS policy literature 
(Ifinedo, 2011) is unclear. The findings suggest that individuals perceive consequences and 
severity differently. These are consequences towards the organisation, technology, 3rd parties 
and themselves. Within these levels, knowledge of the consequences also differs with less 
awareness of consequences towards others and oneself. This suggests that an individual’s 
perceived severity is not one overall construct but may comprise of different types of severity 
implications. This may account for the differences in existing research.  
3.3.2.3 | Experience 
Experience was an emergent theme from the current study and related to individuals 
experiences of security beaches and previous work experience. See Figure 13 for a visualisation. 
 
Figure 13. Thematic map of Experience 
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3.3.2.3.1 | Security breach experience  
The current study suggests that previous experience is important for current behaviour. Previous 
job roles and experiences of security threats (including viruses and phishing emails) appear to 
promote awareness and secure behaviour.  An employee’s experience of security breaches can 
lead to different courses of action depending on their evaluation of an effective response to the 
breach. If an employee misunderstands an effective response, this can lead to “security 
overreactions” in which they make take a scattergun approach to dealing with the breach to 
ensure recovery and continuity (e.g. deleting contacts and changing passwords following an 
account breach). 
“I mean I wouldn’t do anything.. I mean once.. something must have happened to 
my email address, my yahoo email address because people were just getting 
emails just saying “try this money making scheme” so as soon as I got that.. I 
deleted everyone off my contact lists because I had them somewhere else and 
change my passwords and things like that.. but other than that, nothing..” [P2, 
Company 1] 
Inappropriate behaviours are another form of “security overreactions” and can lead to non-use 
of accounts and concluding that devices are unusable following a virus and a new machine 
needs to be acquired. 
“Hotmail. Microsoft.. whoever owns it and yeah just couldn’t get back onto it and 
they wouldn’t allow it.. even though I gave them all the information that I could to 
say it was me.. they just said that it wasn’t enough information so gone… I don’t 
use it anymore..” [P1, Company 1] 
 “I could see that it is not a right file and he should I have no idea why I clicked on 
it and the computer is now very slow and unusable so we are going to be binning it 
or selling it for parts.. no reason for that and it shouldn’t be happening.. and we 
know that we should never disable the anti-virus.” [P3, Company 1]  
These experiences typically refer to personal experiences; however work-related experience also 
appears to be important for secure behaviour especially when it impacts on an employee’s 
productivity. For example, when an employee’s organisation experienced a virus breach it led to 
implications that affected the whole business operation. 
“it made me realise actually there is.. this is not some pen pusher saying don’t use 
pen drives.. it’s actually really serious and that was a good lesson for me and I 
think a lot of people don’t understand the importance of things like that but 
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because I have got experience of what happens.. of what could go wrong.. when it 
goes bad.. when it goes wrong it goes wrong really badly..” [P14, Company 2] 
3.3.2.3.2 | Work experience  
Previous job experience also appears to be important for current security behaviour. 
Organisations differ in their approaches to information security and subsequently their methods 
to promote security awareness and practices amongst employees. This is known as the security 
culture of an organisation which is their shared values and assumptions regarding information 
security. An organisation’s culture is idiosyncratic so there will be differences in the levels of 
security culture across companies.  Employees transfer their behaviour from previous 
organisations; this appears to be more evident in employees who come from organisations with 
a higher security culture than their current employer. 
“Again from my previous job there was, the company had a very very high.. it was 
very secretive company and there was a lot of examples where competitor 
espionage and things like that was.. it was a very regular occurrence and a very 
serious thing so security was.. it was like fort Knox over there most of the time so it 
just got drilled into you to lock your computer work station so that is just 
something that I brought with me to this job.. I notice that a lot of people don’t 
lock their work stations” [P14, Company 2] 
“I kind of have a habit of doing that anyway.. like I say I used to work in a bank 
and we used to always lock our computers.. but I think it’s just a habit really”. [P2, 
Company 1] 
However, not all behaviours are transferred as there appears to be a security threshold where 
employees will not transfer the behaviour if it requires too much effort on their part. For 
example, strong password enforcements in previous companies do not lead employees to adopt 
a strong password management practice in their current job if it is not enforced.  
“I have had the same password for the last 6 and a half years on my computer. I 
know I should change that, in my previous employer we got sent a reminder to 
change the password, I think it was every three months we had to change our 
password … I know I should change it but I just don’t have the memory space to 
do that.. I would forget what I had changed it to.” [P9, Company 1]. 
Experience has received little investigation in previous research but has been supported for anti-
spyware usage (Sriramachandramurthy et al., 2009), adoption of online privacy protections 
(Yao & Linz, 2008), and adoption of virus protection behaviour (Lee et al., 2008). Experience is 
also a source of information within PMT, influencing threat and coping appraisal. These 
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findings suggest that previous breach experience is important for current behaviour. 
Furthermore, employees’ experiences of security in previous jobs are also important and 
potential transferability of behaviour has not been formally explored in employee security 
behaviour. 
3.3.2.4 | Security-related knowledge 
The theme is illustrated in Figure 14 and comprises of sources of knowledge and knowledge of 
specific domains (i.e. security risks and security actions).  
 
 
Figure 14. Thematic map of Security Knowledge 
3.3.2.4.1 | Security risks  
Knowledge of security risks is diverse and varies depending on security behaviours and security 
threats. Awareness of risks specific to poor password management is most prevalent and 
indicates that employees can identify the risks associated with: using poor passwords, not 
changing passwords, the disclosure of passwords, recycling passwords and writing passwords 
down. Furthermore, knowledge of risks associated with employees having administrative rights, 
risks when working remotely, viruses and social engineering tactics such as phishing emails 
were also high. Knowledge of risks related to mobile devices, removable media and physical 
security were however quite mixed, with mobile devices in particular an area where employees 
lack awareness of the risks of using mobile devices and the potential susceptibility of these 
devices. 
3.3.2.4.2 | Security actions  
Knowledge of security actions was also mixed, particularly with regards to those which are 
formally set in their organisations information security policy. There were differences in 
employees’ knowledge of the security policy and its associated procedures between the two 
recruited companies. Information from the demographic questionnaire indicated that in the 
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academic institution only 1 employee out of the 10 recruited had read the policy compared to 
the other organisation in which 9 of the 10 employees had read their companies policy. While 
reading the policy does not indicate compliance with it or awareness of the entire content; it 
does appear to be a source of reference for some employees when determining appropriate 
security actions. Those who are unaware of their IS policy rely on their awareness of 
appropriate security actions when behaving with information and technology and may depend 
more on other sources of knowledge to inform appropriate security actions (such as 
recommendations from fellow employees).  
Regarding security actions, encryption for removable media and work devices was the security 
action in which employees lacked most awareness of and sometimes there was clear confusion 
between the differences between encryption and password protection. Other security actions 
employees appeared to be knowledgeable about were those associated with; authenticating 
users, physical security of information and technology, and the prevention of malicious 
software.  Two-factor verification for cloud storage and email accounts were security actions 
that were mentioned less and could be behaviours that requires further awareness.  
3.3.2.4.3 | Sources of Knowledge  
Employees relied mainly on individuals within their workplace or social circle whom they 
regard as having “IT expertise” as a source of security information. In the workplace, this was 
employees from the IT department but can also be fellow colleagues or friends with IT 
expertise.  
“.. I think it’s pretty good.. I have got windows laptops and I have got a mac and.. 
I have done research on the different virus software that you can use which is 
freely available.. I only use the freeware stuff.. and I have asked my friends as well  
who are quite up on computers and what not and I make sure that I use kind of the 
same ones that they do..” [P1, Company 1].  
Fellow colleagues and line management were noted to a lesser extent as sources of knowledge 
and this most commonly related to the receiving of suspicious emails or files, in which case they 
would seek information from their immediate peers before contacting “IT expertise” sources.     
Other sources of knowledge were company procedures such as the IS policy or professional 
codes of conducts that cover aspects relating to the integrity of information and its security. For 
example, one employee has to sign non-disclosure agreements with service users and this 
influences their behaviour. 
“I probably used to leave my computer unlocked more.. but in the job that I do 
now we have to sign non-disclosure agreements so if you are working with a 
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university on certain things or different companies you have to sign NDAs and 
there have been some projects which have been deemed as pretty secret I guess so 
you have to sign them and say that you won’t talk to anybody about them.. you 
won’t.. and as part of signing them it says when you leave your desk you must lock 
your PC.. you will adhere to this and stuff so I am very aware of doing that..” [P19, 
Company 2] 
The media was another source of information such as reports about hacking to consumers and 
organisations and their associated consequences such as identity theft and fraud-related 
experience (individual) and network disruption and reputation (organisation). Media reports 
relating to security risks and their implications were also noted such as government bodies 
losing unencrypted USB sticks with sensitive information on it.  
“Well.. so far it’s not too bad right other than there has been a few cases where we 
have seen.. Facebook.. or LinkedIn passwords being cracked so the information 
that I have got on Facebook isn’t particularly of interest but of course then when 
you go into online banking and everything that’s when it starts to get a bit scary..” 
[P17, Company 2] 
3.3.2.5 | Personal and work boundaries 
The theme is illustrated in Figure 15 and refers to the boundaries employees have between work 
and personal life.  
 
Figure 15. Thematic map of Personal and Work Boundaries 
An important factor influencing secure and insecure behaviours is the degree to which 
individuals engage in personal activities on their work devices and the boundaries they have 
between home and the workplace. Those who have strong boundaries between home and work 
limit the personal usage they conduct, for example using the work email for work use only and 
limiting personal browsing on the internet. 
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“Well I try not to use it for anything personal so I don’t really email anybody 
outside of work with my work email, just try to use my home one so in that respect 
trying to limit that..” [P12, Company 2] 
“Well actually when I am at work I just do work to be honest and usually the sites 
and places that I visit on the web are educational resources or whatever.. I tend 
to.. I don’t think I don’t really surf the web and stuff and don’t just click on 
random links and stuff.... I just stick to work related things and like I assume those 
kind of resources are pretty clear.. IT also have a web filtering thing so that might 
help as well” [P6, Company 1] 
These strong boundaries also extend to outside of the physical workplace and relate to the use of 
work devices for personal usage when working remotely. Employees with strong personal 
boundaries use work devices solely for work purposes and don’t allow unauthorised users (e.g. 
family, friends) to use the devices.   
“I would suggest no, I mean personally I wouldn’t let somebody use it a work PC.. 
even to log them on as different user or something” [P13, Company 2] 
“Don’t let anyone else use the computer. No one would want to use the computer 
anyway but erm.. I don’t anyone else use it.... I don’t like leave it in anyone else’s 
care.. it’s always kind of, under my own care because it’s not my computer to pass 
around” [P8, Company 1] 
These individuals also demonstrate a preference for using work-issued devices over their 
personal devices for work tasks. They may, therefore, be less likely to engage in BYOD 
activities.  
“try not use personal devices.. that is as close as it gets.. I just view it as a work 
one, it’s just that I am using it with two different works.. I don’t use.. 
So what about that distinction of work and personal? 
I think it’s important in my mind having that line for a couple of reasons.. the 
information that is coming out of work, I don’t want it stored on my home stuff for 
any trace of it and there was another reason..”  [P4, Company 1] 
“Only to transfer files.. I don’t get my work email on my phone.. but that’s not 
actually to do with security but that’s to do with the fact that I don’t want to get my 
email on my phone.. my phone is my phone and I don’t work stuff coming through 
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on it.. It’s not the security aspect of it so I haven’t really considered the security 
aspects of it because it’s not something that I plan to do” [P17, Company 2] 
The role of technology in employees’ work/life balance is well documented in organisational 
psychology literature, ubiquitous access to the workplace can enhance individual productivity 
however can also inflate individual’s stress levels leading to job burnout (Peeters, Montgomery, 
Bakker, & Schaufeli, 2005). However, a strong work-life balance may also be important for 
security. Working remotely is a necessity in some job roles, however, optional in others. 
Limiting working remotely is important for security as it can reduce security risks associated 
with working outside of the workplace. Individuals with a high work/life balance limit or 
prohibit doing work tasks outside of the workplace.  
“I just generally don’t once I leave work that is me done but for serious work.. I 
know for example my boss and other people they have work laptops and they can 
work from home.. they get special  equipment where they can do that.. it’s not 
really applicable to me..” [P14, Company 2] 
They also have high psychology ownership of their personal devices and, therefore, limit work-
related information on their own devices.  
“Yeah I don’t even know if it is a security conscious thing.. I think it is more just.. 
work/life balance of this is my phone.. I don’t want to contaminate it with work 
stuff… yeah its mine, it’s not the company’s” [P19, Company 2] 
“.. my phone is my phone and I don’t work stuff coming through on it..” [P17, 
Company 2] 
Individuals with blurred boundaries between personal and work usage are less restrictive in their 
boundaries and engage in personal tasks on work devices. For example, they may have blurred 
boundaries in email usage for work and personal.  
“In terms of the first one.. It’s quite tricky coz whilst I don’t really receive emails 
from my like.. I kind of do receive emails from my friends at work coz they also 
work here but I don’t receive emails from my friends who don’t work here on that 
account but at the same time but I also have it set up so that I do receive my Gmail 
stuff to that computer as well so it sort of kind of blurs the boundaries a little bit” 
[P6, Company 1] 
When working remotely these boundaries are also blurred; they may use work-issued devices 
for personal usage and allow others to use the work devices.  
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“I have done it myself if my nieces have been up and there is only one laptop.. like 
my own personal one and someone wants to do something else then I would give 
them the work laptop to do it..”  [P19, Company 20] 
They have less distinctive boundaries between home and the workplace and consequently have 
a lower work/life balance, they prefer ubiquitous access to work information so may use their 
own personal devices to stay connected to work and subsequently engage in more BYOD 
activities.  
These employees also engage in more personal risky tasks on their work machines and disclose 
highly sensitive information such as bank details as they rely on the security of their 
organisation and assume that it is more secure than their own devices.  
“Because everything on mine is what I have put onto it or set up to work on it or 
adjusted the settings and I don’t really understand what I am doing with stuff like 
that so you assume that because you get an email from IT services periodically 
that goes to all users that says that we have identified a machine which is running 
malware on the network and they will give you the work station name of it and you 
eventually track it down, you assume that because it’s a corporate computer 
system that there is some money and some resource and expertise at keeping it 
safe..” [P13, Company 2] 
The use of personal devices in the workplace or BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) can bring 
many advantages for businesses including enhanced employee productivity, satisfaction and 
mobility (PwC, 2012). Despite this, BYOD also leaves organisations open to information 
breaches. Despite calls for organisations to implement more stringent BYOD security strategies 
(PwC, 2012), there is little research exploring employee attitudes towards BYOD, the factors 
that influence this form of behaviour and the role of personal device ownership on information 
security.  This study sheds some light on security behaviours and BYOD activities relating to 
work/life boundaries.  
3.3.2.6 | Security responsibility  
The theme is illustrated in Figure 16 and refers to employees perceptions of who is responsible 
for security.  
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Figure 16. Thematic map of Security Responsibility 
Employees rely heavily on their organisation or “security experts” in their company for the 
security of their systems. This appears to relate to specific types of security mechanisms such as 
anti-virus, encryption on machines, and system procedures such as installing updates rather than 
behaviours such as passwords and handling data, in which participants recognise they have 
responsibility.  
“To be honest I assume that if that’s what the company tell us to use then 
somebody in the technology area has decided that it is secure enough and that our 
firewalls are there and whatever” (P16, Company 2) 
To prevent viruses and other malicious software, employees appear to rely heavily on their 
organisation with assumptions that “somebody else is taking care of it” and relying on the 
expertise of those in IT to ensure that they are protected from viruses.  
“I don’t understand bugger all about anti-virus software and all that kind of stuff 
and you assume that somebody else takes care of it and if you need it, it’s sort of 
automatically deposited onto your computer and you assume that its therefore as 
good as it needs to be or as good as it can be.. there are people who work in IT 
services and that’s their job so you assume that’s good enough..” [P13, Company 2] 
“Yeah actually I haven’t checked what it is and how it works and whether I should 
do something about myself or if it’s something that just works in the background.. 
I’m hoping that it’s just something that’s in the background and then its updated 
automatically and things like that.. maybe I should.. I haven’t checked so far, I 
always just assume that’s updated centrally from the IT services” [P10, Company 1] 
In the adoption of new security practise, diffusion of responsibility was also apparent, 
employees would adopt a new security behaviour but only if the company enforced it, therefore 
relying on the company to introduce new security practices rather than an employee taking 
responsibility and implementing a new behaviour. 
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“Yeah I would be quite happy to do it if  the company came out and said every 
USB stick that you put in has to be encrypted and yeah I would do it.. again it 
becomes that another hurdle to get through in ya productivity of work but I can 
understand that reasoning for it..” [P19, Company 2] 
This diffusion of responsibility was not just limited to the organisations that the employees 
work for but to also service and product providers of the technology they use for work tasks. 
For example, there was a general perception that Apple products are secure so you do not need 
any additional security and that you can rely on Apple for the security.  
“I have got a mac at home so as far as I know I don’t need any security on it.. it 
has got its own inbuilt.” [P12, Company 2] 
“My understanding is that.. it’s very basic first of all but understanding is that  
its.. the operation system of the.. of apple products… is designed in such a way 
that you can’t download.. not download things but I can’t quite explain what I 
mean and what I know because I don’t even know it properly but yeah it’s kind of 
protected.. it doesn’t require anti-virus..”  [P3, Company 1] 
The current study supports the findings of existing research (Dourish, Grinter, De La Flor, & 
Joseph, 2004) which found that individuals delegate responsibility to one of four modalities: 
technology, individuals, organisations and institutions. However, delegation of responsibility for 
specific security behaviours has remained relatively unexplored in existing quantitative studies.  
3.3.2.7 | Security behaviour 
The final theme is illustrated in Figure 17 and refers to the actions employees undertake to 
maintain information security in the workplace. 
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Figure 17. Thematic map of Security Behaviour 
Security behaviour is an important overall theme as it indicates an employee’s ability to engage 
in appropriate and effective security actions. There is three forms of security behaviour, here 
referred to as “security hygiene”, which indicates the effectiveness of the security actions 
employees undertake. The previous themes of threat evaluation, response evaluation, 
knowledge, experience, security responsibility and personal and work boundaries affect the 
degree to which an individual engages in high, medium or low-security hygiene.  
High-security hygiene, refers to the most effective security behaviours and is defined as 
employees engaging in proactive security, using high prevention strategies, security citizenship 
and being able to identify appropriate deterrents. Medium security hygiene are somewhat 
effective security behaviours and is defined as medium prevention strategies. Low-security 
hygiene are the least effective security behaviours and are defined as low prevention strategies, 
little to no security citizenship and lack the ability to identify appropriate deterrents.  
3.3.2.7.1 | Prevention strategies 
“prevention is better than cure as they say..” [P14, Company 2] 
Prevention strategies are behaviours employees engage in which contribute towards information 
security in the workplace and aim to prevent security breaches. For example, not downloading 
suspicious attachments, not clicking on suspicious links online, adopting strong passwords, 
locking computers, encrypting removable media and non-disclosure of sensitive information to 
name a few.  
Employees who practice high-security hygiene take appropriate action and have a strong ability 
to engage in the correct security action and take fewer risks with their security behaviour. They 
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rely less on their organisation for security and have a more proactive stance towards information 
security. They can also correctly identify whether a physical or cyber security deterrent is most 
suitable for the security threat. For example, they will adopt encryption on removable media 
rather than rely on keeping it on oneself as a form of protection.  
“Yeah I use a USB stick with encryption and it’s just a bit of a reassurance 
because having in the past, I haven’t lost a USB stick but I have not been able to 
find it for a few hours, dunno where I have put and so feel a lot more comfortable 
now where there is using a USB stick with actually encryption on and knowing 
that if it did disappear then, you know, there wouldn’t be staff information going 
into the wrong hands..” [P4, Company 1] 
Those with medium security hygiene may take appropriate action and know which security 
actions are most suitable but engage in more risks with their behaviour such as creating a strong 
password and then writing it down or locking the desk cabinet but leaving the key located 
within the vicinity. They are less proactive in their stance towards information security and rely 
more on their organisation for security.  
“I put them in the filing cabinet but I didn’t actually lock it but they were out of 
sight so I suppose that is as far as I went.. I didn’t lock but I do remember going I 
shouldn’t just.. because they are so easy.. it’s not like a computer or a laptop that 
you would be seeing walking out with, the mobile phones were just too easy to pick 
up so yeah I put them out of sight but I don’t think  I actually locked them” [P10, 
Company 2] 
Employees with low security hygiene, on the other hand, lack awareness of appropriate security 
actions and engage in inappropriate security behaviours. They rely heavily on “security 
defaults” such as using the default security password and relying on the computer to lock itself 
when leaving their desk. They are more reactive towards security needs as they rely on security 
enforcement by their organisation for their security behaviour. They lack awareness of 
appropriate security actions for physical or cyber security threats, as such, they may engage in 
non-technical deterrents when a cyber-security deterrent would be more beneficial.  
“however the advantages are that I am much more consciously aware because 15-
20 times a day I need to pick my keys up and I would notice if the USB.. because 
the USB stick is attached to a.. like a lanyard thing that goes around your neck so 
if that was missing I would be really consciously aware of it..” [P2, Company 1] 
Their behaviours are considered more negligent as they may be aware of security actions but 
fail to engage or perform the behaviour.  
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“I have kind of blurred the lines a bit by having a laptop.. it mostly stays at home 
but when I do take it to work, it probably is sensible to have a password on but I 
just don’t.. for ease of access..” [P6, Company 1] 
3.3.2.7.2 | Security citizenship   
This refers to actions individuals engage in which aid the organisation in business continuity 
and recovery. Individuals with high-security hygiene may engage in these practices such as 
backing up data, informing colleagues and IT of security issues. 
“Well.. the phishing thing.. they are all set up.. I don’t mess around with them, I 
just leave it as it is.. erm.. if I see anything dodgy I have emailed like IT before and 
made them aware of it and sent them the email” [P1, Company 1] 
“Usually every day or night, I back up the files that I have updated.. the new files.. 
Is that useful? 
I think so yeah.. better safe than sorry”  [P11, Company 2] 
Individuals with low security hygiene, on the other hand, rely more on their organisation for 
business continuity practices and take less responsibility and action to aid the organisation.  
“No.. that’s the one thing that I am really a bit confused about, I don’t know if 
there are like official procedures for backing up or if I should do it myself..”  [P10, 
Company 2] 
3.4 | CONCLUSIONS 
Overall seven themes emerged through the use of this deductive approach that explains why 
employees engage and do not engage in security actions. The results of this study suggest that 
employees undergo a threat and response evaluation before undertaking behaviour. Knowledge 
and prior experience also influence an employees’ security behaviour, as well as, their 
perceptions of responsibility and boundaries between personal and work. All these factors 
influence the degree to which employees engage in security behaviours; this study indicates that 
there are different levels of security behaviour characterised by prevention strategies and 
security citizenship.  
There are key findings from each theme that are important for understanding the research 
question. Firstly from response evaluation, the study found that different behaviours have 
different associated costs that can be either cognitive, monetary expenses or affect productivity. 
Response evaluation also suggested that low response efficacy is a potential barrier to security 
behaviour. Secondly from threat evaluation, information sensitivity may influence whether 
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employees engage in protective actions. Employees’ susceptibility perceptions depend on 
whether it is an online or offline threat and their threat severity concerns correspond to four 
domains (technology, personal, organisational and third party).  Thirdly, security breach 
experience can lead to effective and ineffective responses and previous work experience can 
lead to security behaviour transfer between jobs.  Fourthly, knowledge of security actions and 
risks is important for driving behaviour. Fifthly, personal and work boundaries play a role in 
risky behavioural engagement and provide an understanding of personal usage of company 
resources in the workplace. Sixthly, perceived responsibility for security appears to empower 
employees to engage in protective security behaviours. Finally, security behaviours were found 
to relate to hygiene levels comprising of protective actions and citizenships behaviours.  
The current study has provided a number of contributions to the security research area and 
organisational practice. Firstly, the findings demonstrate that IS policy compliance is 
complicated as different security behaviours are motivated by different factors and to varying 
degrees. Where possible, future research should move away from using an IS policy compliance 
paradigm and focus on individual security behaviours. Likewise, organisational campaigns 
would benefit more from targeting specific security behaviours. 
Secondly, response efficacy was shown to be a potential barrier to some security behaviours; 
response efficacy is low because employees lack feedback on how effective their security 
behaviour is at reducing threats. Systems rarely provide enough feedback or positive 
reinforcement to users on their proactive security behaviour although they sometimes provide 
information on their reactive behaviour (e.g. weak password or non-updated system). Systems 
need to provide more feedback on their efforts and provide information on the effectiveness of 
these for prevention of security threats. Furthermore, employees perceive that their security 
efforts may be in vain as they do not receive reinforcement from their organisation/management 
to keep up their behaviour. Research shows the importance of management feedback on 
employee performance (Hackman & Oldham, 1976) and the importance of positive 
reinforcement in shaping behaviour (Skinner & Ferster, 1997). One approach may be for 
organisations to include security behaviour as part of the performance appraisal of employees. 
As security is part of an employee’s job role, it should be given more focus and feedback from 
the attention of management during day-to-day business operation and more specifically, as part 
of their employees’ performance appraisal. 
Thirdly, the current study showed that employees undergo an information sensitivity 
assessment, evaluating the sensitivity based on their perceptions of the value of the information 
and the audience for it. The study highlights differences in individuals’ threat evaluation; 
employees’ perceived susceptibility differs depending on off- and online threats. Within 
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information security research, off- and online threats are often given equal weighting or not 
specified. However, this study suggests that research needs to consider these as two separate 
information security issues (on- vs. offline) and campaigns need to focus on communicating 
susceptibility to these threats differently to employees and being specific when framing 
susceptibility questions. More work is required to provide concrete definitions of sensitivity 
levels, rather than it being determined in relation to other types of information. The following 
study will seek to explore this issue in more depth.  
Fourthly, security responsibility was an emergent theme that suggested that employees 
perceived different responsibilities for security tasks, some of which they accept responsibility 
for and others they diffuse the responsibility onto their organisation. Organisations need to be 
more transparent to employees with regards to what they are expected to do and what is within 
their remit. Organisational policies dictate these responsibilities however they need to be 
embedded within the culture of the organisation. Finally, employees’ personal/work boundaries 
may help explain risky behaviour in the workplace and adoption of BYOD has implications for 
these boundaries. These boundaries need to be explored further. 
The initial deductive framework included the factors social pressures, attitude and self-efficacy 
however these did not emerge within the final framework. These three factors have consistently 
been found to relate to security behaviour as identified by the literature review. The current 
study found that attitude emerged more broadly across the other constructs rather than as a 
separate construct. For example, security responsibility and personal/work boundaries have 
attitudinal components within them. For social pressures, existing literature suggests that what 
people important to the user expect them to do influences their security behaviour (see section 
2.2.6.1). However, the current study found that when discussing security behaviour, employees 
did not appear to be concerned about the behaviour of others and their line management, with 
regards to their motivations for behaving securely. However, this factor may play more of a 
larger component within the security culture of both of the organisations. Previous research has 
explored the role of security culture, which is the shared beliefs, norms, values and learned ways 
that have developed through the organisation’s history (Brown, 1998) and are captured in the 
mission statements and the vision of the organisation as they represent the values they wish to 
be known for. A poor security culture is one where security is not built into these shared 
assumptions and is not part of “the way things are done around here”. In the absence of a 
security culture, individual-level motivational factors may play more of an important role as 
information security is at the level of the employee rather than driven top-down and across the 
organisation. This may account for the lack of discussion about social pressures in the two 
participating companies. The study did find that employees use social influencers as a source of 
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information regarding security, so while they may not be influenced by normative security 
behaviour of others, they may seek guidance for their security concerns.  
Another factor that has received attention within information security behaviour is the role of 
sanctions. The findings suggested that employees were not influenced by the fear and certainty 
of sanctions in the workplace. This is somewhat supportive of the existing literature as sanction 
severity is consistently related to security behaviour but sanction certainty is not. The lack of 
discussion and consideration of sanctions could be due to low sanction certainty in employees 
supporting the literature base that while employees perceive sanctions to be severe, the 
likelihood of being sanctioned may be low.  
The lack of discussion of environmental influencers – social pressures and sanctions and no 
other emerging environmental factors indicates that internal influences may play a larger role in 
determining security behaviour. Environmental influencers may play a more implicit role in 
security but internal influencers (threat and coping appraisal) may be best able to explain 
security behaviours as indicated by the current study. The role of these internal factors will 
further explored in the following chapters.  
The current study also aimed to address differences in psychological ownership and 
organisational citizenship behaviour between the two recruited companies. The analysis 
indicated that there was no significant difference between the two for psychological ownership 
of technology and data and organisational citizenship behaviours towards the organisation i.e. 
those behaviours that help aid the functioning of the organisation. The lack of significant 
difference for psychological ownership could be due to the type of companies recruited. Most 
employees from both organisations worked in a research capacity involving the development of 
their own ideas or research. Although the research institution, compared to the academic 
institution, has a more explicit intellectual property ownership policy, it could be that the level 
of input and effort on behalf of the employee accounts for more of their perceived ownership of 
their performance outputs rather than explicit policy. Furthermore, organisational citizenship 
refers to discretionary behaviours that go beyond the job role. The current study found that 
“security citizenship” was part of the security behaviour performed by employees and may be a 
form of OCB. Security citizenship refers to behaviours that go beyond the job role of the 
employees but help serve the organisational information security goal.   
Despite the benefits of this approach for the furthering understanding of the causes of secure 
and insecure practice, the approach has its limitations. Self-efficacy proved difficult to assess 
within an interview context and this could be due to the construct itself and tapping into an 
individual’s perceived capabilities of engaging in security tasks. Certain constructs may, 
therefore, prove difficult to tap into with an interview context, it may be more suitable to assess 
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these constructs within a questionnaire format to give an indication of the levels of these 
constructs within the target population. 
The use of the deductive approach incorporated factors from many behaviour change theories 
which allowed the comparison of the final framework with existing theory. The final thematic 
framework of security behaviour is primarily PMT based with other security-contextual factors 
that may be able to explain additional variance in behaviour if it was to be explored 
quantitatively and with regression analysis. By exploring these constructs qualitatively, the 
study was able to explore what leads to high or low levels in these constructs and the individual, 
system and organisational components that may influence different perceptions. In doing this, it 
has provided better clarity of the use of PMT in security and may explain the disparate findings 
for PMT constructs (severity and response costs) in research.  Future research will investigate 
components of the thematic framework to explore what influences security behaviours using 
structural equation modelling. This will give an estimation over which factors explain the most 
variance in intention and actual behaviour, this information will help provide the basis for future 
intervention efforts to influence the determinants of behaviour to bring about change. An 
iterative approach will be adopted to ensure full scope within the study; this will involve 
investigating the themes from the current study, supported factors in previous security research 
and other potential factors from behaviour change models.  
The use of a deductive elicitation approach proved a useful application for exploring the factors 
that influence security behaviour. Refinement of the initial thematic framework through the 
qualitative data allowed the emergent factors to be driven fully from the data set and also 
allowed comparison to the behavioural determinants that were identified a priori from the 
existing literature. Furthermore using this approach allows exploration of theoretical constructs 
with target populations ensuring that beliefs and attitudes are data-driven rather than pre-
determined by the research. This is important for behaviour change as it allows the data from 
the qualitative interviews to be used to develop a questionnaire to quantitatively determine the 
degree to which the constructs influence intention and actual behaviour.   
Overall, the current study provided further understanding of the causes and barriers to secure 
behaviour. The use of a deductive approach proved useful to assess previously researched 
constructs and understand how these differ for different security behaviours. The findings will 
prove valuable for future intervention efforts. 
3.5 | NEXT STEPS 
Components of the thematic framework will be taken forward in future studies. In particular, an 
extended PMT model (see Figure 18) will be explored throughout the rest of the thesis 
comprising of the original PMT components: threat appraisal (severity and susceptibility) and 
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coping appraisal (response costs, response efficacy and self-efficacy).  The model is extended to 
include additional factors of information sensitivity (WISA), security responsibility, and 
experience derived from this qualitative study and psychological ownership and organisational 
citizenship from the literature review.  
 
Figure 18. Extended-PMT model to be explored in thesis 
Attention will be given to these factors as they are consistently under-researched and while 
appearing over-researched more work will also be given to understand the role of the PMT 
constructs; threat and coping evaluation with specific security threats and behaviours. The 
themes of knowledge and personal and work boundaries will not be taken forward in future 
studies. Knowledge will not be explored as it often an implicit part of many behaviour change 
models and not directly measured. Personal and work boundaries will also not be explored as 
this factor played more of a role in risk-taking behaviours, whereas future studies will focus on 
protective behaviours. 
Prior to validating the extended-PMT model, a scale must be developed to assess information 
sensitivity and further explore its influence on security behaviours (Chapter 4). Following this, 
the model will be explored for its ability to predict engagement with three specific security 
behaviours (Chapter 5). Resulting from the findings of Chapter 3-5, the final study will assess 
whether the knowledge of the supported influencers from the model can be applied to an 
intervention (Chapter 6).  
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4 CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORKPLACE INFORMATION 
SENSITIVITY APPRAISAL (WISA) SCALE 
This chapter builds on the findings from Chapter 3 by developing a Workplace Information 
Sensitivity Appraisal (WISA) scale. There is currently a lack of empirical studies investigating 
information sensitivity and its role in employee security behaviour. There is also an absence of 
scales measuring how employees appraise information sensitivity. This chapter outlines the 
design, development and validation of the scale with an employment sample. To determine the 
validity of the scale, the factorial, content, discriminant and criterion-related validity were 
assessed. The scale was found to comprise of five subscales: Privacy, Worth, Consequences, 
Low proximity interest by others and High proximity interest by others.  
The final 17-item WISA scale, alongside its five subscales, was found to have strong factorial 
validity which was confirmed across eight target information types.  The scale was also found to 
have strong content validity, good criterion-related validity and adequate discriminant validity. 
Furthermore, the scale was found to have high internal reliability and represents a 
comprehensive measure of information sensitivity appraisal in the workplace.  
The study also sought to explore sensitivity differences for company information pertaining 
directly to living individuals (personal, health, financial & lifestyle) compared to information 
that is organisationally-focused (intellectual property, day to day, commercial & HR). Financial 
information was found to have the highest ratings for sensitivity followed by health and HR. 
These information types were also found to be the highest for three of the five sensitivity 
subscales, in particular, Privacy, Worth and Consequences. Information about individuals (e.g. 
personal, health and lifestyle) was considered to be of significantly higher interest to 
employees’ high proximity interest groups (i.e. family and friends) in comparison to 
organisational-focussed information. For low proximity interest, the opposite effect is apparent 
with organisational-focussed information perceived to be of interest (e.g. intellectual property 
(IP), day to day, commercial) to low proximity groups (i.e. criminals, fellow employees & 
business competitors). Finally, the findings indicated that the more an employee works with an 
information type did not influence their sensitivity ratings. There were, however, some 
differences in security behaviour dependent on data usage grouping.  
This chapter starts by providing evidence of why an information sensitivity scale should be 
developed and then outlines the research questions explored in the study.  
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4.1 | INTRODUCTION 
An under-investigated area is the role of information sensitivity appraisal in employees’ 
protection efforts. Chapter 3 identified that employees appraise the sensitivity of the information 
that they work with and use this as a pre-cursor as to whether it needs protection. To explore 
this further, it is necessary to understand how individuals evaluate information sensitivity and 
how this may be linked to their security behaviours.  
4.1.1 | WHAT IS INFORMATION SENSITIVITY? 
There is no clear global definition of information sensitivity. In the UK, the protection of 
citizen’s information is regulated by the Information Commissioner’s Office and governed more 
specifically by the Data Protection Act (DPA; 1998). The act seeks to control how individuals’ 
personal data is used in businesses by specifying different levels of protection required for 
personal data and sensitive personal data. Personal data refers to identifiable information such as 
name and sensitive personal data refers to information such as ethnicity, political opinions, 
religious beliefs, health, trade union membership, sexual health and criminal records. The DPA 
stipulates that these be considered sensitive due to: 
“The presumption is that, because information about these matters could be used 
in a discriminatory way, and is likely to be of a private nature, it needs to be 
treated with greater care than other personal data” (ICO, 2015).  
Whilst in the US, there is much broader definition provided in the Computer Security Act of 
1987 in which they define sensitive information as: 
“any information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of 
which could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of federal 
programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under section 552a of 
title 5, United States Code (the Privacy Act)…” (Computer Security Act, 1987) 
The US Federal Trade Commission considers sensitive information to be personal information. 
They have two primary categories; personally unidentifiable or personally identifiable 
information. Personally identifiable refers to information such as name, address, phone number 
and credit card information whereas unidentifiable refers to information such as gender, age, 
and occupation (FTC, 2015).  
Within the research domain, the majority of studies do not provide a clear definition. However, 
there are two clear divides in the way that research has conceptualised information sensitivity. 
Some conceptualizations focus on the privacy and intimacy of information as a basis for 
evaluating sensitivity. For example, Weible (1993) defines it as “the level of privacy concern an 
individual feels for a type of data in a specific situation” (p.30). Sheehan and Hoy (2000) 
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present a broader definition and argue that information sensitivity is simply the distinction 
between what is private and what is not private.  Other researchers consider sensitivity to relate 
to intimate self-disclosures. Lwin, Wirtz, and Williams (2007) define information sensitivity as 
the perceived intimacy level of information and Moon (2000) defines intimate self-disclosures 
as those information types that are high-risk and heighten vulnerability if disclosed. The second 
type of definition focuses more on the vulnerability and potential exploitative nature of 
information as a basis for evaluating sensitivity. For example, Gandy (1993) argues that some 
people view sensitive information as any information that if disclosed would cause harm.  
Mothersbaugh, Foxx, Beatty, and Wang (2012) also define sensitivity as potential losses 
associated with disclosing information.    
The disclosure of certain types of information can have many negative effects towards 
individuals such as potentially opening them to discrimination, identity theft or have their 
access controls exploited on systems and services. Security is, therefore, a requirement to 
maintain the confidentiality of sensitive information.   
4.1.2 | INFORMATION SENSITIVITY AND PRIVACY 
The majority of research investigating the role of information sensitivity has explored its links 
to individuals’ privacy concerns and their willingness to disclose information. Bélanger and 
Crossler's (2011) critical review of research on information privacy discusses the many 
definitions of privacy and information privacy specifically. They acknowledge that definitions 
of privacy can include the consideration of moral and legal rights with regards to the 
information or concern an individual’s ability to control their information. They conclude with a 
broad definition by Clarke (1999) which defines information privacy as “the interest an 
individual has in controlling, or at least significantly influencing the handling of data about 
themselves”. 
Research (Adams & Sasse, 2001; Mothersbaugh et al., 2012; Phelps, Nowak, & Ferrell, 2000) 
suggests that information sensitivity works along a continuum of “willing to disclose” to “not 
willing to disclose” and that individuals do not make simple binary judgements of sensitivity. 
On this sensitivity continuum participants are most willing to disclose demographic (e.g. age, 
marital status and occupation) and lifestyle (favourite pastimes) information. They are less 
willing to disclose purchase-related or lifestyle-related information (e.g. recent credit purchases) 
and least willing to disclose personally identifiable or financial information (e.g. telephone 
number, social security number). 
Research suggests that willingness to disclose may be linked to perceived risks associated with 
that information, with more sensitive information indicative of greater risks and losses. 
Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal (2004) found that individuals’ perceived risk of disclosure differed 
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depending on the sensitivity of the information. Sensitive personal information (e.g. financial 
data) had higher risks associated with disclosure than less sensitive information (e.g. product 
preferences). Highly sensitive personal data such as identifiable or financial information is open 
to exploitation and can lead to identity theft, which may explain the increase in protective 
measures taken by consumers in limiting their disclosure of this information. 
Previous research has largely focussed on individuals’ willingness to disclose different types of 
sensitive information (Cranor, Reagle, & Ackerman, 1999; Phelps et al., 2000). It is clear from 
research that individuals are more open to disclosing information that is less identifiable (such 
as lifestyle) than more personal information (such as health and financial).  With the exception 
of a study by Malhotra et al. (2004) who focussed on risks of disclosure linked to information 
sensitivity, there is less research exploring if and how individuals appraise the sensitivity of 
information. 
Furthermore, studies traditionally focus on individuals’ own information however employees 
regularly work with information belonging to others and must abide by organisational and 
legislative regulations in the security and disclosure of this information. It is, therefore, 
important to understand how employees evaluate the sensitivity of information belonging to 
others and their organisation.  
4.1.3 | INFORMATION SENSITIVITY AND SECURITY 
There has been limited research exploring the direct link between information sensitivity and 
security in the workplace. Adams and Sasse (1999) found that employees perceived sensitive 
information within the workplace to require more protection and security. They found that 
confidential information about individuals (personnel files, emails) were rated as sensitive, 
whereas commercially-orientated information (such as customer databases and financial data) 
were often seen as less sensitive and consequently needing less protection.  
The sensitivity of data has been found to have no effect on password length and composition 
(Zviran & Haga, 1999) but does have an impact on password re-use (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 
2011). These findings suggest that users do consider the sensitivity of the data stored on a 
service and adjust their security behaviour accordingly.  
The findings from the qualitative study (reported in Chapter 3) found that employees appraise 
the sensitivity of their work information by considering the perceived value of the information 
and the perceived interest to others.  Health and financial information were deemed to be more 
sensitive than organisational data such as intellectual property and required more protection and 
security.   
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4.1.4 | STUDY FOCUS 
4.1.4.1 | Research Aims  
The study has two aims, the first aim is develop and validate a new measure exploring 
employees’ evaluation of information sensitivity called the Workplace Information Sensitivity 
Appraisal (WISA) scale. The second aim is to then apply this scale to explore differences in 
information sensitivity and security behaviour for different information types, participants’ 
knowledge about legal and organisational regulations applying to the information types and 
their frequency of data usage.  
Specifically, the research steps involved to address these aims are to: 
 Explore the underlying factor structure of the WISA scale  Test the content, discriminant and criterion-related validity of the scale   Ascertain the reliability of the scale  Explore differences in WISA ratings for different information types  Identify differences in sensitivity ratings for different information types and security 
behaviour based on participant perceptions of legal and organisational regulations and 
their frequency of data usage 
4.1.4.2 | WISA scale development 
There is currently no scale that measures information sensitivity within the workplace. Previous 
studies exploring information sensitivity have largely used scales investigating willingness to 
disclose (e.g. Cranor et al., 1999) or privacy concerns (e.g. Buchanan, Paine, & Joinson, 2007; 
Preibusch, 2013). However none of these explicitly investigate how individuals appraise 
sensitivity.  
Previous research and the qualitative study in Chapter 3 identified four aspects of information 
sensitivity appraisal: the private nature of information, potential consequences associated with 
information, the value of information, and perceived (third party) interest in information.   
The WISA distinguishes between two general types of information. The first is information 
about living individuals replicating the four information types used by Little, Briggs, and 
Coventry (2011). These four types are: personal information (e.g. address, gender, date of birth, 
marital status), health information (e.g. physical and mental health history, weight, family 
medical history), financial information (e.g. banking details, credit rating, loan history) and 
lifestyle information (e.g. shopping habits, hobbies, interests).  However, the focus of the items 
has been changed to other individuals’ information, rather than the employee’s own 
information. The second refers to organisationally-owned information in which there are also 
four types: intellectual property (e.g. trade secrets, creative ideas that could lead to patents, 
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copyrights, new products), day-to-day business information (e.g. current customer & supplier 
details, quotes, purchase history, call records), commercial information (e.g. strategic plans, 
business financial data) and personnel/HR information (e.g. appraisal, disciplinary information, 
salary, sickness records).  
As discussed earlier, individuals do not perceive organisational data as being as sensitive as 
personal information. By exploring principles of sensitivity analysis of personal and 
organisational information, it may identify reasons why individuals do not perceive such 
information as sensitive and if this affects their security behaviour.  
4.2 | METHOD 
4.2.1 | DESIGN 
A non-experimental survey design was employed.  The following approach (summarised in 
Figure 19) was used to explore the validity and reliability of the scale, following 
recommendations by Hinkin (1995, 1998). The specific forms of validity explored were: 
content, factorial, discriminant and criterion-related.  
 
Figure 19. The process of assessing the validity and reliability of the WISA scale 
Stage 6: Reliability of measures 
Determining the internal consistency of the WISA scale 
Stage 5: Criterion Related Validity  
Identifying the predictive power of the WISA scale on security behaivour 
Stage 4: Discriminant Validity 
Testing whether the WISA scale is unrelated to dissimilar constructs 
Stage 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
Testing the hypothesised factorial structure and estimating the degree to which it is a good fit to 
the sampled data 
Stage 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)  
Exploring the underlying factorability of the scale items and their associations with the constructs 
Stage 1: Face/Content Validity  
Subject-matter experts and participants determine the suitability of items 
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Content validity refers to the extent to which items within the scale represent the construct being 
measured (Hinkin, 1995) which can be further broken down into face validity and item validity. 
Face validity is whether the items are relevant, important and interesting to respondents 
(Onwuegbuzie, Daniel, & Collins, 2009), whereas item validity is the extent to which the items 
in the measure represent the intended construct (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009). The content validity 
of the scale will be assessed using subject-matter experts and naïve participants to evaluate the 
suitability and comprehensibility of items. 
Factorial or structural validity refers to how well the scoring structure of the tool corresponds to 
the domain of interest by assessing the composition of the scales (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009). 
The factorial structure of the WISA appraisal will be undertaken to explore the four aspects of 
the WISA appraisal using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA).   
The discriminant validity of a scale refers to whether it is unrelated to similar, yet distinct 
constructs (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009). To assess the discriminant validity of the WISA scale, 
organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB-O) was identified as an organisational construct that 
may be linked to sensitivity appraisal. An organisational behaviour was chosen because 
individuals who have high citizenship behaviours are involved in more activities that promote 
optimal functioning of their organisation (Organ, 1988). They comply with organisational rules 
and procedures (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997, 1993), which may include reading organisational 
policies about information security and information classification. However, it is theoretically 
distinct from information sensitivity so should not highly correlate with the WISA scale and 
may help demonstrate the discriminant validity of the scale.  
Criterion-related validity is the extent to which the developed tool is related to the variable to 
which it is hypothesised to relate (Hinkin, 1998).  As the current study is interested in the link 
between sensitivity appraisal and information security behaviour, the criterion-related validity 
of the scale was also measured using a self-report security behaviour questionnaire based on 
best practices for security identified in a report for Department of Business, Innovation and 
Skills (Coventry et al., 2014). 
4.2.2 |  PARTICIPANTS 
An opportunity sample of 326 (Age, M= 31.75, SD= 11.51) individuals were recruited online. 
All recruited participants were currently in full time or part time employment or unemployed for 
less than 3 months.  87 males and 217 females (22 participants chose not to disclose their 
gender) took part with an average organisational tenure of 5.23 years (SD=6.66) and job tenure 
of 3.18 years (SD 4.7). 11% (34) were from a microenterprise (less than 10 staff), 13% from a 
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small enterprise (less than 50 staff), 9.2% from a medium-sized enterprise (less than 250 staff) 
and 61% from a large organisation (more than 250 staff). Appendix E presents the 
organisational sectors recruited participants were sampled from. 
Participants were recruited using a variety of platforms based on recruitment recommendations 
from Branley, Covey, and Hardey (2014) which included dedicated participation sites (e.g. 
callforparticipants.com), social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn), mailing lists, student 
participation pools and websites and forums. Snowballing sampling technique was used to 
recruit participants in order to maximise recruitment, this involved encouraging participants to 
share the study with their acquaintances such as retweeting the study link on Twitter or sharing 
the recruitment advertisement on Facebook.  In compensation for study completion, participants 
were entered into a prize draw to win an iPad or if they were university psychology students, 
they received institutional participation points.  
4.2.3 | SCALE CONSTRUCTION 
4.2.3.1 | Item generation and reduction 
Existing literature on information sensitivity was consulted to aid item generation. This 
deductive approach outlined by Hinkin (1998) is deemed most suitable when there are sufficient 
theoretical grounds to base the generation of items on. However, given the lack of previous 
research on information sensitivity, specifically in the workplace, this approach was not used in 
isolation.  
Therefore, the current study used a combination of inductive and deductive approaches to 
enhance item generation. As discussed earlier, an employee’s information sensitivity appraisal 
comprises of the privacy, exploitability, value and perceived interest in the information. Using 
this definition, items were first generated using the quotes from the interviews with employees 
reported in Chapter 3. This allowed the dimensions to be clearly defined. This also helped 
ensure that the language used in the items was familiar to target respondents. Items were further 
developed based on recommendations by Hinkin (1998) including the use of short and simple 
items, avoidance of “double-barrelled” items and leading questions. Reverse-scored items were 
also included to help reduce response bias.  Following this, items were further generated using 
the deductive approach. Existing literature on information sensitivity was explored. The WISA 
scale was validated across 8 information types. 4 types of sensitive information were taken from 
Little et al. (2011) and an additional 4 were added to include workplace specific information. 
Following the generation of items by the lead researcher, these were reviewed and modified by 
other members of the research team.  
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4.2.4 | MEASURES 
Alongside the WISA questionnaire, participants also completed an existing measure of 
organisational citizenship behaviour so that discriminant validity could be assessed and a 
measure of security behaviour to assess criterion validity. Both scales are measured on a 7 point 
scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (always) for which participants indicated the extent to which 
they perform the behaviours. Participants’ knowledge of legal and organisational requirements 
for information was also measured and on a 3 point scale: ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘I do not know’. 
4.2.4.1 | Organisational citizenship behaviour 
This behaviour was measured using the same OCB-O subscale (Appendix A) by Lee and Allen 
(2002) as used in Chapter 3. The scale of OCB-O had strong internal reliability, Cronbach’s α 
= .89.   
4.2.4.2 | Security behaviour 
Security behaviour was measured using a 16 item self-developed scale based on best practice 
security behaviours identified in the report for the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (Coventry et al., 2014). Behaviours were worded to explicitly target the workplace setting 
(e.g. I share passwords with other people at work). The behaviours comprised access control, 
software updates, anti-malware, physical behaviours and reporting behaviours. The scope of the 
scale was broad to encompass the different working conditions employees may face. The 
security behaviour scale had strong internal reliability, Cronbach’s α = .85. A copy of the scale 
can be found in Appendix I.  
4.2.4.3 | Knowledge of legal and organisational requirements for information 
For information types that participants worked with as part of their job role, they were also 
asked if they thought the information was (1) publicly available outside of my organisation, (2) 
access restricted by my organisation and (3) regulated by law. See Appendix F for scale.  
4.2.5 | PROCEDURE 
Table 9. Presentation of questionnaire sections and associated appendices 
Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 
Evaluation of the 
8 information 
types using the 
WISA scale 
Frequency of 
information 
usage and OCB 
scale  
Knowledge of legal and 
organisational requirements 
of information that they 
stored and processed as part 
of their job role 
  
Security 
behaviour 
questionnaire 
Demographic 
information 
Appendix G Appendix H & 
Appendix A 
 
Appendix F Appendix I Appendix J 
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Participants took part individually and were provided with a link to the online survey that was 
hosted on the Qualtrics website. The online survey first provided participants with information 
outlining the study requirements and exclusion criteria. Participants generated a unique code 
should they wish to withdraw at a later date and they then consented to take part in the online 
questionnaire. The online questionnaire was split into five sections. In section 1, participants 
evaluated the sensitivity of the 8 different types of information. Section 2 required participants 
to indicate the degree to which they work with each of the information types and they completed 
the OCB scale. Section 3 was tailored to participants’ responses in section 2 where they were 
asked about their knowledge of legal and organisational requirements of information that they 
stored and processed as part of their job role. These were any information types that they 
worked with at least “rarely”. Section 4 comprised the security behaviour questions which were 
presented to participants who used a computer as part of their daily work tasks, again at least 
“rarely”. Section 5 requested demographic information from participants. Following completion 
of all five sections, participants provided their email address to be entered into the prize draw; 
this information was stored in a separate database to ensure the questionnaire data remained 
anonymous. Participants were then presented with debrief information. The online survey 
provided participants with the option to print or save a pdf version of the participant and debrief 
information to refer to at a later date.  
4.3 | RESULTS 
4.3.1 | CONTENT VALIDITY (STAGE 1) 
The content validity of the scale was assessed using subject-matter experts as well as naïve 
participants to evaluate the suitability and comprehensibility of items. A workshop with subject-
matter experts revealed that the items were suitable for measuring the construct of information 
sensitivity, however, concerns were raised regarding the information types targeted. Initially, 
two broad information types (organisational vs. individual) were used to compare potential 
differences in their sensitivity ratings. It was decided following the sessions that eight types 
were to be investigated as these adequately reflected the information types that employees may 
experience within their job role. Furthermore, targeting eight different information types would 
allow for greater comparison to previous research. Following the session, a consistent rating 
scale “strongly disagree to strongly agree” was implemented across the 4 areas of the WISA 
appraisal as research has highlighted issues in combining scores from different rating scales 
(Gliem & Gliem, 2003).  
Ten participants were recruited as naïve subjects to assess the items. In a card sort activity, they 
were presented with the questionnaire items and asked to sort the items into clusters they felt 
most represented that collection of items. This followed a similar technique to that used by 
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MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Fetter (1991). Participants were asked to define their categories, 
definitions were not provided to participants as it was hoped that this approach would provide 
better clarity over how the constructs could be defined and would not be a purely cognitive 
sorting task akin to traditional card sorting with definitions (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991). 
Participants were also asked to read the questionnaire instructions and items, and comment on 
the clarity and complexity of them, and highlight any potential issues. Finally, participants were 
asked to provide additional examples of types of information they would classify under the 8 
target information types. 60% of participants sorted the items into the same constructs as the 
current study, this falls below the acceptable agreement index of 75% (Hinkin, 1998). This was 
to be expected as participants were not provided with the definitions. Therefore, another 4 
participants were recruited to conduct the card sort with definitions in which 100% sorted them 
into their respective factors. Changes were made to instructions and definitions of the 
information types following the one-to-one sessions to improve the usability and 
comprehensibility of the questionnaire.  
4.3.2 | DATA SCREENING AND CLEANING 
Data was checked for errors before EFA. Six participants were removed due to incomplete data. 
Missing values analysis was conducted on the dataset and the findings revealed that the average 
percentage of missing data for the WISA scale items was 0.3%, indicating the amount of 
missing data was low. To retain as much data as possible, pairwise data deletion was 
subsequently used to retain data cases.  
4.3.3 | ANALYSIS OF THE WISA STRUCTURE: FACTORIAL VALIDITY (STAGE 2 
& 3) 
Testing the factorial validity of the WISA scale involved two stages to assess its underlying 
structure. The first stage was EFA to explore its potential structure and the second stage was to 
confirm its structure using CFA.  The data file was therefore first split into two so that EFA 
could be performed on one half and CFA on the other as recommended by Thompson (2004).  
Following this, two statistical tests were conducted to determine the suitability of the dataset for 
factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and the Bartlett 
tests of sphericity (BS) were calculated. KMO indicates the suitability of the data to factor 
analysis by exploring correlations between the variables. The analysis revealed that the KMO 
output was .86 indicating a “good” sample adequacy (Kaiser, 1974). The BS also assesses 
whether the data meets the requirements for factorial analysis and a significant finding indicates 
an appropriate sample. The BS test showed a significant result (BS x2 (231) = 5586.27, p<.001). 
The findings from both tests, therefore, suggested that the data was suitable for EFA.   
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4.3.3.1 | Exploratory factor analysis (Stage 2) 
To explore the factor structure of information sensitivity appraisal, Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) was performed using varimax with Kaiser normalization. The 21 items of the 
original scale were entered into the factor analysis and factor loadings lower than 0.30 were 
suppressed. 
Table 10. Factor loadings for each item (factor loadings lower than .30 are suppressed) 
Item 
 
 
I think <information type> is… 
Rotation Factor Loadings 
Factor 
1: 
Privacy 
Factor 
2: 
Worth 
Factor  
3: 
Consequences 
Factor  
4: Low 
proximity 
interest  
Factor  
5: High 
proximity 
interest  
…confidential .897     
…private .898     
…secret .850     
…restricted .761     
…privileged  .656     
…insignificant*  .834    
…meaningless*  .895    
…worthless*  .890    
…embarrassing    .869   
…compromising    .753   
…discreditable   .656   
… humiliating    .866   
…of interest to my friends     .941 
…of interest to my family     .946 
…of interest to business 
competitors 
   .895  
… of interest to criminals    .861  
…of interest to fellow 
employees 
   .755 .360 
Eigenvalues 4.89 3.37 2.72 1.52 1.06 
R
EM
O
V
ED
 
FA
C
TO
R
S 
…sensitive .723 .451    
…valuable .433 .733    
…important .553 .685    
…exploitable  .359 
.601 .359  
… of interest to the 
general public 
  
 .670 .514 
*Reversed scored 
The findings from the PCA revealed that five factors (eigenvalues were above 1) could explain 
the data accounting for 79.73% of the variance. This complied with the minimum acceptable 
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level of 60% variance and recommendations of eigenvalues above 1 for factors (Hinkin, 1998). 
All items loaded onto their expected factor above the accepted .40 criterion level.  
The fourth-factor “interest by others” was found to be two distinct factors. Theoretically, this 
seems plausible as the factor contained various targets including family, friends, the general 
public, fellow employees, business competitors and criminals. Factor four from the PCA 
contained those targets that may be considered to be low proximity to individuals (i.e. business 
competitors, criminals and fellow employees). Factor five, on the other hand, contained those 
targets which are in high proximity to individuals (i.e. family and friends).  
The PCA revealed five items that cross-loaded onto multiple factors and these were removed 
(see Table 10) as their values were above 0.4 (Hinkin, 1998). “I think < information type>  is of 
interest to fellow employees” was left in the analysis as the cross-loading was less than .40 on 
the second factor (Hinkin, 1998).  
Overall, the PCA revealed that the five factors explained a large amount of the variance in the 
data and the items had strong factor loadings (above .40). The next stage was then to confirm 
this structure using CFA. 
4.3.3.2 | Confirmatory factor analysis (Stage 3) 
CFA was carried out on the data using AMOS (version 22) to explore the hypothesised factor 
structure and estimate the degree to which the model was a good fit to the data. The five factors 
were presented as latent variables within AMOS and were permitted to co-vary. The items for 
each factor were only allowed to load onto their respective factor. Covariance between error 
terms was only allowed where items were related to the same factor; this followed advice from 
modification indices within AMOS. The item “privileged” was removed as it shared too much 
covariance across factors, had the lowest factor loadings and was deemed non-specific within 
the privacy factor. Figure 20 shows the average standardised item loadings for the hypothesised 
model.  
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Figure 20. WISA Appraisal Confirmatory Factor Analysis with average Item Loadings 
(standardised path coefficients) 
Maximum likelihood estimation methods were used and the input for each analysis was the 
covariance matrix of the items. The goodness-of-fit for the models was evaluated with the 
following absolute goodness-of-fit indices (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1986): (1) the X2 goodness-of-
fit statistic; (2) the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA); (3) the Goodness of 
Fit Index (GFI); (4) the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI). Non-significant X2 values 
indicate that the hypothesised model fits the data and RMSEA values smaller than or equal to 
.08 are indicative of acceptable fit. However, values above 0.1 should lead to model rejection 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1992). GFI values greater than .95 are indicative of good fit and values 
greater than .90 are indicative of an acceptable fit (Marsh & Grayson, 1995). AGFI values of .90 
are indicative of a good fit and values greater than .85 may be considered an acceptable fit (Hu 
& Bentler, 1995).  
Table 11. Goodness-of-fit indices for WISA appraisal for 8 target information types 
Information type X2  RMSEA GFI AGFI 
Personal x2 (92)=201.456, p<.001 .061 .926 .890 
Health x2 (92)=211.818, p<.001 .065 .921 .883 
Lifestyle x2 (92)=216.460, p<.001 .065 .928 .893 
Financial x2 (92)=252.166, p<.001 .073 .907 .862 
Intellectual Property x2 (92)=179.095, p<.001 .054 .939 .910 
Day to Day x2 (92)=170.270, p<.001 .051 .941 .913 
Commercial x2 (92)=223.679, p<.001 .066 .923 .887 
HR x2 (92)=189.792, p<.001 .057 .931 .898 
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The final model (see Figure 20) indicated an acceptable level of fit for three of the four fit 
indices and this was evident across all 8 information types (see Table 11).  The fit indices for 
GFI and AGFI were all above .9 and .85 and the RMSEA were all below .08. The chi-square 
indicated that the model was not a good fit to the data for all information types, however, chi-
squared has been criticised for being too sensitive to large sample size, especially for samples 
over 200 (Hoe, 2008), as in the current study. Regarding the information types, the model had 
the best fit for intellectual property and the least best fit for financial information. However, it 
was an acceptable fit for all types. Therefore, the WISA appraisal was considered to be an 
acceptable model to explain the data that it was tested on.   
 
 
 
Table 12 shows the standardised regression weights for the latent variables for each information 
type. See Appendix G for the final WISA scale.  
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Table 12. Standardised regression weights for latent variables per information type and overall means (& SDs) 
 
Privacy 
<> 
Worth 
Privacy <> 
Consequences 
Privacy 
<> High 
proximity 
interest 
Privacy 
<> Low 
proximity 
interest 
Consequences 
<> High 
proximity 
interest 
Consequences 
<> Low 
proximity 
interest 
Consequences 
<> Worth 
High 
proximity 
interest <> 
Low 
proximity 
interest 
Worth <> 
High 
proximity 
interest 
Worth <> 
Low 
proximity 
interest 
Personal .29 .13 -.01 .03 .08 .05 -.21 .24 -.03 .24 
Health .44 .17 -.02 .01 .15 .12 -.08 .28 -.01 .22 
Lifestyle .09 .34 -.09 -.02 .07 .07 -.01 .23 .00 .22 
Financial .41 .05 -.15 -.14 .03 -.05 -.05 .55 -.08 .21 
IP .47 -.02 -.07 .18 .32 -.13 -.50 .13 -.16 .43 
DTD .27 .13 -.07 .08 .28 -.03 -.40 -.03 -.20 .32 
Comm .27 .10 .01 .07 .22 -.01 -.44 .03 -.25 .32 
HR .42 .28 -.05 .04 .07 .17 .07 .39 -.06 .18 
Mean 
(SD) 
.33 
(.13) 
.15 (.12) -.05 (.05) .03 (.09) .15 (.11) .02 (.10) -.20 (.22) .23 (.19) -.10 (.09) .27 (.08) 
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Table 13. Standardised regression weights for scale items per information type and overall means (& SDs) 
 PRIVACY -> CONSEQUENCES -> WORTH -> LOW PROXIMITY 
INTEREST  
-> 
HIGH PROXIMITY 
INTEREST -> 
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Personal .84 .63 .92 .65 .74 .39 .53 .75 .62 .74 .78 .73 .62 .55 1.07 .90 
Health .86 .62 .86 .64 .81 .56 .39 .86 .72 .74 .77 .82 .70 .63 1.09 .84 
Lifestyle .84 .71 .85 .79 .85 .61 .39 .82 .71 .81 .74 .72 .55 .66 1.02 .94 
Financial .83 .56 .73 .61 .73 .40 .39 .96 .69 .73 .89 .77 .81 .56 1.07 .81 
IP .86 .70 .85 .83 .87 .29 .38 .77 .73 .79 .79 .88 .62 .75 .97 .92 
DTD .87 .59 .91 .81 .80 .30 .45 .78 .78 .86 .93 .83 .50 .61 .92 1.01 
Commercial .86 .61 .93 .88 .81 .24 .37 .81 .72 .86 .92 .78 .51 .65 1.04 .89 
HR .82 .63 .93 .73 .90 .59 .38 .82 .72 .80 .82 .86 .68 .58 1.01 .86 
Mean (SD) .85 
(.02) 
.63 
(.05) 
.87 
(.07) 
.74 
(.10) 
.81 
(.06) 
.42 
(.15) 
.41 
(.05) 
.82 
(.07) 
.71 
(.04) 
.79 
(.05) 
.83 
(.07) 
.80 
(.06) 
.62 
(.11) 
.62 
(.07) 
1.02 (.06) .90 (.06) 
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4.3.4 | OBTAINING AN EMPLOYEES WISA SCORE 
An employee’s WISA score is calculated by taking the scores for all 5 WISA aspects for the 
information type they indicated they worked with most regularly (or the average if more than 
one).  
4.3.5 | DISCRIMINANT AND CRITERION-RELATED VALIDITY (STAGE 4 & 5) 
Table 14. Descriptive statistics for OCB and security behaviour 
Factor Mean (& SD) N= 
OCB – total 35.6 (9.2) 310 
Security behaviour – Total 54.9 (11.1) 293 
I share passwords with other people at work* 4.5 (.8) 292 
I use trusted and secured connections, and devices (including Wi-Fi) 
when at work 
4.1 (1.1) 292 
I log out of websites when I finish at work 4.0 (1.3) 293 
I use trusted and secure websites and services at work and connect 
securely 
4.0 (1.1) 293 
I am aware of my physical surroundings when online at work 4.0 (1.0) 293 
I lock my computer when I leave my workstation 3.9 (1.3) 293 
I avoid security risks online and in the workplace 3.9 (1.2) 292 
I use complex passwords at work 3.6 (1.2) 293 
I use different passwords for different work accounts 3.4 (1.4) 293 
I stay informed about security risks online and in the workplace 3.4 (1.2) 293 
I ensure I run the latest and official version of software (including 
operating system) at work 
3.2 (1.4) 293 
I report suspicious or criminal activities in the workplace 3.2 (1.4) 290 
I personally back up data on my workplace devices 2.8 (1.5) 293 
I adjust account settings on websites that I use at work 2.5 (1.3) 293 
I personally run the security software including anti-virus, anti-
spyware and firewalls at work 
2.2 (1.4) 293 
I personally scan work devices for available software updates and 
install them at work 
2.1 (1.3) 292 
*Reversed scored 
Table 14 indicates that employees report engaging in not sharing passwords, using trusted and 
secured connections and services and logging out of websites the most. The means also suggest 
that employees are less likely to adjust account settings, personally scan for available software 
updates and run security software.  
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The WISA scale was explored to identify whether it was unrelated to OCB (discriminant 
validity) and the degree to which it can predict a composite measure of security behaviour and 
the individual security behaviours.  
4.3.5.1 | Discriminant validity (Stage 4) 
The findings revealed that 3 of the 5 aspects of the WISA scale were unrelated to organisational 
citizenship behaviour, therefore, providing partial support for discriminant validity for the 
WISA scale. 
Table 15. Correlations between WISA components and OCB (n=284) 
Predictor variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. WISA Privacy -      
2. WISA Worth .361**      
3. WISA Consequences .209** -.098     
4. WISA High Proximity .032 -.041 .159**    
5. WISA Low Proximity  .071 .239** .045 .193**   
6. OCB .137* 149* .021 -.039 .043 - 
*p<.05; **p<.01 
4.3.5.1.1 | Criterion-related validity (Stage 5) 
Multiple regressions were performed to explore the predictive validity of the WISA scale in 
explaining security behaviour. The multiple regression revealed that R2 = .089, F(5, 287) = 
5.586, p < .001 indicating that the WISA scale accounts for 8.9% of the variance in the 
composite measure of security behaviour. 3 (Worth, Consequences & Low proximity) of the 5 
WISA components were found to significantly contribute to the prediction, of which worth 
contributed the most. 
Table 16. Tests of significance for the predicted variable of security behaviour from the predictors 
of the WISA appraisal 
Predictor variable β B SE B P 
WISA Privacy .100 1.454 .918 p=.114 
WISA Worth .143 2.562 1.138 p<.05* 
WISA Consequences -.125 -1.887 .906 p<.05* 
WISA High Proximity -.075 -.729 .578 p=.208 
WISA Low Proximity  .140 1.616 .692 p<.05* 
*p<.05; **p<.01 
Further analyses were conducted to estimate the degree to which the WISA scale predicts 
individual security behaviours. As shown in Table 17, the WISA scale best predicts security 
behaviours relating to access control and physical security.  
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Table 17. Regressions with specific security behaviours and the variance explained 
Behaviour Regression Variance 
explained 
I use complex passwords at work R2 = .106, F(5, 287) = 6.807, p < .01. 
 
10.6% 
I use different passwords for 
different work accounts 
 
R2 = .056, F(5, 287) = 1.115, p < .01. 
 
5.6% 
I use trusted and secured 
connections, and devices 
(including Wi-Fi) when at work 
R2 = .086, F(5, 286) = 5.361, p < .01 
 
8.6% 
I use trusted and secure websites 
and services at work and connect 
securely  
R2 = .075, F(5, 287) = 4.670, p < .01 
 
7.5% 
I stay informed about security 
risks online and in the workplace
    
R2 = .050, F(5, 287) = 3.019, p < .05 
 
5% 
I avoid security risks online and 
in the workplace 
R2 = .068, F(5, 286) = 4.198, p < .05 
 
6.8% 
I am aware of my physical 
surroundings when online at 
work 
R2 = .099, F(5, 287) = 6.281, p < .01 
 
9.9% 
I adjust account settings on 
websites that I use at work 
R2 = .040, F(5, 287) = 2.384, p <.05 
 
4% 
I lock my computer when I leave 
my workstation 
R2 = .032, F(5, 287) = 1.897, p =.095. 
 
3.2% 
 
Overall, the WISA scale explains a proportion of the variance in security behaviour, therefore, 
demonstrating strong criterion-related validity.  
4.3.6 | INTERNAL RELIABILITY (STAGE 6) 
The final WISA scale comprises of 17 items. The majority of items demonstrated an acceptable 
alpha level normally deemed to be 0.70 or above (Hinkin, 1998; Kline, 1999). A few items fell 
short of this .70 level (e.g. Day-to-day- WISA Low Proximity Interest). These items were still 
above the .65 level considered to be at the lower end of the acceptable level for new scales 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 2006). 
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Table 18. Reliability statistics for each WISA total and the WISA subscales across 8 information 
types 
 
Factor No. of items R (α =) N= 
Pe
rs
o
n
a
l 
WISA Total 16 .70 319 
WISA Privacy 4 .85 326 
WISA Worth 3 .75 326 
WISA Consequences 4 .69 326 
WISA High Proximity Interest 2 .98 320 
WISA Low Proximity Interest 3 .65 319 
H
ea
lth
 
WISA Total 16 .74 314 
WISA Privacy 4 .83 326 
WISA Worth 3 .78 326 
WISA Consequences 4 .76 326 
WISA High Proximity Interest 2 .96 319 
WISA Low Proximity Interest 3 .75 315 
Li
fe
st
yl
e 
WISA Total 16 .73 313 
WISA Privacy 4 .88 326 
WISA Worth 3 .80 326 
WISA Consequences 4 .77 326 
WISA High Proximity Interest 2 .98 318 
WISA Low Proximity Interest 3 .67 315 
Fi
na
n
ci
al
 
WISA Total 16 .68 311 
WISA Privacy 4 .76 326 
WISA Worth 3 .81 326 
WISA Consequences 4 .70 326 
WISA High Proximity Interest 2 .92 313 
WISA Low Proximity Interest 3 .76 314 
In
te
lle
ct
u
a
l 
Pr
o
pe
rt
y 
WISA Total 16 .72 313 
WISA Privacy 4 .89 326 
WISA Worth 3 .82 326 
WISA Consequences 4 .68 326 
WISA High Proximity Interest 2 .94 316 
WISA Low Proximity Interest 3 .79 313 
D
ay
 
to
 
da
y WISA Total 16 .70 310 
WISA Privacy 4 .88 326 
WISA Worth 3 .86 326 
WISA Consequences 4 .67 326 
WISA High Proximity Interest 2 .96 314 
WISA Low Proximity Interest 3 .66 312 
C
om
m
er
ci
al
 
WISA Total 16 .71 307 
WISA Privacy 4 .90 326 
WISA Worth 3 .84 326 
WISA Consequences 4 .63 326 
WISA High Proximity Interest 2 .96 314 
WISA Low Proximity Interest 3 .67 308 
H
R
 
WISA Total 16 .78 312 
WISA Privacy 4 .86 326 
WISA Worth 3 .82 326 
WISA Consequences 4 .77 326 
WISA High Proximity Interest 2 .93 314 
WISA Low Proximity Interest 3 .74 313 
4.3.7 | INFORMATION SENSITIVITY DIFFERENCES 
This section is dedicated to assessing the second aim of the study to explore differences in 
information sensitivity and security behaviour for the different information types, knowledge 
about legal and organisational regulations applying to these information types and employees’ 
frequency of data usage. 
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Table 19. Means (and standard deviations) for the 5 WISA aspects for each information type 
N=315 Information type Mean (SD) 
Pr
iv
a
cy
 
Personal information 3.74 (.86) 
Health information 4.32 (.68) 
Lifestyle information 3.02 (.93) 
Financial information 4.55 (.58) 
Intellectual property 4.01 (.82) 
Day to day business information 3.67 (.86) 
Commercial information 3.86 (.88) 
HR information 4.34 (.71) 
W
or
th
 
Personal information 4.10 (.71) 
Health information 4.25 (.69) 
Lifestyle information 3.68 (.81) 
Financial information 4.30 (.75) 
Intellectual property 4.25 (.65) 
Day to day business information 4.00 (.69) 
Commercial information 4.14 (.69) 
HR information 4.22 (.68) 
C
o
n
se
qu
en
ce
s 
Personal information 2.34 (.68) 
Health information 3.08 (.82) 
Lifestyle information 2.70 (.72) 
Financial information 3.19 (.80) 
Intellectual property 2.56 (.70) 
Day to day business information 2.60 (.67) 
Commercial information 2.66 (.66) 
HR information 3.33 (.85) 
H
ig
h 
Pr
o
x
im
ity
 
In
te
re
st
 
Personal information 2.76 (1.34) 
 
Health information 2.77 (1.28) 
Lifestyle information 2.93 (1.29) 
Financial information 2.20 (1.08) 
Intellectual property 2.21 (1.02) 
Day to day business information 1.89 (.93) 
Commercial information 1.89 (.93) 
HR information 2.17 (1.12) 
Lo
w
 
Pr
ox
im
ity
 In
te
re
st
 
 
Personal information 2.97 (.92) 
Health information 2.80 (1.06) 
Lifestyle information 3.05 (.99) 
Financial information 3.22 (1.08) 
Intellectual property 3.64 (1.06) 
Day to day business information 3.51 (.96) 
Commercial information 3.64 (.95) 
HR information 3.11 (1.05) 
 
An 8 (information type) X 5 (WISA appraisal) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
explore differences in ratings for the 8 information types.  
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4.3.7.1 | Main effect of WISA appraisal on ratings 
There was a significant main effect of WISA appraisal on ratings (F(3.17, 994.48)=438.924. 
p<.001) with Greenhouse-Geisser correction.  
Table 20. Mean differences for ratings for all aspects of the WISA appraisal and p values resulting 
from Bonferroni corrected repeated measures t-tests 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 - WISA Privacy - -0.179** 1.131** 1.585** .696** 
2 - WISA Worth   1.310** 1.585** .875** 
3 - WISA Consequences    .454*** -.436** 
4 - WISA High Proximity 
Interest 
    -.889*** 
5 - WISA Low Proximity 
Interest 
     
*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001  
Post-hoc analyses indicated that there was a significant difference in ratings between all WISA 
types. Worth had the highest ratings (M=4.12), followed by privacy (M=3.94), low proximity 
interest (M=3.24), consequences (M=2.81) and finally, high proximity interest (M=2.35).  
4.3.7.2 | Main effect of information type on sensitivity ratings 
There was a significant main effect of information type on rating = (F(5.73, 1799.27)=92.435. 
p<.001) with Greenhouse-Geisser correction. Table 21 shows the results of the posthoc analyses 
t-tests.  
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Table 21. Mean differences for ratings for all information types and p values resulting from Bonferroni corrected repeated measures t-tests 
 Personal Health Lifestyle Financial Intellectual 
Property 
Day to 
day 
business 
Commercial HR 
Personal 
- -2.96** .139** -.309** -.155** .045  -.057 -.255** 
Health 
 - .435** -.013  .141** .341** .239** .041  
Lifestyle 
  - -.448** -.293** -.094* -.196** -.394** 
Financial 
   - .155** .354** .252** .054  
Intellectual 
Property 
    - .199** .098** -.101* 
Day to day business 
     - -.102* -.300* 
Commercial 
      - -.300* 
HR 
       - 
*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Post hoc analyses indicated that financial information had the highest ratings (M= 3.49), followed by health information (M= 3.48), HR information 
(M= 3.44), intellectual property (M=3.34), commercial information (M= 3.24), personal information (M= 3.18), day to day business information was 
second lowest for sensitivity ratings (M= 3.14), and lifestyle information was the lowest for ratings (M=  3.04). 
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4.3.7.3 | The Interaction Effect of Information Type and WISA appraisal 
There was a significant interaction effect of information type and WISA appraisal on ratings 
(F(16.46, 5169.106)=110.43. p<.001) with Greenhouse-Geisser correction.  
 
Figure 21. Line graph of ratings for each information type 
Figure 21 shows that there appears to be a consistent trend in the order of the information types 
across privacy, worth and consequences. This ordering appears to change for high and low 
proximity interest, particularly for the information types of financial and HR for high proximity 
interest, and commercial and day to day for low proximity interest. These findings will be 
further explored in the additional analyses outlined below.  
4.3.7.4 | Follow-up of interaction effect 
Differences in WISA appraisal for information types were explored by running posthoc 
analyses using repeated measures ANOVAs for each WISA subscale.  
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4.3.7.4.1 | PRIVACY  
Figure 22. Mean privacy ratings by information type 
 
Table 22. Mean differences for privacy ratings for all information types and p values resulting from 
Bonferroni corrected posthoc analyses 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(1) Personal - -.583*** .715*** -.818*** -.293*** .056 -.133 -.610*** 
(2) Health  - 1.23*** -.235*** .290*** .639*** .450*** -.027 
(3) Lifestyle   - -.1.53*** -1.01*** -.659*** -.847*** -1.32*** 
(4) Financial    - .525*** .874*** .686*** .209*** 
(5) Intellectual Property     - .349*** .160 -.317*** 
(6) Day to day business      - .189** -.666*** 
(7) Commercial       - -.477*** 
(8) HR        - 
*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Pairwise comparisons of information type revealed that there were significant differences 
between each information type for privacy score. However, as shown in Table 22 the 
differences between some information types were not significant. Financial information was 
considered the most private (M= 4.55). Followed by HR information (M= 4.34) and then health 
information (M= 4.31) and IP (M=  4.02) which were the third and fourth highest for privacy 
ratings. Commercial information (M= 3.86), personal information (M= 3.73) and day to day 
information (M= 3.67) were the fifth, six and seventh in order of privacy ratings. Finally, 
lifestyle information (M= 3.01) was considered the least private.  
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4.3.7.4.2 | WORTH 
Figure 23. Mean worth ratings by information type 
 
Table 23. Mean differences for worth rating for all information types and p values resulting from 
Bonferroni corrected posthoc analyses 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(1) Personal - -.143** .426*** -.187** -.143* .103 -.022 -.105 
(2) Health  - -.570*** -.044 .016 .246*** .121 .038 
(3) Lifestyle   - -.613*** -.570*** -.323*** -.449*** -.532*** 
(4) Financial    - .044 .290*** .165** .082 
(5) Intellectual Property     - .246*** .121** .038 
(6) Day to day business      - -.126** -.209*** 
(7) Commercial       - -.083 
(8) HR        - 
         
*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Pairwise comparisons of information type revealed that there were significant differences 
between each information type for worth score. However, as shown in Table 23 the differences 
between some information types were not significant. Financial information was considered to 
have the most worth (M=  4.3), followed by IP (M=  4.25) and health information (M= 4.25), HR 
(M= 4.22), commercial (M= 4.13), personal information (M= 4.11), day to day (M= 4.01) and 
finally lifestyle information (M= 3.69).  
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4.3.7.4.3 | CONSEQUENCES 
Figure 24. Mean consequences ratings by information type 
 
Table 24. Mean differences for consequences rating for all information types and p values resulting 
from Bonferroni corrected posthoc analyses 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(1) Personal - -.744*** -.369*** -.856*** -.255*** -.274*** -.335*** -1.00*** 
(2) Health  - .375*** -.112  .519 *** .40*** .409*** -.258*** 
(3) Lifestyle   - -.487*** .144* .095  .034  -.633*** 
(4) Financial    - .631*** .582*** .521*** -.146** 
(5) Intellectual Property     - -.049 -.110* -.777*** 
(6) Day to day business      - -.061  -.728*** 
(7) Commercial       - -.666*** 
(8) HR        - 
*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001 
HR was considered to have the highest consequences ratings (M= 3.34), followed by financial 
(M= 3.19), and health information (M= 3.08). Lifestyle (M= 2.70) was the fourth highest for 
perceived consequences, commercial information (M= 2.67) was the fifth highest and day to day 
information was the sixth (M=  2.61). IP was second to last for lowest consequence ratings 
(M= 2.56) and finally, personal information (M= 2.33).  
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4.3.7.4.4 | HIGH PROXIMITY INTEREST 
Figure 25. Mean high proximity interest ratings by information type 
 
Table 25. Mean differences for high proximity interest ratings for all information types and p 
values resulting from Bonferroni corrected posthoc analyses 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(1) Personal - -.179  -.014  .560*** .541*** .862*** .862*** .581*** 
(2) Health  - .165  .740*** .721*** 1.04*** 1.04*** .760*** 
(3) Lifestyle   - .575*** .556*** .876*** .876*** .595*** 
(4) Financial    - -.019  .302*** .302*** .021  
(5) Intellectual Property     - .321*** .321*** .040 
(6) Day to day business      - .000 -.281*** 
(7) Commercial       - -.281*** 
(8) HR        - 
*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that there were significant differences between each information 
type for high proximity interest score. However, as shown in Table 25 the differences between 
some information types were not significant. Health information was the highest for high 
proximity interest (M= 2.93), followed by lifestyle (M= 2.77), personal (M= 2.76), IP (M= 2.21) 
and financial (M= 2.20). HR (M= 2.17) was sixth highest for high proximity interest ratings, and 
Day to day (M= 1.89) and commercial (M= 1.89) were lowest for ratings. The findings suggest 
that information types which involve individual’s information (e.g. personal, health and 
lifestyle) are considered to be of interest to employees’ high proximity groups (i.e. family and 
friends) compared to information of an organisational or commercial focus (e.g. IP, commercial 
and HR).  
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4.3.7.4.5 | LOW PROXIMITY INTEREST 
Figure 26. Mean low proximity interest ratings by information type 
 
Table 26. Mean differences for low proximity interest ratings for all information types and p values 
resulting from Bonferroni corrected posthoc analyses 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(1) Personal - -.172** -.075  -.243*** -.670*** -.540*** -.665*** -.139  
(2) Health  - -.247*** -.415*** -.842*** -.712*** -.837*** -.311*** 
(3) Lifestyle   - -.168* -.595*** -.465*** -.589*** -.064  
(4) Financial    - -.427*** -.296*** -.421*** .104  
(5) Intellectual Property     - .131** .006  .531* 
(6) Day to day business      - -.125* .401* 
(7) Commercial       - .525* 
(8) HR        - 
*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001 
IP (M= 3.64) and commercial (M= 3.64) were rated the highest for low proximity interest, 
followed by day to day (M= 3.51) and financial (M= 3.22). The fifth highest for low proximity 
interest was HR (M= 3.11), followed by lifestyle (M= 3.05), personal (M= 2.97) and health 
(M= 2.80). The is contrasting to the findings for high proximity interest as information with an 
organisational focus (e.g. IP, commercial and day to day) were rated as high interest for low 
proximity groups (i.e. criminals, business competitors and fellow employees) compared to 
information about individuals (e.g. health, personal). 
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4.3.7.5 | Summary of sensitivity differences by information type 
Financial, HR and health were the three information types to be amongst the highest for privacy, 
worth and consequences dimensions whereas commercial, day to day, and personal are amongst 
the lowest for these three dimensions. IP is amongst the highest for privacy and worth, and 
lifestyle are amongst the lowest, however, this observation reverses for the consequences 
dimension. Intellectual property is considered to be highly private and has high worth but 
consequences of its disclosure are not perceived as severe. This may be due to the consequences 
dimension including emotional consequences (e.g. humiliating and embarrassing) which 
employees may not associate with information that is unrelated to living individuals. Lifestyle 
information is not perceived as highly private and having high worth, but it may have 
consequences if disclosed. For perceived interest in information, intellectual property is the only 
information type to be amongst the highest for high and low proximity interest. Health, lifestyle 
and personal information were considered to be of interest to high proximity groups whereas 
commercial, day to day and financial were perceived to be of interest to low proximity groups.  
4.3.7.6 | Perceptions of legal and organisational regulations  
It was also necessary to explore whether there were differences in employees’ sensitivity ratings 
as well as their security behaviour, dependent on their perceptions of legal and organisational 
regulations. For each information type, the regulations explored were; whether the information 
was (1) publically available, (2) regulated by law and (3) access controlled by their organisation. 
In the following analyses, participants are grouped based on their response to these questions in 
which they rated ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘I do not know’.     
4.3.7.6.1 | Perceptions of publically available information and access restrictions by 
organisation on sensitivity ratings 
For each information type, a one-way MANOVA was conducted to explore differences in 
perceptions of publically available information and perceptions of access restrictions by the 
organisation on sensitivity ratings. Findings revealed that there were no significant main effects 
of publically available information perceptions and access restrictions perceptions on sensitivity 
ratings (p>.05) for all information types. 
4.3.7.6.2 | Perceptions of regulation by law on sensitivity ratings 
For each information type, a one-way MANOVA was conducted to explore differences in 
perceptions of law regulations on sensitivity ratings for each information type. Findings 
revealed that there were no significant main effects of law regulations on sensitivity ratings 
(p>.05) for all information types apart from personal information. 
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The findings for personal information indicated a significant main effect of perceptions of law 
regulations on personal information sensitivity ratings (Pillai’s Trace =.091, F(10, 460)=2.202, 
p<.05).  
Further analyses indicated that the effect of perceptions of law regulations was significantly 
different for low proximity ratings for personal information (F(2, 233) = 5.509, p<.05).  
Gabriel posthoc analyses were conducted in which pairwise comparisons revealed no significant 
difference between those with (M=  3.12) and those without (M=  3.29) perceptions of law 
regulations for personal information low proximity interest (p>.05). There was, however, a 
significant difference between those with and those without perceptions compared to individuals 
who indicated that they did not know (M= 2.55) (p<.05). This suggests that those with lacked 
awareness of law regulations rated low proximity interests significantly lower than those with 
an incorrect awareness of law regulations pertaining to personal information and those with a 
perception that law regulations exist.  
4.3.7.6.3 | Interaction effects 
Findings from the MANOVAs indicated that there were no significant interactions between any 
of the perceptions of legal and organisational regulations on any information type.  
4.3.7.6.4 | Perceptions of legal and organisational regulations on information security 
behaviours 
The degree to which a difference in security behaviour depends on employees’ perceptions of 
legal and organisational regulations was further investigated using one-way ANOVAs. These 
found no significant differences in security behaviour depending on regulation perceptions for 
all information types (p>.05) apart from personal information.  
For personal information, differences were explored between those individuals with perceptions 
of access restrictions (M= 57.86), those who indicated there were no access restrictions for 
personal information (M= 55.11) and those who did not know if there were access restrictions 
(M= 50.11). The ANOVA revealed that there was a significant difference in security behaviour 
depending on perceptions of access restrictions for personal information (F(2,226)= 4.236, 
p=.016).  Gabriel posthoc analyses revealed that the only significant difference was between 
those with perceptions of access restrictions and those who did not know if there were access 
restrictions  (p<.01). 
Overall, this suggests that those individuals with perceptions that personal information is access 
controlled within their organisation have significantly higher self-reported security behaviour. 
This was in comparison to those individuals who lacked awareness of access restrictions 
relating to personal information within their workplace.  
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4.3.7.7 | Data usage 
 
Figure 27. The frequency of data usage for each information type 
Employees indicated their frequency of storing and processing the information types within 
their workplace. Personal information was the most used with 82.6% using this data at least 
‘rarely’, followed by health information (56.8%), day to day business information (58.9%), 
commercial (53.1%) and HR information (50.9%). Lifestyle, financial and intellectual property 
were used by less than 50% of employees at least ‘rarely’. Figure 27 shows the percentage of 
participants and their frequency of data usage for each information type.   
4.3.7.7.1 | Data usage and information sensitivity and security 
 Employees were split into three groups for each information type, depending on their ratings of 
the frequency of data usage. Those who indicated that they never worked with the information 
type were grouped into the “no” user group, those who worked with the information rarely or 
sometimes were placed in the “low” user group and those who worked with the information 
often or always into the “high” user group. 
One-way MANOVAs were conducted for each information type to explore if there were 
significant differences in sensitivity ratings for all 5 WISA dimensions dependent on data usage 
group. Findings revealed that there were no significant main effects or interaction effects of data 
usage groups on ratings (p>.05) for all information types. This, therefore, indicates that data 
usage does not influence sensitivity ratings.  
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One-way ANOVAs were conducted for each information type to explore whether there were 
significant differences in the security behaviour depending on data usage group. There was no 
significant difference in the security behaviour between data usage groups for health 
information, lifestyle, financial, IP and HR (p>.05).  
Personal information. There was a significant difference in the security behaviour between data 
usage groups (F(2, 290)=6.595, p<.01). Post-hoc analyses indicated a significant difference 
between the ‘no’ usage group (M=50.41) and ‘high’ usage group (M=57.13) (p>.05) suggesting 
that individuals who are high regular users of personal information data significantly engage in 
more security behaviours compared to those individuals that do not work with personal 
information.  
Day to day business information. There was a significant difference in the security behaviour 
between data usage groups (F(2, 290)=8.295, p<.01). Post-hoc analyses indicated that there was 
a significant difference between the ‘no’ usage group (M=52.57) and ‘high’ usage group 
(M=59.47) (p<.01) suggesting that individuals with high usage of day to day business perform 
significantly more security behaviours than low and no data users.  
Commercial information. There was a significant difference in the security behaviour between 
data usage groups (F(2, 290)=6.884, p<.01). Post-hoc analyses indicated that there was 
significant difference between the ‘no’ usage group (M=52.55) and the ‘low’ usage group 
(M=56.95) and high usage group (M=57.98) (p<.01). This suggests that data users independent 
of usage frequency perform significantly more security behaviours as compared to users who do 
not work with commercial data.  
4.4 | DISCUSSION 
4.4.1 | SCALE VALIDATION 
This study developed and validated a new measure for information sensitivity to be used within 
a workplace setting. The resulting 17-item scale has five sub-scales: privacy, worth, 
consequences, low proximity interest and high proximity interest. The WISA scale, alongside its 
five subscales was found to have strong factorial validity which was confirmed across 8 target 
information types. The scale also had good criterion-related validity as it was found to 
significantly predict security behaviour. Finally, the scale was found to have adequate 
discriminant validity as 3 of the 5 aspects of the WISA scale were found to be unrelated to 
organisational citizenship behaviour.  
 
As discussed earlier, there is no clear consensus on defining information sensitivity. However, 
there were two clear themes in previous research of what comprises sensitive information. The 
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first focuses on the privacy and intimacy of the information and the second focuses on the 
vulnerability and exploitability of the information. The current study sought to add further 
understanding to defining information sensitivity by combining the previous literature 
definitions with the findings from Chapter 3. Following EFA, the final information sensitivity 
structure was found to comprise of privacy, worth, consequences, high and low proximity 
interest. The only difference between the initial information sensitivity structure and that which 
emerged from the EFA was that “interest by others” was found to be two distinct factors – ‘high 
proximity’ and ‘low proximity’ interest groups rather than one encompassing factor. This revised 
structure was found to be a strong fit to the data for the 8 target information types. This suggests 
that this definition of information sensitivity is a strong explanation of the data which was 
confirmed on 8 information types that may be stored and processed in organisations. This 
knowledge might be useful for how we conceptualise information sensitivity in further research 
and within government legislation such as the Data Protection Act (1998). Differences with 
regards to information types and the five aspects of sensitivity rating will be discussed in the 
next section.  
 
The scale requires further exploration to improve its validity. The WISA scale while shown to 
significantly predict security behaviour explained less than 10% of the variance for the 
composite measure. However, when exploring its role on individual security behaviours, the 
scale was found to explain between 8-10% of the variance for use of complex passwords, secure 
Wi-Fi and awareness of physical surroundings. This indicates that the WISA scale may be able 
to provide improved predictive validity for some security behaviours in comparison to others. 
This is promising as not one factor would be able to predict security behaviour in isolation and 
the qualitative study and existing security literature has shown that there are a number of factors 
that influence security behaviour. The use of WISA may, therefore, explain additional variance 
in security behaviour alongside other important determinants such as PMT constructs.  The aim 
of the next study is to further explore the extended-PMT model derived from the qualitative 
study, alongside the WISA scale, to estimate how much variance can be explained in security 
behaviour and which factors are the best predictors. This will help provide further evidence of 
the discriminant validity of the WISA scale. Further evidence of criterion-related validity will 
also be obtained by exploring its role in specific security behaviours (i.e. anti-malware 
behaviours). Further validation of the scale will provide more evidence for its potential utility 
for use within the workplace setting and for future research focussing on information sensitivity.  
 
A limitation of the current study is that convergent validity (a form of construct validity) could 
not be assessed. Convergent validity is important as it measures the degree to which the current 
scale is correlated with scales that claim to measure the same construct (i.e. information 
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sensitivity) (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009). Previous research (Cranor et al., 1999; Malhotra et al., 
2004) have used related measures of information sensitivity. However, these were not 
considered adequate as they had not been under validation assessment nor did they measure 
information sensitivity in the workplace or were related to assessing information that is not 
about oneself. Furthermore, they measure the information sensitivity of consumers’ own 
information and there is potential ownership and framing issues when used in comparison to the 
construct measured within the current study. However, despite this limitation, the current study 
provides a basis for further development of additional scales measuring information sensitivity 
within the workplace.  
4.4.2 | INFORMATION SENSITIVITY DIFFERENCES 
Financial information was found to have the highest ratings for sensitivity followed by health 
and HR. These aspects were also found to be the highest for 3 of the 5 sensitivity ratings; 
privacy, worth and consequences. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter and chapter 3, 
employees rate information about individuals to be more sensitive than organisational 
information. The current study supports these qualitative findings, however not all information 
types are considered sensitive. For example, lifestyle information overall had the lowest ratings 
for sensitivity. This difference in information sensitivity with regards to individuals’ data 
supports previous research by Cranor et al. (1999) who found that individuals were willing to 
disclose lifestyle information (such as favourite snack) but not willing to disclose financial 
information (such as a credit card). Further research by Mothersbaugh et al. (2012) on 
information disclosure has found that sensitivity works along a continuum. The continuum 
ranges from willing to disclose to not willing to disclose with demographic and lifestyle factors 
being the information people are most willing to disclose and personal identifiable and financial 
information as least willing to disclose. The current study supports this literature, however, it 
adds a further level of understanding by exploring how individuals make this appraisal of 
sensitivity by considering its perceived privacy, worth, consequences and perceived interest by 
high and low proximity others and if it affects security behaviour.  
 
This study is one of the first to explore how individuals appraise the sensitivity of 
organisationally-focused information (i.e. IP, day to day, commercial & HR). The findings by 
Adams and Sasse (1999), supported by the conclusions of Chapter 3, highlighted that 
individual’s rate some information about individuals as more sensitive than organisational 
information. Information regarding health and financial data is consistently viewed as sensitive 
across the dimensions of privacy, worth and consequences. Likewise, HR information about 
individuals is also considered sensitive across these dimensions. Personal and lifestyle 
information, whilst they refer to individuals’ information are not considered sensitive for 
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privacy, worth and consequences. Commercial and day to day organisationally-focussed 
information were consistently low for privacy, worth and consequences. Intellectual property 
was the only information type that did not relate to individuals but was highly rated for privacy, 
worth, high proximity and low proximity interest. IP was not highly rated for consequences and 
this was the same for other organisational information; commercial and day to day. There are a 
number of possible reasons for this finding; firstly this study defines consequences as 
humiliating, compromising, discreditable, and embarrassing, which individuals may not 
associate with information that is not about people. This could reflect the decline in sensitivity 
rating for consequences when comparing the two broad information types of organisational-
focussed and individual-focussed. A second potential explanation could be that individuals lack 
awareness of consequences associated with organisational information and, therefore, rate them 
lower.  
 
This study is one of the first to focus on how employees rate sensitivity of organisational 
information. The study confirms both the findings from Chapter 3 and those of Adams and 
Sasse (1999) but also showed that employees do consider some forms of organisational-
focussed information to be sensitive i.e. intellectual property. This suggests that a binary 
judgement of sensitivity is not sufficient for understanding how sensitivity is appraised and 
consequently the current study suggests that individuals consider five components of this. The 
main difference between individually-focussed information and organisational-focussed is the 
perceived high or low proximity interest.  
 
High proximity and low proximity interest revealed some interesting findings with regards to 
differences in the two broad information types. Information about individuals (e.g. personal, 
health and lifestyle) was considered to be of interest to employees’ high proximity interest 
groups (i.e. family and friends) in comparison to organisational-focussed information as well as 
financial and HR information. For low proximity interest, the opposite effect is apparent with 
organisational-focussed information (IP, commercial and day to day) perceived to be of interest 
to low proximity groups (i.e. criminals, fellow employees & business competitors). There is 
limited previous research that looks at this form of sensitivity appraisal, the inclusion of which 
was driven by the findings of Chapter 3 which suggested that employees consider the audience 
(or interest) in information that they work with and use this as a basis to evaluate the sensitivity 
of the information. The current study contributes novel findings that suggest that future research 
may need to further explore perceived interest in information sensitivity conceptualisations. 
 
This study also explored perceptions of legal and organisational regulations with regards to the 
information types, and the impact of these perceptions on their sensitivity ratings and security 
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behaviour. There was only an observed difference for personal information. For sensitivity 
ratings, a significant difference was found for perceptions of law regulations for personal 
information for the WISA component - low proximity interest. These differences were between 
those who had perceptions and those who did not know there were regulations. For security 
behaviour, those with perceptions that personal information is access controlled had 
significantly higher self-reported security behaviour compared to those who lacked awareness.  
 
Taken together, these findings could be due to employees’ knowledge of law regulations 
surrounding the Data Protection Act (1998) suggesting that knowledge may play a small role in 
personal information but not for any other. The DPA governs the information of living 
individuals, including their personal information. Companies must abide by the DPA and have  
restrictions in place to protect information governed by the act. This may account for why those 
who are aware of access controls and legal regulations rate the information more sensitive (for 
low proximity interest) and engage in more security behaviours.  
 
These findings could also be due to attitudinal differences around personal information storage 
by those who indicated that they ‘did not know’ if there were regulations. These individuals 
may be complacent towards information sensitivity and security which may explain the 
significant difference in the low proximity component and self-report security behaviour 
between those with perceptions and those who indicated they did not know.  
 
The role of frequency of data usage in information sensitivity (and security) was also explored. 
Findings revealed that there were no significant main effects or interaction effects of data usage 
groups on sensitivity ratings for all information types. This suggested that the more an 
individual works with an information type does not mean they rate the information any more 
sensitive than employees who do not work with the information. There were, however, some 
differences in the security behaviour of individuals for the information types: personal, day to 
day and commercial which suggested that individuals who work with these information types 
engaged in more security behaviours than those who did not.  
 
This study is one of the first to explore how individuals rate the sensitivity of information 
belonging to other individuals in contrast to previous research (e.g. Cranor et al., 1999) that 
investigates how individuals evaluate the sensitivity of their own information.  Future research 
is needed to explore differences in sensitivity evaluation of self vs. others information and 
whether individuals evaluate the sensitivity of their own information differently depending on 
data ownership.   
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Overall, this chapter has outlined the development and validation of a new scale to evaluate the 
sensitivity of workplace information. This study has identified differences in employees’ 
sensitivity evaluation of different types of information stored by organisations. The scale will be 
further explored in the next chapter for a specific sub-set of security behaviours; anti-malware 
behaviours.  
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5 CHAPTER 5: EXPLORING THE EXTENDED-PMT MODEL FOR ANTI-
MALWARE BEHAVIOURS 
 
This chapter builds on the findings from Chapter 3 by investigating the influence of the 
identified factors with three specific behaviours; an anti-malware software behaviour (AMS 
security; using anti-malware software to scan USB sticks for malware), an email security 
behaviour (ES security; not clicking on links in suspicious emails) and a software update 
behaviour (SU security; installing software updates when prompted). The study adds to the 
body of knowledge by exploring an extended-PMT model. The extensions are derived from 
existing literature and Chapter 3 namely security responsibility, information sensitivity, 
experience, psychological ownership and organisational citizenship behaviour. In summary, the 
study addressed the following issues as identified in the literature review: 
 An over-reliance on security policy compliance as representing a single security 
behaviour;   A lack of studies exploring the behavioural determinants of single security behaviours, 
particularly in relation to a specific security threat;  A lack of understanding of whether behavioural determinants differ by security 
behaviour.   
These issues were addressed by focussing on malware as the specific threat and three different 
malware protection behaviours. The study found that an extended PMT-model and its 
components differed by security behaviour. The revised models were a strong fit to the data. 
Overall, the findings suggested that the coping appraisal components (self-efficacy, response 
costs and response efficacy) of the model could explain security behaviours better than the 
threat component (susceptibility and severity). In particular, response efficacy (an identified 
barrier from Chapter 3) was a significant predictor of all three behaviours.  From the extended 
factors, responsibility was found to be an important predictor of the AMS and SU behaviour. A 
component of the WISA appraisal (WISA consequences) was also found to predict the AMS 
behaviour. Psychological ownership and organisational citizenship behaviour were not found to 
influence any of the behaviours.  
This chapter starts by providing evidence of why these anti-malware behaviours are important 
and then outlines the hypotheses to be explored in the study, driven by existing literature and 
the findings from Chapter 3.  
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5.1 | MALWARE AND ANTI-MALWARE BEHAVIOURS 
Malware continues to be one of the frequently experienced cyber-attacks faced by organisations 
(Ponemon Institute, 2012). Despite companies best efforts, attacks remain relatively stable with 
317 million new pieces of malware created in 2014 (Symantec Corporation, 2015) and a rise in 
more innovate and diverse tactics (Sophos, 2014). 
Malware threats and malware prevention behaviours were chosen because they are relatively 
understudied within the workplace. A number of studies have explored consumers’ anti-
malware behaviours (Chenoweth et al., 2009; Dang-pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Gurung et 
al., 2009; Lee et al., 2008; Liang & Xue, 2009, 2010) but only the study by Ng et al. (2009) 
explored viruses in the workplace using behavioural models; investigating employees’ threat 
and coping appraisal for checking email attachments. More attention is therefore warranted to 
understand employees’ malware threat appraisal and their evaluation of different anti-malware 
behaviours.  
5.1.1 | ANTI-MALWARE BEHAVIOURS 
The current study seeks to address three specific anti-malware behaviours; use of anti-malware 
software to scan USB sticks, avoiding links in suspicious emails and installing software updates 
when prompted. The behaviours were chosen as they are important behaviours to prevent 
malware and require different levels of input from the user so may provide potential variation in 
the influence of their determinants.  The current study seeks to address the gap in the lack of 
studies on behavioural security for these behaviours in relation to malware mitigation.  
5.1.2 | USING ANTI-MALWARE SOFTWARE TO SCAN USB STICKS FOR 
MALWARE 
USB sticks are used to store and share data as they are readily available, small, inexpensive and 
portable. However, they are an important security concern due to their ability to store hidden 
malware. Malware can be easily spread across computers as the user shares or plugs their USB 
device into other machines; potentially passing on malware, without the user being aware that 
their device is infected. Removable media is recognised as a risk for malware infection in 
businesses by the UK government (Gov.uk, 2015).  
There are some recommendations to protect against this risk including disabling autorun for 
removable media and scanning USB sticks for malware (Zonealarm, 2013). The current study 
seeks to explore behaviours at the employee-level and identify the determinants of intentions to 
engage in scanning USB sticks for malware.  
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5.1.3 | LINKS IN PHISHING EMAILS 
One form of phishing is “Malware-based phishing” or “Malicious spam”, an attempt to get the 
user to download a malware-infected attachment or click on a malicious link where malware can 
be downloaded onto their machine. The tactics used by attackers are variable, often changing 
the way malware may be distributed by email. For example, in October 2014 only 7% of spam 
emails contained malicious links, this rose to 41% in November 2014 and continued to rise in 
December (Symantec, 2014). Links are less problematic for attackers as organisations’ security 
software often scans and blocks attachments that they suspect of containing malware so URLs 
represent an opportunity to avoid detection from these security products.  
Avoiding malware spread via phishing is an important deterrent in preventing a security breach. 
Habitual clicking on links by susceptible employees is problematic in the context of malware 
prevention. Existing research traditionally focuses on phishing emails as a threat towards 
collecting sensitive information, but there has been less attention on the role in distributing 
malware in behavioural information security research.  
5.1.4 | INSTALLING SOFTWARE UPDATES ON DEVICES 
Malware targets the vulnerabilities of computer systems and software. For example, drive-by 
downloads exploit vulnerabilities in web browsers or plugins that allow malware to be installed 
on users’ machines. Software such as Java, Flash and Adobe Acrobat have been used as 
platforms for cybercriminals to install malware on users’ machines and these need to be kept up 
to date (Microsoft, 2015). Security software and operating system updates are important to 
make sure vulnerabilities are quickly removed. Attackers compromise systems through zero-day 
exploits in which attackers exploit vulnerabilities in software that are unknown to the software 
provider (Sans, 2015) and through users delayed machine updates.  
In the workplace, identifying and deploying updates are often the responsibility of the IT 
department. Even so, the employee may still be required to restart their machines to allow the 
installation. However, the findings from Chapter 3 suggest that employees may postpone or 
refrain from restarting their computer machines to reduce the impact on their productivity. In 
addition, software on employees’ machines may be installed that is not maintained by IT that 
requires the user to manage the entire update process.  
There is a lack of studies exploring motivations of employees intentions to install software 
updates when prompted by their machine, however, there are a few qualitative studies on 
consumers identifying the unintended consequences of installing software updates and the 
negative implications of this towards security behaviour (Wash, Rader, Vaniea, & Rizor, 2014).  
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5.2 | STUDY AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The current study aims to identify key factors related to employees’ protection motivation for a 
specific subset of security behaviours, in particular, anti-malware behaviours: removable media, 
software updates and suspicious links in relation to malware mitigation. It is intended that this 
will lead to a more concise model to understand the complexity surrounding individuals’ 
motivations to engage in protective actions. Furthermore, the findings of the study will help to 
further explore threat and coping appraisal, alongside findings from the qualitative study and 
explore how they may differ dependent on security behaviour.   
Chapter 3 led to the development of the modified PMT framework to be explored within the 
current study which is presented below:  
 
Figure 28. Extended Hypothesized Protection Motivation Theory in the context of security 
In line with the original PMT model (as outlined in section 2.2.1.1) and existing research in 
section 2.2 and studies exploring these factors on specific anti-malware behaviours (Chenoweth 
et al., 2009; Gurung et al., 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2009; Ng et al., 
2009), the following hypotheses are formulated: 
 Hypothesis1: There will be a positive relationship between perceived severity and 
intention  Hypothesis2: There will be a positive relationship between perceived susceptibility and 
intention   Hypothesis3: There will be a positive relationship between self-efficacy and intention   Hypothesis4: There will be a positive relationship between response efficacy and 
intention 
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 Hypothesis5: There will be a negative relationship between response costs and 
intention   Hypothesis6a: The effects of experience on protection motivation will be mediated by 
threat appraisal (susceptibility & severity) and coping appraisal (response efficacy, 
self-efficacy and response cost)   Hypothesis6b: There will also be a positive relationship between experience and 
intention  
Based on the qualitative study (chapter 3) and chapter 4 for WISA, the following hypotheses 
were formulated:  
 Hypothesis7: There will be a positive relationship between workplace information 
sensitivity appraisal and protection intention   Hypothesis8: There will be a positive relationship between security responsibility and 
protection motivation  
Previous research as outlined in section 2.2.5.5 for ownership and section 2.2.6.5.2 for 
citizenship lead to the development of the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis9a: There will be a positive relationship between psychological ownership of 
data and intention   Hypothesis9b: There will be a positive relationship between psychological ownership of 
technology and intention  Hypothesis10: There will be a positive relationship between organisational citizenship 
and intention 
5.2.1 | IMPLICIT SECURITY TASK 
In addition to exploring self-report anti-malware behaviours, it was important to explore the 
factors in relation to an objective measure of actual behaviour and explore if there are 
differences in the determinants of those who engage in the secure behaviour. By using an 
implicit measure, it was possible to explore a behaviour that is not open to self-report bias. The 
implicit security measure will take the form of non-acceptance of an online cookie, while 
cookies are nothing more than text files and they are not malware. They are stored on users’ 
machines and transmitted back to the website when they browse a site. They are associated with 
a number of security issues as they can store sensitive information such as passwords and credit-
card details to pre-fill forms online. They are potentially open to exploitation by hackers if the 
security of the website and the user’s browser is poor or there is not appropriate encryption in 
place to secure the data. This behaviour is not related to anti-malware, however, the current 
study is interested in exploring if there are differences in the researched factors for those who do 
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accept the cookie compared to those who do not accept the cookie. This will allow an 
understanding of the effects of the factors on an objective behavioural measure rather than 
solely focusing on self-report measures.  
Hypothesis11: There will be a significant difference in levels of the extended-PMT factors 
between those individuals who accept the cookie and those who do not 
5.3 | METHOD 
5.3.1 | DESIGN 
A correlational design was adopted to understand the relationship between the predictors (threat, 
coping and additional factors) and outcome variables (intention to engage in the three 
behaviours).  
5.3.2 | PARTICIPANTS 
An opportunity sample of 526 (Age, M= 35.52, SD= 12.22) individuals were recruited online of 
which 124 did not complete the demographic section. 422 completed the SU section, 324 
completed the AMS section and 428 completed the email section.  All recruited participants 
were currently in full time or part time employment.  152 males and 243 females (6 participants 
chose not to disclose their gender) took part with an average organisational tenure of 6.19 years 
(SD=7.31) and job tenure of 3.81 years (SD 5.17). 36% of which had managerial 
responsibilities.  
58% stated they had read their organisation’s information security policy, 13% were unsure, 
22% had never read the policy and the remaining 7% stated that their organisation did not have 
a policy in place. Of those who said yes, 10% had read the policy within the last month, 29% in 
the last 1-6 months, 18% had read it 6-12 months ago and 23% was more than a year ago, the 
remaining 20% were not sure.  8% were from a microenterprise (less than 10 staff), 9% from a 
small enterprise (less than 50 staff), 10% from a medium-sized enterprise (less than 250 staff) 
and 73% from a large organisation (more than 250 staff).  
71% of employees used their desktop PC most for work tasks, 26% used a laptop, 1% their 
smartphone and 2% their tablet. 84% of employees worked from their company-owned device 
while 16% used a personally-owned device. 83% of employees used Microsoft Windows, 13% 
Mac OS X, 2% Linux, 2% iOS and 1% used Android.  
Appendix K presents the organisational sectors recruited participants were from. 
5.3.3 | MEASURES 
Unless otherwise stated all items were measured on a 5 point Likert scale that ranged from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree.  
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Perceived Susceptibility was measured with 4 items. 2 items were taken from Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010) in which the security threat was changed from spyware to malware. 2 items 
were also based on Milne et al. (2002) and were re-worded to reflect the area of security e.g.  
“My chances of developing CHD in the future are” was changed to “My chances of infecting my 
work device with malware in the future are high”. The scale had an internal reliability of α = 
.72. See Appendix M for full scale. 
Perceived Severity was measured with 13 items. 3 items were based on Johnston and Warkentin 
(2010) such as “If my work device were infected by malware, it would be severe”. The 
remaining 10 items were self-developed and were based on the findings from the qualitative 
study. The inclusion of these items was to target the four areas of potential consequences 
(technological, personal, 3rd party and organisational) to provide a more grounded and 
contextual perceived severity measure. An example item is “If my work device were infected by 
malware, I could be severely disciplined”. The total scale had an internal reliability of α =.88. 
See Appendix M for full scale. 
Security Responsibility was measured using a self-developed 7 item scale in which participants 
scored themselves on a 7-point visual analogue scale from “my company’s responsibility” to 
“my responsibility”. An example item is “to install anti-malware software on devices I use for 
work”. The scale had an internal reliability of α =.81. See Appendix N for full scale. 
Workplace Information Sensitivity Appraisal developed in Chapter 4 was used consisting of 17 
items (see Appendix G). Participants were asked to select the information type that they worked 
with most which were those information types used within the previous study. Their WISA 
appraisal was then measured for this information type. The full-scale had an internal reliability 
of α = .78. The sub-scale for privacy was α = .82, consequences α = .79, worth α = .85, low 
proximity interest α = .75 and for high proximity interest α = .94.  
Psychological ownership was measured using the same 4 items as Chapter 3, section 3.2.3.1 
(see Appendix B). The full-scale had an internal reliability of α = .87. The sub-scale for data 
ownership had an internal reliability of α = .80 and for device ownership α =.87. 
Past experience was self-developed and consisted of 12 items. 6 items measured employees’ 
direct personal experience of the consequences of security breaches and the other 6 items 
measured experience of these breaches in the workplace. An example of an item “My personal 
account (e.g. email, social media) has been used by someone without my permission”. Items 
were measured on a 3 point scale consisting of ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘I don’t know’. A total composite 
score was created to represent their security experience as a continuous variable. See Appendix 
O for full scale. 
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Organisational citizenship behaviour  was measured using the same OCB-O scale as Chapter 3, 
section 3.2.3.1 consisting of 8 items (see Appendix A).  The scale had an internal reliability of α 
=.85.  
The following constructs were measured for each of the three security behaviours. All the items 
were the same except the beginning of the sentence; here it is represented as <security 
behaviour>.  
Response efficacy was measured with 13 items. 3 items were based on Witte, Cmaeron, 
McKeon, and Berkowitz (1996) response efficacy template such as “< security behaviour>  
works in preventing malware”. Additional items were included to assess ratings of response 
efficacy for avoiding the negative consequences associated with the security threat as previous 
studies mainly focus on threat reduction in response efficacy measures. In line with perceived 
severity, these targeted the four areas of threat consequences. An example item is “< security 
behaviour>  works in protecting the reputation of my organisation”. RE for AMS (α =.95), ES 
(α =.95) and SU (α =.95).  See Appendix P for full scales. 
Self-efficacy was measured with 4 items based on Milne et al. (2002) such as “I feel confident in 
my ability to < security behaviour> ”. SE for AMS (α =.85), ES (α =.84) and SU (α =.84).  See 
Appendix Q for full scales. 
Response costs were measured with 2 items based on Gurung et al. (2009). Security behaviours 
had additional items that were specific to their associated costs. Anti-malware software had an 
additional 7 items such as “Using the anti-malware software on my device to scan for malware 
would slow my device down”. The security behaviour installing operating system updates had an 
additional 6 items such as “Installing operating system updates on my work device could lead to 
a less reliable or ‘buggy’ software version being installed”. Finally, not clicking on URL links 
in suspicious emails had 4 additional items such as “not clicking on URL links in suspicious 
emails would affect my productivity at work”. RC for AMS (α =.84), ES (α =.89) and SU (α 
=.87).  See Appendix R for full scales. 
Protection motivation was measured with 3 items based on Johnston and Warkentin (2010) such 
as “I intend to < security behaviour>  in the next 2 weeks”. <time element> was specific to 
situation. PM for AMS (α =.92), ES (α =.88) and SU (α =.93).  See Appendix S for full scales. 
Implicit security measure  
Before starting the survey, participants were prompted with the following message: 
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“This cookie stores basic user information on your computer, potentially improving the 
browsing experience and helping us deliver more relevant information to you. Do you want to 
use this option?” 
Clicking “don’t accept” was indicative of the secure behaviour (scored 1=accept, 2=don’t 
accept). See Appendix T for prompted message. 
5.3.4 | PROCEDURE  
Table 27. Presentation of questionnaire sections and associated appendices 
Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 
4 
Section 
5 
Section 
6 
Section 7 Section 8 
   <---order randomized----->   
Previous 
security 
breach 
experience 
and OCB 
Devices used 
at work, 
psychological 
ownership 
and WISA 
Malware 
threat 
perception 
AMS 
items 
SU items ES items Security 
responsibility 
Demographics 
Appendix 
O & 
Appendix 
A 
Appendix L, 
Appendix B 
& Appendix 
G 
Appendix 
M 
Appendix 
P 
Appendix 
R 
Appendix 
S 
Appendix 
U 
Appendix 
P 
Appendix 
R 
Appendix 
S 
Appendix 
U 
Appendix 
P 
Appendix 
R 
Appendix 
S 
Appendix 
U 
Appendix N Appendix J 
After consenting to take part, participants were presented with the implicit security task. They 
were then directed to the first section of the questionnaire which asked questions about their 
previous security breach experience and their levels of organisational citizenship. The second 
section questioned participants about the devices they used at work, psychological ownership 
and the WISA scale. Section 3 asked questions about employees’ malware threat perception. 
Section 4, 5 and 6 were questions about employees’ response evaluation of the three anti-
malware behaviours, the order of these sections was randomised. Participants were presented 
with the AMS section if they answered “Yes” to whether their organisation allowed them to use 
USB sticks.  Each section presented instructions to participants, explaining key terms and 
images to help participants with answering the survey items. Section 7 measured employees’ 
levels of security responsibility. The final section took demographic information from 
participants. On completion, participants were given the option to enter a prize draw to win an 
iPad, thanked for their participation and were provided with debrief information.  
5.4 | RESULTS 
5.4.1 | DATA ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
A multi-stage process was adopted to test the hypotheses. Firstly, relationships between the 
variables were identified. Following this, EFA was employed on constructs that had newly 
developed items; both established (perceived severity, response efficacy and response costs) and 
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new (psychological ownership and responsibility).  Hierarchical regression was then employed 
to identify which factors from PMT and which additional factors predict behavioural intention. 
Finally, SEM was used to explore the hypothesised model and the findings from the regressions 
to ensure that the model is the best fit to the sampled data.   
5.4.2 | PRELIMINARY ANALYSES 
First, the data was screened for multi-collinearity, missing data and outliers. Variance Inflation 
Factors were checked for multi multi-collinearity issues, all factors ranged from 1.13 to 2.04 for 
all behaviours and therefore were below the conservative cut off of 3 (Bowerman & O’Connell, 
1990; Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007) indicating that multi-collinearity was not present. The data 
file was split into three components per behaviour and EM estimation was performed on the 
data to retain as many participants as possible. This was only permitted where items had less 
than 10% missing data. Inspection of the data indicated that there were no outliers. Correlational 
analyses were conducted to explore relationships between the study variables. See for Table 28 
for descriptive statistics.  
Table 28. Descriptive statistics for variables under investigation 
Variable Mean SD 
WISA Privacy  4.03 0.78 
WISA Consequences  2.10 0.81 
WISA Worth  4.40 0.68 
WISA Low proximity  3.25 0.87 
WISA High proximity  1.72 0.93 
Perceived susceptibility  2.21 0.73 
Perceived Severity - Overall 3.49 .66 
Perceived Severity - Organisational  3.45 0.87 
Perceived Severity - Consequences  3.54 1.00 
Perceived Severity - Personal   3.03 0.99 
Perceived Severity - Productivity  3.91 0.68 
Organisational Citizenship Behaviour (OCB)  3.58 0.68 
Personal security experience  1.89 0.25 
Work security experience  2.05 0.38 
Psychological ownership – Data  3.74 1.12 
Psychological ownership – Technology  2.05 0.38 
Responsibility  2.94 0.83 
Self-efficacy (AMS security)  3.69 0.89 
Response efficacy (AMS security)  3.72 0.63 
Response costs (AMS security)  2.62 0.67 
Self-efficacy (Email security)  4.52 0.72 
Response efficacy  (Email security)  4.08 0.64 
Response costs (Email security)  1.55 0.81 
Self-efficacy (SU security)  3.73 1.03 
Response costs (SU security)  2.73 0.84 
Response efficacy (SU security)  3.37 0.69 
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AMS intention   3.54 0.99 
SU intention  3.32 1.1 
ES intention  4.67 0.65 
The means show that employees intended to perform the email security behaviour the most. The 
software update behaviour has the highest ratings of response costs, followed by the AMS 
behaviour and email security behaviour respectively. The email security behaviour has the 
highest ratings for response efficacy, followed by the AMS behaviour and SU behaviour. 
Ratings for self-efficacy perceptions are highest for the email security behaviour, followed by 
the SU behaviour and AMS behaviour.  
Ratings for perceived susceptibility appear to be relatively low, whereas severity and its 
components appear to be high with productivity severity having the highest ratings. Employees 
have higher ratings for psychological ownership of data compared to technology. For the WISA 
scale employees’ ratings of privacy, worth and low proximity appears to be high whereas 
consequences and high proximity appear to be lower. Finally, organisational citizenship 
behaviour and responsibility appear to be trending towards a medium level.  
Appendix V shows the inter-correlations of the variables. Inspection of the inter-correlations 
revealed the presence of many significant correlations suggesting that there are relationships 
between the variables under investigation. There appears to be strong correlations between 
coping appraisal components (SE, RE and RC) and the three behavioural intentions. 
Interestingly, threat appraisal (severity and susceptibility) does not appear to correlate with any 
behavioural intentions. These relationships will be explored in more depth in the following 
analyses.  
5.4.2.1 | Exploratory Factor Analysis 
EFA was employed using PCA to explore the factor structure of the following constructs: 
response efficacy (for all 3 behaviours), security experience, responsibility and perceived 
severity. This was undertaken as these constructs were self-developed or expanded from 
previous instruments. Only perceived severity suggested a factorial structure beyond one factor 
and, therefore, was subjected to further analysis.   
Using the same procedure as Chapter 4, two statistical tests were conducted to determine the 
suitability of the dataset for factor analysis. The analysis revealed that the KMO output was .85 
indicating a “good” sample adequacy (Kaiser, 1974) and the BS test showed a significant result 
(BS x2 (78) = 3099.20, p<.001). The findings from both tests, therefore, suggest that the data 
was suitable for EFA.   
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To explore the factor structure of perceived severity, PCA was performed using varimax with 
Kaiser normalization. The 13 items from the initial scale were entered into the factor analysis 
and factor loadings lower than .30 were suppressed. See Table 29 for factor loadings.  
Table 29. Factor loadings for each item (factor loadings lower than .30 are suppressed) 
Item - If my work device 
were infected by 
malware… 
Rotation Factor Loadings 
Factor 1: 
Organisational 
consequences 
Factor 2: 
Consequence 
severity 
Factor 3: 
Personal 
consequences 
Factor 4: 
productivity 
consequences 
…the consequences would 
be severe 
 .854   
…the consequences would 
be serious 
 .892   
…the consequences would 
be significant 
 .879   
…it would run significantly 
slower 
   .811 
…my organisation’s 
computer network could be 
severely disrupted 
.612    
…I could be severely 
disciplined 
.435  .670  
…I would be seriously 
embarrassed 
  .879  
…it could significantly 
reduce my productivity 
   .717 
…there would severe 
complications for my 
organisation's service 
users/customers 
.812    
…it could lead to my 
organisation having 
severely dissatisfied service 
users/customers 
.844    
…there could be severe 
consequences to company 
data and files 
.754    
…the organisation's image 
could be seriously damaged 
.813    
Eigenvalues 5.356 1.510 1.293 1.037 
R
EM
O
V
ED
 
FA
C
TO
R
S 
my personal 
information and 
data could be 
severely at risk 
  .448 .452 
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The findings from the PCA revealed that four factors could explain the data, which accounted 
for 70.75% of the variance above the 60% minimum acceptable level (Hinkin, 1998). All 
eigenvalues were above 1 conforming to acceptable values as suggested by Hinkin (1998).  
Most items were found to load onto a respective factor above the accepted .40 criterion level 
(Ford, MaCallum, & Tait, 1986). Two items cross-loaded onto another factor: “my personal 
information and data could be severely at risk” was removed as it did not load onto one factor 
more than the other and both levels were below .46. The second item, “I could be severely 
disciplined” loaded more onto factor 3 and conceptually seemed to link better to that factor as it 
is more at the level of a personal consequence than an organisational one. The item was 
therefore retained in factor 3 and will be further explored within the CFA.  
Overall, the PCA revealed that the factors explained a large amount of the variance in the data 
and the items had strong factor loadings (above .40). The next stage was to confirm the four 
factors using CFA. 
5.4.2.2 | Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
CFA was tested on the data using AMOS (version 22) to explore the factor structure and 
estimate the degree to which the factor structure is a good fit to the data. The four factors 
constituting severity were presented as latent variables within AMOS and were permitted to co-
vary. The items for each factor were only allowed to load onto their respective factor. 
Covariance between error terms was only allowed where items were related to the same factor 
following advice from modification indices within AMOS. Figure 28 shows the standardised 
item loadings for the hypothesised model. 
 
Figure 29. The perceived severity model with standardised path coefficients 
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The goodness-of-fit of the models was evaluated using the following absolute goodness-of-fit 
indices (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1986): (1) the X2 goodness-of-fit statistic; (2) the Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA); (3) the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI); (4) the 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) and (5) Comparative Fit Indices (CFI). 
Table 30. Goodness-of-fit indices for perceived severity model 
Model X2  RMSEA GFI AGFI CFI 
Perceived 
Severity 
Model 
x
2
 
(47)=141.289, 
p<.001 
.062 .958 .930 .971 
 
The final model indicated a good level of fit for three of the four fit indices. GFI and AGFI were 
both above the cut-off point for a “good fit” (Hu & Bentler, 1995; Marsh & Grayson, 1995). 
RMSEA was smaller than .08 so led to model acceptance (Browne & Cudeck, 1992). The chi-
square indicated that the model was not a good fit to the data for all information types, however, 
chi-squared has been criticised for being sensitive to large sample size especially if over 200 
(Hoe, 2008), as in the case for the current study. The four factors were therefore considered to 
be a “good” fit to the data.  
5.4.3 | EXPLORING THE THEORETICAL MODELS 
5.4.3.1 | AMS security: Hierarchical Regression 
Hierarchical regression was employed to explore the additional factors to the initial PMT 
framework. The first step included all predictors that had been previously explored in security 
research with protection motivation theory using the enter method. These were the following 
predictors: Susceptibility, self-efficacy, response efficacy, response costs and severity. The 
second step used the stepwise method to add each additional factor (responsibility, WISA, 
security breach experience, OCB, psychological ownership) to the initial PMT model.  
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Table 31. Coefficients for Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 following hierarchical regression for AMS 
security 
 B SE B � 
Model 1    
Constant -.222 .469  
Perceived Susceptibility .091 .066 .066 
Self-efficacy .502 .055 .450*** 
Response efficacy .286 .076 .182*** 
Response costs (R) .274 .072 .184*** 
Perceived Severity (Organisational) -.022 .068 -.002 
Perceived Severity (Productivity) -.017 .074 -.011 
Perceived Severity (Personal) -.012 .059 -.011 
Perceived Severity (Consequences) -.049 .053 -.048 
    
Model 2    
Constant -.792 .487  
Perceived Susceptibility .081 .064 .059 
Self-efficacy .455 .056 .407*** 
Response efficacy .279 .075 .178*** 
Response costs (R)  .269 .070 .181*** 
Perceived Severity (Organisational) .036 .068 .030 
Perceived Severity (Productivity) -.005 .072 -.003 
Perceived Severity (Personal) -.026 .058 -.025 
Perceived Severity (Consequences) -.040 .052 -.040 
Responsibility .211 .058 .170*** 
    
Model 3    
Constant -1.182 .507  
Perceived Susceptibility .065 .064 .047 
Self-efficacy .469 .056 .420*** 
Response efficacy .280 .074 .178*** 
Response costs (R)  .311 .072 .209*** 
Perceived Severity (Organisational) .019 .068 .016 
Perceived Severity (Productivity) .005 .072 .004 
Perceived Severity (Personal) -.034 .058 -.032 
Perceived Severity (Consequences) -.038 .052 -.037 
Responsibility .195 .058 .157*** 
WISA (Consequences) .152 .061 .117*** 
Note. R2=.37 for step 1. ∆R2=.02 for step 2. ∆R2=.01 for step 3. ***p<.001. 
The findings from the regression analyses (see Table 31) shows that model 1 is able to account 
for 37% of the variance in employees’ intentions to scan USB sticks for malware (R2 =  .37, 
F(8,315) =  22.72, p < .001) with self-efficacy as the strongest significant predictor (β =  .50, 
t(315) =  9.084, p < .001), followed by response costs (β =  .184, t(315) =  3.827, p < .001), and 
response efficacy (β =  .50, t(315) =  9.084, p < .001). The addition of responsibility contributed 
to an increase in R2 of 2% in model 2 (R2 =  .39, F(1,314) =  13.138, p < .001) in which 
responsibility was a significant predictor (β =  .170, t(314) =  3.625, p < .001). The final model, 
the addition of WISA consequences was a significant predictor (β =  .117, t(313) =  2.501, p 
< .001) and contributed to an increase in R2 of 1% (R2 =  .40, F(1,313) =  6.254, p< .05). The 
addition of responsibility and WISA consequences predicts unique variance in the behaviour. 
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Overall, the final model consisting of the following significant predictors (in order of 
contribution to regression): self-efficacy, response costs, response efficacy, responsibility and 
WISA consequences explain 40% of the variance in employees’ intentions to scan USB sticks 
for malware.  
5.4.3.2 | AMS security: Structural Equation Modelling 
 
Figure 30. The extended PMT model with standardised path coefficients for AMS security  
The model was then tested using SEM to ascertain how well the model explains the data. 
Severity remained as part of the model as its part of the original PMT. The chi-square indicated 
that model was not a good fit to the data, x2 (177)=386.195, p<.001. However, the fit indices for 
GFI and AGFI were .90 and .87 which are indicative of an acceptable fit. RMSEA was .051 and 
CFI was .95 which also indicated a good fit. Overall, the final model was a good fit to the 
sampled data for four out of the five goodness-of-fit indices. 
Modification indices suggested covariance between some constructs that lead to a stronger fit, 
this was only between constructs derived from PMT e.g. constructs from response appraisal 
were allowed to co-vary. Suggested modifications were also allowed between PMT constructs 
and additional factors (Responsibility and WISA Consequences) as these were exploratory. 
These modifications had to make conceptual sense, for example, WISA Consequences is 
conceptually similar to severity and susceptibility but related to information so was allowed to 
co-vary.  
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Table 32. The regression weights and critical ratio values for the main effects of the hypothesised 
model 
Parameter Unstandardised (standardised) 
Path Coefficient 
Critical Ratio 
(CR) 
P 
Self-efficacy Intention 
.278 (.439) 7.432 <.001* 
Response efficacy Intention 
.070 (.178) 3.712 <.001* 
Response costs  Intention 
.155 (.195) 3.738 <.001* 
Severity  Intention 
-.061 (-.041) -.783 .434 
Susceptibility  Intention 
.032 (.054) 1.146 .252 
WISA (Consequences)  Intention 
.179 (.134) 2.904 .004* 
Responsibility  Intention 
.066 (.023) 2.898 .004* 
 
For threat appraisal, neither severity nor susceptibility had a significant positive relationship 
with intention therefore not supporting hypothesis 1 or 2. The findings from the regression and 
SEM indicated that coping appraisal had the biggest influence on intention. Within coping 
appraisal, self-efficacy had a significant positive relationship with intention and was the 
strongest predictor of the behaviour as shown in Table 32. Self-efficacy had the strongest 
standardised path coefficient (.439), followed by response costs (.195) and response efficacy 
(.178). Reponse costs (R) had a significant positive relationship with intention, indicating that 
low levels of response costs influence intentions to scan USB sticks for malware. Finally, 
response efficacy also had a significant positive relationship with intention. Hypotheses 3, 4 and 
5 were therefore supported.   
The additional factors of responsibility and WISA (consequences) were found to significantly 
relate to intention supporting hypothesis 8 and providing partial support for hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 7 was partially supported as only 1 component of WISA was supported. The 
findings indicated no relationship between; experiences (H2), psychological ownership (H9) 
and OCB (H10) on intention.   
Overall, the modified PMT model was a good fit to the sampled data of employees and the 
regression analysis indicated that the final model could explain 40% of the variance in 
employees’ intentions to scan USB sticks for malware. 
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5.4.3.3 | Software updates: Hierarchical Regression 
Table 33. Coefficients for Model 1 and Model 2 following hierarchical regression for SU security 
  B SE B � 
Model 1    
Constant -.883 .459  
Perceived Susceptibility .237 .066 .155*** 
Self-efficacy .118 .050 .110* 
Response efficacy .504 .073 .315*** 
Response costs (R) .328 .064 .250*** 
Perceived Severity (Organisational) -.057 .072 -.044 
Perceived Severity (Consequences) .079 .055 .072 
Perceived Severity (Personal) -.033 .056 -.030 
Perceived Severity (Productivity) .123 .075 .075 
    
Model 2    
Constant -1.405 4.75  
Perceived Susceptibility .212 .066 .139*** 
Self-efficacy .080 .050 .075 
Response efficacy .487 .072 .304*** 
Response costs (R) .329 .063 .252*** 
Perceived Severity (Organisational) -.001 .072 -.001 
Perceived Severity (Consequences) .082 .054 .074 
Perceived Severity (Personal) -.070 .056 -.064 
Perceived Severity (Productivity) -135 .074 .083 
Responsibility .217 .060 .161*** 
Note. R2=.27 for step 1. ∆R2=.02 for step 2. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. 
The findings from the regression analyses, as shown in Table 33, shows that model 1 is able to 
account for 27% of the variance in employees’ intentions to install software updates (R2 =  .27, 
F(8,413) =  18.663, p < .001) with response efficacy as the strongest significant predictor (β = 
.315, t(413) =  6.921, p < .001), followed by  response costs (β = .250, t(413) = 5.251, p <.001), 
and perceived susceptibility (β = .155, t(413) = 3.226, p <.01).  
In the final model, the addition of responsibility was a significant predictor (β = .161, t(412) = 
3.599, p < .001) and contributed to an increase in R2 of 2% (R2 =  .29, F(1,412) =  12.954, 
p< .001) predicting unique variance in the behaviour. 
Overall, the final model consisting of the following significant predictors (in order of 
contribution to regression); response efficacy, response costs, perceived susceptibility, and 
responsibility explain 29% of the variance in employees’ intentions to install software updates.  
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5.4.3.4 | Software updates: Structural Equation Modelling  
 
Figure 31. The extended PMT model with standardised path coefficients for SU security 
The chi-square indicated that the model was not a good fit to the data, x2 (45)=142.056, p<.001. 
However, the fit indices for GFI and AGFI were .91 and .88 which are indicative of a good fit. 
Finally, RMSEA was .065 and CFI was .94 which also indicated a good fit. Overall, the final 
model was a good fit to the sampled data for four out of the five goodness-of-fit indices. 
Table 34. The regression weights and critical ratio values for the main effects of the hypothesised 
model 
Parameter Unstandardised (standardised) 
Path Coefficient 
Critical Ratio 
(CR) P 
Self-efficacy  Intention 
-.008 (-.013) -.247 .805 
Response efficacy  Intention 
.094 (.307) 6.372 <.001* 
Response costs  Intention 
.160 (.271) 4.780 <.001* 
Severity  Intention 
.158 (.041) .824 .410 
Susceptibility  Intention 
.134 (.157) 2.695 .007* 
Responsibility  Intention 
.071 (.188) 3.853 <.001* 
As shown in Table 34, response efficacy had the strongest standardised path coefficient and a 
significant positive relationship with intention, thus supporting hypothesis 4. Response costs 
also had a significant positive relationship with intention and, therefore, hypothesis 5 was 
supported. Self-efficacy was the only component of coping appraisal not to significantly relate 
to intention, its standardised path coefficient indicates a marginally negative relationship which 
is in the opposite direction what was hypothesised (H3).  
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For threat appraisal, susceptibility had a significant positive relationship with intention, 
therefore, supporting Hypothesis 2. However, severity did not have a significant positive 
relationship with intention and hHypothesis 1 was therefore not supported.  
For the additional constructs, responsibility was found to have a significant positive relationship 
with intention supporting hypothesis 8. OCB, WISA, psychological ownership and experience 
did not significantly relate to intention and therefore, Hypothesis 6, 7, 9 and 10 were not 
supported.  
Overall, the modified PMT model was a good fit to the sampled data of employees and the 
regression analysis indicated that the final model 29% of the variance in employees’ intentions 
to install software updates. 
5.4.3.5 | Email security: Hierarchical Regression 
Table 35. Coefficients for Model 1 and Model 2 following hierarchical regression for ES security 
 B SE B � 
Model 1    
Constant 1.937 .243  
Perceived Susceptibility -.065 .034 -.073 
Self-efficacy .416 .041 .485*** 
Response efficacy .094 .042 .092* 
Response costs (R) .138 .037 .172*** 
Perceived Severity (Organisational) -.032 .035 -.043 
Perceived Severity (Consequences) .042 .028 .064 
Perceived Severity (Personal) -.017 .029 -.026 
Perceived Severity (Productivity) .008 .038 .008 
    
Model 2    
Constant 1.969 .241  
Perceived Susceptibility -.091 .035 -.102* 
Self-efficacy .415 .040 .484*** 
Response efficacy .092 .041 .089* 
Response costs (R) .144 .037 .180*** 
Perceived Severity (Organisational) -.024 .035 -.032 
Perceived Severity (Consequences) .040 .028 .062 
Perceived Severity (Personal) -.022 .028 -.034 
Perceived Severity (Productivity) -.001 .038 -.001 
Experience work  .084 .028 .110** 
Note. R2=.46 for step 1. ∆R2=.01 for step 2. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. 
The findings from the regression analyses suggested that the final model accounted for 47% of 
the variance in employees’ intentions to not click on suspicious links within emails. Self-
efficacy was found to contribute the most, followed by response costs, security breach 
experience at work, susceptibility and response efficacy.  
The findings from the regression analyses, as shown in Table 35, shows that model 1 is able to 
account for 46% of the variance in employees’ intentions to not click on links in suspicious 
emails (R2 =  .46, F(8,419) =  44.655, p < .001) with self-efficacy as the strongest significant 
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predictor (β = .485, t(419) = 10.190, p <.001), followed by response costs (β = .172, t(485) = 
3.708, p < .001) and response efficacy (β = .092, t(419) = 2.214, p <.05).  
In the final model, the addition of security breach experience at work was a significant predictor 
(β = .110, t(418) = 2.954, p <.01), alongside contributing susceptibility to the prediction (β = -
.102, t(418) =  -2.592, p < .01) led to an increase in R2 of 1% (R2 =  .47, F(1,418) =  8.725, 
p< .01).  
Overall, the final model consisting of the following significant predictors (in order of 
contribution to regression); self-efficacy, response costs, security breach experience at work and 
perceived susceptibility explain 47% of the variance in employees’ email security behaviour.  
5.4.3.6 | Email Security: Structural Equation Modelling  
 
Figure 32. The extended PMT model with standardised path coefficients for email security 
The chi-square indicated that model was not a good fit to the data, x2 (143)=309.098, p<.001. 
However, the fit indices for GFI and AGFI were .93 and .91 which are indicative of a good fit. 
Finally, RMSEA was .05 and CFI was .97 which also indicated a good fit. Overall, the final 
model was a good fit to the sampled data for four out of the five goodness-of-fit indices. 
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Table 36. The regression weights and critical ratio values for the main effects of the hypothesised 
model 
Parameter Unstandardised (standardised) 
Path Coefficient 
Critical Ratio 
(CR) 
P 
Self-efficacy  Intention 
.252 (.615) 8.539 <.001* 
Response efficacy  Intention 
.011 (.049) 1.182 .237 
Response costs  Intention 
.045 (.128) 2.323 .020* 
Severity  Intention 
-.018 (-.020) -.493 .622 
Susceptibility  Intention 
-.079 (-.105) -.2491 .013* 
Security breach experience (work)  
Intention 
.078 (.117) 3.080 .002* 
 
The findings indicated that coping appraisal had the biggest influence on intention. Within 
coping appraisal, self-efficacy had a significant positive relationship with intention and was the 
strongest predictor of the behaviour as shown in Table 36. Response costs also significantly 
predicted intention. Hypothesis 3 and 5 were therefore supported. Response efficacy was a 
significant predictor within the hierarchical regression. However, this was not supported in the 
SEM. Hypothesis 4 is therefore partially supported.   
Security breach experience at work was also found to have a significant positive relationship 
with intention supporting H6b. WISA (H7), responsibility (H8), psychological ownership (H9) 
and OCB (H10) did not significantly relate to intention. 
For threat appraisal, severity had a marginally negative relationship with intention but it was 
non-significant, thus not supporting hypothesis 1. Susceptibility did significantly relate to 
intention but this was negative and in the opposite direction to what was hypothesised, therefore 
not supporting hypothesis 2.   
Taken together, the modified PMT model was a good fit to the sampled data of employees and 
the regression analysis indicated that the final model could explain 47% of the variance in 
employees’ email security behaviour. 
5.4.4 | IMPLICIT SECURITY TASK 
Logistic regression was performed to explore which factors predict whether individuals’ 
accepted or did not accept the use of a cookie using stepwise-forward method for participants 
who completed all sections of the survey (n=278). Don’t accept (17%) and accept (83%).  
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Table 37. Coefficients of the model predicting whether the participant accepted the cookie 
                                                                 95% CI for the Odds Ratio 
Variable B(SE) Lower Odds Ratio Upper 
Constant 2.888(.582)    
Perceived 
Susceptibility 
-.555* (.231) .365 .574 .903 
 
R2 = .021 (Cox & Snell), .035 (Nagelkerke), .035 (Hosmer & Lemeshow) Model χ2(2) = 5.913, p<.05.   
* p< .05, **p< .001 
 
The full model was tested against a constant only model and it was found to be statistically 
significant, indicating that the only predictor (susceptibility) reliably distinguished between 
accepters and decliners of the cookie (χ2(2) = 5.913, p<.05). Nagelkerke’s R2 .035 indicated a 
low effect size between the prediction and cookie acceptance. The findings indicate that as the 
level of perceived susceptibility of malware increases, the likelihood of cookie acceptance 
decreases.  
5.4.5 | EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE MEDIATED BY THREAT 
AND COPING APPRAISAL 
To further explore Hypothesis 6a, a mediation analysis was employed to explore whether 
experience was mediated by the PMT components. Before proceeding with mediation analysis, 
four conditions must be met. Baron and Kenny (1986) outline the four conditions to determining 
mediation 
1. IV (experience – personal or work) predicts the DV (AMS, SU or ES intention) 
2. IV predicts the mediator (threat and coping appraisal constructs) 
3. The mediators predict the DV while controlling for the IV 
4. IV does not predict the DV (when controlling for the mediator) 
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to explore the first condition for work and 
personal security experience on AMS, SU and ES intention. Personal security experience did 
not significantly predict AMS intention (β=-.009, SE=.261, p=.874, R2=.00), SU intention (β=-
.058, SE=.248, p=.252, R2=.00) and ES intention (β=-.069, SE=.130, p=.167, R2=.00).  As 
condition 1 was not met for personal security experience, full mediation was not employed. 
Security experience at work did not significantly predict AMS intention (β=-.271, SE=.177, 
p=.127, R2=.01) and SU intention (β=-.158, SE=.154, p=.306, R2=.00). However, it did 
significantly predict ES intention (β=-.248, SE=.086, p<.01, R2=.02). Further analysis was 
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therefore employed to explore work security experience mediated through threat and coping 
appraisal on ES intention.  
For condition 2, the findings from the earlier hierarchical regression showed that self-efficacy 
(β=484, SE=.040, p<.001), susceptibility (β=-.091, SE=.241, p<.05), response efficacy (β=.089, 
SE=.041, p<.05) and response costs (β=.180, SE=.037, p<.001) significantly predicted ES 
intention.  
Further meditation analysis was performed to explore security experience at work mediated 
through self-efficacy, susceptibility, response efficacy and response costs. The results indicated 
that there was no significant indirect effect of experience on ES intention through; response 
efficacy (b= -.060, BCa CI [-.153, .000]), self-efficacy (b= -.098, BCa CI [-.260, .073]), 
response costs (b= -.045, BCa CI [-.120, .067]) and susceptibility (b= -.00, BCa CI [-.056, 
.066]). The findings, therefore, suggest that experience is not mediated by threat or coping 
appraisal but only has a direct effect on ES intention in isolation as shown by the findings of the 
SEM. 
5.4.6 | FURTHER EXPLORATION OF RESPONSE EFFICACY AND RESPONSE 
COSTS 
5.4.6.1 | Response efficacy perceptions 
A repeated measures MANOVA was conducted to explore whether there were differences in 
efficacy perceptions across the three anti-malware behaviours (n=311) 
Table 38. The means (and standard deviations) for response efficacy perceptions by behaviour 
Response efficacy perception AMS SU ES 
Protecting my personal data 3.75 (.77) 3.47 (.82) 4.23 (.74) 
Reduce likelihood of getting malware 3.94 (.73) 3.54 (.84) 4.22 (.75) 
Protecting my productivity 3.85 (.75) 3.50 (.82) 4.17 (.69) 
Effective in preventing malware 3.79 (.74) 3.38 (.82) 4.14 (.78) 
Securing my organisation's data and files 3.79 (.76) 3.47 (.83) 4.13 (.73) 
Effective in preventing embarrassment 3.56 (.82) 3.23 (.84) 4.11 (.77) 
Works in preventing malware 3.85 (.74) 3.38 (.83) 4.10 (.75) 
Works in ensuring that my work device runs as efficiently as 
possible 
3.72 (.79) 3.67 (.81) 4.09 (.79) 
Preventing problems for my organisation’s service users/customers 3.79 (.75) 3.38 (.82) 4.07 (.80) 
Protecting network from malware 3.78 (.79) 3.50 (.81) 4.00 (.82) 
Protect organisation’s reputation 3.57 (.83) 3.36 (.85) 3.84 (.86) 
Prevents dissatisfied service users 3.59 (.84) 3.33 (.84) 3.82 (.89) 
Reduces chances of getting disciplined 3.32 (.92) 2.94 (.89) 3.51 (.97) 
 3.71 (.17) 3.40 (.18) 4.03 (.20) 
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The MANOVA revealed that there was a significant main effect of behaviour on response 
efficacy ratings for all behaviours (p<.01).  Pairwise comparisons (see Appendix W) revealed 
that the email behaviour response efficacy ratings were significantly higher for all efficacy 
perceptions compared to the AMS behaviour and software update behaviour (p<.01). The AMS 
behaviour also had significantly higher efficacy ratings compared to the software update 
behaviour (p<.01) except for beliefs that the behaviours work in ensuring that the device runs as 
efficiently as possible.  
5.4.6.2 | Response costs perceptions 
Response costs are different for each behaviour; it was therefore not possible to compare 
differences by item using inferential statistics. They are presented together in the table below to 
allow comparisons for items that are the same. See Appendix X for pairwise comparisons for 
each behaviour.  
Table 39. Means (and standard deviations) of the response costs perceptions for scanning USB 
sticks with anti-malware software (n=422), Installing software updates and for not clicking on URL 
(n=422) and not clicking on links in suspicious emails (n=428)  
Response cost perception AMS Mean SU Mean ES Mean 
...would slow my work device down 3.28 (.97) 2.74 (1.05) 1.61 (1.03) 
...would reduce my productivity 3.42 (.91) 2.66 (1.05) 1.58 (.97) 
...can lead to non-malicious files being identified 
as infected with malware 
2.92 (.93) - - 
..would be time consuming 3.05 (.99) 2.91 (1.1) 1.54 (.90) 
...could lead to important files being destroyed 3.47 (.93) 2.58 (1.09)  
...would require considerable effort 3.59 (.94) 2.49 (1.07) 1.47 (.84) 
...would have a considerable financial cost for me 3.91 (.90) - - 
...could lead to a less reliable or 'buggy' software 
version being installed 
- 3.00 (1.07) - 
 3.38 (.33) 2.73 (.20) 1.55 (.06) 
 
Of the three behaviours, AMS was perceived to be most costly followed by the SU behaviour 
and the ES behaviour. This trend follows for shared items; requiring effort, reducing 
productivity and slowing down their work device.    
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5.4.7 | OVERALL FINDINGS SUMMARY 
Table 40. The hypothesised relationships for the three anti-malware behaviours and whether the 
hierarchical regression (HR) or structural equation modelling (SEM) supports the hypothesis 
Hypothesis AMS SU ES 
 HR SEM HR SEM HR SEM 
H1: Severity -> Intention NS NS NS NS NS NS 
H2: Susceptibility -> Intention NS NS S S S (-) S (-) 
H3: Self-efficacy -> Intention S S NS NS S S 
H4: Response efficacy -> Intention S S S S S NS 
H5: Response costs -> Intention S S S S S S 
H6a: Experience -> Threat and Coping Appraisal NS NS NS NS NS NS 
H6b: Experience -> Intention NS NS NS NS S S 
H7: WISA -> Intention PS PS NS NS NS NS 
H8: Responsibility -> Intention S S S S NS NS 
H9: Psychological ownership -> intention NS NS NS NS NS NS 
H10: OCB -> Intention NS NS NS NS NS NS 
*Supported (S), Not supported (NS), Partially Supported (PS) 
Overall, the findings indicate that the significant negative relationship between response costs 
and intention is the most consistent across the three behaviours. The relationship between 
response efficacy and intention is also consistent across the three behaviours. There appears to 
be differences in behaviour as the positive influence of self-efficacy is important for the AMS 
security and ES security behaviour but not for SU security. Responsibility has a significant 
positive relationship to intention for AMS security and SU security but not for ES security. The 
positive relationship between severity and intention is not supported for any of the behaviours, 
and the positive relationship between susceptibility and intention is inconsistent as the direction 
is supported for SU security but in the opposite direction for ES security. The findings also 
demonstrate support for the additional constructs; WISA for AMS security, experience for ES 
security and responsibility for AMS and SU security.  
In summary, the behaviours are influenced by (in order of strength): 
 AMS security – self-efficacy, response costs, response efficacy, responsibility and 
WISA (consequences)  SU security – response efficacy, response costs, responsibility and susceptibility  ES security – self-efficacy, response costs, experience (work), susceptibility and 
response efficacy 
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5.5 | DISCUSSION 
5.5.1 | INFLUENCES ON MOTIVATIONS TO PERFORM ANTI-MALWARE 
BEHAVIOURS 
5.5.1.1 | Coping appraisal  
Within coping appraisal, lower levels of response costs were significantly related to intention 
for all behaviours indicating that higher levels of response costs lead to lower levels of 
motivation for all three behaviours. When comparing all three behaviours, response costs was 
strongest for the anti-malware software behaviour, followed by software updates and finally, the 
email security behaviour. Employees who perceive that anti-malware behaviours have lower 
costs (such as productivity, effort and time) are more likely to intend to perform the behaviours, 
suggesting that costs are a potential barrier to security behaviour.   
The relationship between response costs and security behaviour is consistent with studies 
exploring the relationship with anti-spyware software in consumers (Chenoweth et al., 2009; 
Liang & Xue, 2010), and adds to the body of knowledge in this underexplored area and costly 
security in general (e.g. Beautement et al., 2009). For email security behaviour, Ng et al., (2009) 
found no support for a negative relationship between response costs and engagement in 
employees’ email security behaviour for virus prevention.  They had a particular focus on email 
attachments, whereas the current study was concerned with suspicious links. The differences 
could be due to employees perceiving “being cautious with attachments” as less costly than 
checking suspicious links. Additionally, the employment sample of the Ng et al. (2009) study 
was primarily IT organisations, whose staff may have higher awareness and knowledge of 
security so may not perceive security behaviours to be as costly as non-IT employees (as used in 
the current study). The current study used a cross-section of employees from different 
organisations and found support for the role of response costs that may explain the inconsistent 
finding by Ng et al. (2009).   
Response efficacy was also shown to be a key influencer of motivation to follow anti-malware 
security behaviours. The relationship between response efficacy and intention was highest for 
the AMS security. Response efficacy has been regarded as one of the worst predictors of 
compliance and IS misuse in the workplace (Sommestad et al., 2014) as the existing research 
has been inconsistent either supporting a positive relationship (Ifinedo, 2011; Wall et al., 2013; 
Zhang & McDowell, 2009), a negative relationship (Vance et al., 2012) or finding no 
relationship (Siponen et al., 2010). The current study shows that response efficacy is important 
for security behaviour when focusing on specific behaviours and security threats. This is in line 
with PMT which posits that adaptive behaviour is enhanced by beliefs that it is effective in 
reducing threat. Employees perceive that all three behaviours are important in reducing malware 
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threats, and their associated consequences. Of three behaviours, the ES behaviour was perceived 
to be the most effective in preventing malware, followed by the AMS behaviour and finally, the 
SU behaviour. Employees may be unaware of how a system that is not updated is vulnerable to 
be compromised by malware and associate software updates more with improving device 
efficiency, the perception that was rated highest for this behaviour. This finding indicates that 
the connection between software updates and malware may need to be improved to heighten 
employees’ response efficacy perceptions.   
The influence of self-efficacy was supported for the AMS and ES security behaviour but not for 
the software update behaviour. Self-efficacy was the strongest predictor for both the AMS and 
ES behaviour. The lack of support for the SU behaviour indicates that employees beliefs in their 
capabilities is not important for installing software updates when prompted. This highlights that 
perceptions of capability is not important for all security behaviours, installing software updates 
may be perceived as an easy behaviour to perform as this often involves responding to a dialog 
box and, therefore, other factors may be better able to explain the lack of engagement. On the 
other hand, the AMS and ES security behaviours require a level of skill. The first requires the 
user to know how to access and run the AMS software and the ES behaviour requires the users 
to have the ability to detect suspicious links. The current study supports the existing research on 
the role of self-efficacy in using anti-spyware software (Gurung et al., 2009; Lee & Kozar, 
2008; Liang & Xue, 2010; Sriramachandramurthy et al., 2009) and those exploring email 
security behaviour in relation to malware threats (Ng et al., 2009). Self-efficacy is also 
consistently supported in the IS compliance literature. There is little research looking at 
software update behaviour. However, the current study suggests that for passive behaviours that 
require less input from the user, self-efficacy may not be important for motivating employees to 
undertake them.  
5.5.1.2 | Threat appraisal 
The current study provided greater insight into the complexities and inconsistencies surrounding 
the support for and against threat appraisal in security research. Following factor analysis, 
perceived severity was found to comprise of four components (organisational, personal, 
productivity and consequences).  However, these components did not significantly relate to 
intention. The current study does not support previous research showing a significant 
relationship between perceived severity and compliance intention (Chenoweth et al., 2009; 
Gurung et al., 2009; Siponen et al., 2014; Vance et al., 2012) and intentions to adopt anti-
spyware software (Chenoweth et al., 2009; Gurung et al., 2009; Liang & Xue, 2009). However, 
the current study does support Lee et al. (2008) who found that severity did not affect anti-virus 
protection behaviours. Ng et al. (2009) found that severity did not have a significant effect on 
being cautious with emails with attachments but had moderating effects on other variables that 
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influenced security behaviour. The lack of support could be due to a number of factors. Firstly, 
there are few studies exploring specific security threats in the workplace as the majority that do 
focus on particular types (e.g. malware) have been within a consumer population. This study, 
alongside Ng et al. (2009), are the only studies to explore malware threats in an employment 
sample and both did not find a direct relationship to intention. Within the workplace setting, 
employees may perceive the severity of malware threats to be less severe. The consequences of 
malware to consumers are different to that of organisations as there is greater potential for 
complications for individuals including loss of personal data, performance disruption of their 
personal devices and the potential for identity theft. In the workplace, people may be less 
concerned with the severity of security threats as the personal consequences may not be seen as 
great. The lack of support could reflect the security threat under investigation; employees may 
lack awareness of the consequences of malware in the workplace. There is little research 
exploring whether employees’ severity perceptions differ depending on organisational and 
personal consequences. The current study broke down severity into both organisational 
consequences and personal consequences (e.g. productivity, embarrassment) and found that 
neither influenced security behaviour. Meta-analytic research exploring the efficacy of PMT in 
other domains has found that severity and intention have the weakest association amongst all of 
the PMT relationships (Milne et al., 2000).  The current study suggests that employees’ 
perceptions of the severity of malware are not important for driving anti-malware behaviour.  
The second aspect of threat appraisal, susceptibility, was also found to have a complicated 
relationship with security behaviour. The current study found that it was a significant predictor 
of software update intention and the cookie acceptance task. This partially supports research by 
Lee et al. (2008) who found that susceptibility was a significant predictor of virus protection 
behaviours, one of which was installing OS updates. The current study found that susceptibility 
did not predict AMS security behaviour which is supportive of other research that has found no 
role for susceptibility in consumers use of anti-spyware software (Chenoweth et al., 2009; 
Gurung et al., 2009). This further highlights that factors play differing roles for each security 
actions. The SU behaviour and cookie behaviour rely on prompts either from the computer or a 
website, whereas the AMS security behaviour relies solely on the employee to scan the USB 
stick in which case other factors such as those pertaining to ability evaluation (i.e. self-efficacy) 
may be more important in motivating the behaviour. This is somewhat confirmed by the current 
studies’ findings as self-efficacy was not a significant influencer for the software update 
behaviour or the cookie acceptance task. When ability is not a requirement for security 
behaviour, threat appraisal may, therefore, play more of an important role.  
The relationship between susceptibility and the ES behaviour was in the opposite direction to 
the hypothesis with lower levels of susceptibility indicative of greater motivation to perform the 
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behaviour. This is unexpected, as according to PMT, individuals with greater perceived 
susceptibility to malware would be more likely to adopt behaviours to mitigate it. This negative 
relationship may relate to the behaviour in reducing malware threats as phishing emails are 
often more associated with information disclosure or phishing scams (Getsafeonline.org, 2015) 
rather than the distribution of malware. There is a lack of research in exploring malware and 
email behaviour, however, Ng et al. (2009) found that susceptibility of malware attachments 
influenced cautious email behaviour. There may be differences in relation to link behaviour in 
emails, employees may not perceive email links to be associated with malware threats but may 
have a greater awareness of the likelihood of attachments being infected with malware.  The 
majority of research exploring organisational security behaviour has been supportive of the link 
between susceptibility and behaviour, however, a number of these studies do not focus on 
specific security threats (Herath & Rao, 2009b; Ifinedo, 2011; Siponen et al., 2014). The current 
study explored a specific security threat: malware and found malware susceptibility to have 
differing effects on behaviours highlighting users’ inability to connect behaviour to threats.  
Overall, employees’ malware susceptibility perceptions were low.  This may be consistent with 
the tendency for individuals to believe that they are more likely than others to experience 
positive events in their lives and less likely to experience negative events. This has been referred 
to as optimism bias (Weinstein, 1980) where peoples’ perceived susceptibility is unrealistically 
positive so they engage in protective behaviours less. This may account for the low levels of 
susceptibility within the employees and differences for its influence on the security behaviours. 
Optimism bias is most likely to occur for events that have a high degree of perceived control 
(Harris, 1996; Weinstein, 1980). Employees may perceive that malware received via email is 
under greater control as they can engage in multiple behaviours that directly prevent the threat 
at this medium (e.g. checking links and not opening attachments); whereas malware received 
from browsing the internet or distributed via removable media may be seen as less controllable. 
Software update behaviour is important for reducing malware threats; however an employee 
may not be aware of this. Malware that has exploited these vulnerabilities may be seen as less 
controllable (as users are often unaware of how malware has compromised their system) and 
therefore, less open to optimism bias. This may account for differences in the positive and 
negative direction of effects for susceptibility on these behaviours.   
The complicated role of susceptibility on security behaviour is supported by research by 
Boehmer et al. (2015) who found that moderate levels of susceptibility were associated with 
lower levels of security behaviour in students but individuals with a high or low threat 
susceptibility perception engaged in higher levels of security behaviour. They argue that 
undertaking safe behaviour may cause their threat perception to be low as those who engage in 
the protective actions may perceive they are not vulnerable because they perform the behaviour. 
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This explanation may also explain the negative relationship to the ES security behaviour in the 
current study.  
Experience of security issues at work were also found to significantly influence the ES security 
behaviour. After self-efficacy, it was the strongest predictor of the behaviour indicating that 
experience of the negative aspects of security/computer related issues in the workplace 
influences email-related security behaviour. Experience is considered within PMT to directly 
influence threat and coping appraisal. However, the current study found that it was not mediated 
by the threat and coping appraisal on intention. The role of experience is relatively understudied 
in existing research focusing on PMT in security research. However, the findings do support the 
qualitative study (Chapter 3) which found that experiencing the negative consequences of 
security threats influence current behaviour. The current study suggests that experience has a 
direct role in some behaviours, as it did not relate to the AMS or SU behaviour. For ES security, 
experiencing the negative consequences of security issues may promote awareness and greater 
detection surrounding email phishing.  
5.5.1.3 | Additional factors 
The current study found that the WISA factors did not influence SU or ES security. There was 
partial support for the AMS security behaviour in which the consequences component of WISA 
significantly related to intention, suggesting that employees who have a greater perception that 
the disclosure of the data they work with has consequences (such as compromising and 
discreditable) intend to scan USB sticks with AMS to protect the information. Employees 
working with information that has the potential for serious consequences if disclosed may, 
therefore, have greater motivation to protect it in relation to USB stick usage and anti-malware 
software. This was the first study to specifically explore the role of WISA for a particular 
security threat and sub-set of behaviours. Chapter 4 found that the WISA scale explained greater 
variance in security behaviours relating to access control and physical security. The WISA scale 
may play more of a role in behaviours that have a direct link to information and data that 
employees work with. The connection between malware prevention and data sensitivity may not 
be clear compared to other behaviours such as physical security that is physically protecting 
information and assets. Further work is required to explore the WISA scale for other 
behaviours, particularly those where its links to information protection are clearer such as access 
control.  
The current study found that responsibility was a strong predictor of AMS security and SU 
security. Individuals with higher perceptions of personal responsibility for security had greater 
motivation to undertake anti-malware actions. There was no support for the email security 
behaviour which suggests that other factors may be more important for influencing email 
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behaviours. This supports the findings from the qualitative study (chapter 3, section 3.3.2.6) that 
employees may diffuse responsibility onto third parties for certain behaviours. Interestingly, the 
qualitative study suggested that employees were more likely to perceive behaviours such as 
virus prevention as the responsibility of their organisation. However the current study suggests 
that employees with a sense of responsibility for security are likely to undertake anti-malware 
behaviours pertaining to use of anti-malware software and installing software updates. On the 
other side, lower levels of personal responsibility may lead to lower levels of security 
engagement for malware prevention. Empowering users with a sense of responsibility is, 
therefore, important to promote uptake of behaviours. The lack of support for the ES behaviour 
may be due to the level of involvement. The AMS and SU behaviours are required to be 
performed less frequently than the ES behaviour. Employees regularly use email as part of their 
job so may actively carry out the behaviour on a daily basis. Due to the repeated occurrences, 
the behaviour may become more habitual and therefore, not require a conscious deliberation on 
responsibility.  
Psychological ownership was not significantly related to any of the behaviours. The findings 
suggest that employees’ data and technology ownership perceptions do not influence their anti-
malware security behaviour. This contradicts Anderson and Agarwal (2010) who found 
ownership perceptions influenced home users’ intentions to perform security behaviours. 
However, they used a non-specific measure that referred to security behaviour in general. The 
lack of support in the current study may reflect the specific behaviours under investigation. The 
affective components of ownership are apparent when others lay claim to objects/target for 
which an individual has a sense of ownership (Pierce et al., 2003). Ownership perceptions may 
be more important for other security behaviours such as physical security or where the security 
threats may put their ownership of data and technology in jeopardy such as theft. As perceived 
severity also did not influence behaviour, employees may not perceive malware threats to 
compromise their work devices and, therefore, do need to lay claim to the ownership of their 
data and work devices. 
The current study also found no support for a relationship between organisational citizenship 
behaviour and security intentions. This does not support the qualitative findings that suggested 
that employees, who engage in actions that aided the organisation in business continuity and 
recovery, may have better security behaviour. The lack of support could be due to the measure 
that was used in the current study. The scale adopted was a well-validated scale and looks at 
OCB broadly within the organisation, exploring citizenship behaviours that contribute to the 
optimal functioning of the organisation. A specific measure looking at security citizenship 
behaviours may have shown a direct relationship. Future research could, therefore, develop and 
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validate a measure of security citizenship behaviour to allow a more detailed exploration of the 
relationship.  
5.5.2 | REVISED MODELS 
The study found that using an extended-PMT model could explain 40% of the variance in 
employees’ intentions to scan USB sticks for malware, 29% of the variance in employees’ 
intentions to install software updates and 47% of the variance in employees’ email security 
behaviour. The variance explained for the AMS behaviour and ES behaviour is line with other 
research using PMT, Chenoweth et al. (2009) explained 43% of the variance in consumers 
intentions to use anti-spyware software, whereas Liang and Xue (2010a) explained 56% of 
users’ intentions to use anti-spyware software. Lee et al. (2008) using PMT in combination with 
other theories explained 45% of the variance in a composite measure of anti-virus behaviours. 
Ng et al. (2009) used the HBM and explained 61% of the variance in being cautious with email 
attachments. The current study is line with those using PMT to explain users’ behaviour; 
however it does mean 50-60% of the variance for these two behaviours is explained by factors 
not considered in the study.  
The variance explained for the software update behaviour is relatively small, however, there is a 
lack of research exploring this type of security behaviour to make appropriate comparisons. This 
behaviour is different from the others in that it can be automated for employees and this may be 
influenced more readily by factors such as the Health Belief Model’s “cues to action” which 
prompt users to behave in desirable ways such as a prompt on their machine to install software 
updates. Individuals who know when to conduct the secure behaviour (i.e. when prompted by 
the machine) may be more likely to engage in it whereas others may disregard it and postpone 
the update. Further research is required to understand what may also influence software update 
behaviour.    
This study is one of the first to explore specific security behaviours in an organisational context 
using this approach and explained adequate variance for two of three behaviours using an 
extended-PMT model. PMT is consistently used within security. However, the findings from the 
current study suggest that in isolation it may not be the most appropriate model for 
understanding the diversity of specific security behaviour as not all of its components are 
adequate to explain security behaviour. Expanding PMT from the findings of the qualitative 
work allowed further variance to be explained within the behaviours. However a portion of the 
variance is still explained by factors that were not investigated in the study. Further research is 
needed to explore additional factors to understand fully what influences security behaviour 
within the workplace.  
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5.5.3 | LIMITATIONS  
Attempts were made to reduce common method bias, however as security behaviours can be 
considered to be a form of job performance, social desirability bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) may have inflated participants intentions to engage in the behaviours. 
Furthermore, the study relied on self-report measures and actual performance measures would 
have been more beneficial. Future research would benefit from utilizing multi-method 
approaches to measuring security performance such as supervisor ratings (Harris & 
Schaubroeck, 1988) or objective logs from employees computers (Workman et al., 2008).  
The survey was piloted with subject-matter experts and a small group of naïve participants. 
However there may have been some issues with the measurement items. In particular, items that 
related to the email security behaviour had the use of double negative in its wording. This may 
have been misinterpreted by participants and potentially negatively skewed the data. Future 
research would benefit from piloting the self-developed items with a larger sample to pre-empt 
any potential issues with item wording.  
5.5.4 | LEADING TO THE INTERVENTION: INFORMING STUDY 4 (CHAPTER 6) 
The current study suggested that employees’ intentions to perform the email security behaviour 
were high, however, a wealth of research shows that employees are still susceptible to phishing 
emails (McAfee, 2014) suggesting that whilst employees may be motivated, they may not 
follow through with the required behaviour and that their self-report email behaviour may be 
inflated. This suggests that there is an intention-behaviour gap with regards to employees’ email 
behaviour as intention accounts for only 1/3 of the variance in actual behaviour (Sheeran, 2002). 
The next study will seek to bridge this intention-behaviour gap by promoting employees’ email 
security behaviour in regards to malware threat mitigation and using implementation intentions 
to help translate motivation into behaviour change. 
The ES behaviour was influenced by (in order of strongest predictor); self-efficacy, security 
breach experience at work, susceptibility, response costs and response efficacy. Self-efficacy 
can be enhanced through enactive mastery, performance accomplishments and vicarious 
experience. Persuasive information could also be provided on the effectiveness of the behaviour 
and minimising perceptions of response costs (e.g. effort expended, slowing device down). 
Experience would be difficult to target. However employees could reflect on situations when 
they have experienced security issues and the benefits of security behaviours could be re-
iterated to reduce the likelihood of the issues. 
Susceptibility has a significant negative relationship with the behaviour, it would be 
inappropriate to manipulate users towards lower levels of malware susceptibility. However as 
discussed, the negative relationship could be due to lack of awareness between the behaviour 
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(suspicious links in emails) and malware mitigation or could reflect an unrealistic optimism bias  
(Weinstein, 1980). Providing information or fear appeals surrounding the likelihood and 
probability of email malware threats may, therefore, enhance awareness of the relationship 
between email malware and behaviours, motivating users towards malware mitigation in 
phishing emails and not just focusing on information disclosure as a threat in phishing emails.  
This would be in line with existing research that has shown that simply reminding users of risk 
is important for changing secure behaviour regardless of the level of risk presented to them 
(Davinson & Sillence, 2010) and that low and high threat levels but not moderate levels are 
important for motivating protective behaviour (Boehmer et al., 2015). Furthermore, meta-
analyses on fear-arousing communications have found that it is necessary that people feel 
vulnerable to the portrayed risk to be effective in changing behaviour (de Hoog, Stroebe, & de 
Wit, 2007). 
To this end, the intervention will be motivation-based to improve the strongest predictors of 
behaviour to enhance self-efficacy, minimise response costs, build a sense of responsibility, 
increase susceptibility and maximise response efficacy. Implementation intentions will be used 
to bridge the intention-behaviour gap between the motivational intervention and actual email 
security behaviour.  
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6 CHAPTER 6: MALWARE-BASED PHISHING IN THE WORKPLACE: AN 
INTERVENTION TO IMPROVE  EMPLOYEE EMAIL SECURITY 
BEHAVIOURS  
6.1 | INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapters have explored the motivational processes underpinning security 
behaviours in general and then focused more specifically on anti-malware behaviours. This 
chapter presents how this knowledge was then applied to the design of a motivational and 
volitional intervention that aimed to increase the objective (email legitimacy task) and 
subjective (self-report engagement in) email security behaviour of employees.  The main email 
behaviour of interest was not clicking on suspicious links in emails, the determinants of which 
were identified in chapter 5. This behaviour was explored alongside a subset of email security 
behaviours that are necessary for detection of phishing emails. The motivational component of 
the intervention was primarily self-efficacy-based but also targeted security breach experience 
at work, susceptibility, response costs and response efficacy. The volitional component sought 
to bridge the intention-behaviour gap through implementation intentions by providing 
participants with “volitional help sheets” in which they identified barriers to goal attainment 
(checking links are genuine before clicking) and strategies to overcome those barriers in relation 
to email usage. An RCT design was adopted to evaluate the intervention in which participants 
were randomly allocated to one of four conditions: A combined motivational and volitional 
condition, a motivational-only condition, volitional-only condition or a control condition. The 
change in behaviour was measured alongside an examination of its effectiveness in changing 
employees’ perceptions, i.e. their threat and coping appraisals. 
The study found that those exposed to the motivational intervention either alone or in 
combination with implementation intentions had significantly better task performance compared 
to the control group immediately post-exposure. The combined intervention had sustained 
performance compared to control at 1-week follow-up but there was a significant reduction in 
performance for the motivational-only group.  This suggests that the motivational intervention 
alongside implementation intentions led to sustained performance at 1-week follow-up 
compared to a control group. Further analyses revealed that these observed differences were for 
participants’ overall accuracy in detecting genuine and phishing emails and approaching 
significance for participants’ genuine precision detection ability but had no effect on phishing 
precision ability. The study also found no effect of the intervention on self-reported email 
security behaviour. It also found that there was significant improvement in some components of 
threat and coping appraisal perceptions regardless of condition. Response efficacy was the only 
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factor to change significantly as a result of the intervention in which the combined and 
motivational-only interventions had a significant increase in their perceptions of response 
efficacy.  
This chapter starts by outlining the design of the intervention and then states the hypotheses to 
be explored in the study.  
6.2 | DESIGNING THE INTERVENTION 
6.2.1 | THE MOTIVATIONAL COMPONENT  
In chapter 5, self-efficacy was the strongest predictor of not clicking on links in suspicious 
emails, so the motivational component of the intervention is primarily self-efficacy based with 
additional persuasive information to target the other PMT constructs.  
Existing PMT approaches have used fear appeals (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010, 2015) by 
highlighting the risk of security threats (such as susceptibility to downloading malware and its 
severity) and information about how to cope with such a security threat (e.g. using anti-malware 
software, not downloading attachments that are executable files). Other approaches have 
focussed on highlighting perceived severity within fear appeals (Boss et al., 2015; Jenkins et al., 
2013). The findings from Chapter 5 suggested that severity did not influence individuals 
intentions. However the other PMT constructs (susceptibility, response costs and self-efficacy) 
alongside security breach experience at work played a role in determining high or low levels of 
intentions to engage in the email behaviour. In addition to self-efficacy, persuasive information 
will also target these factors. 
There are four information sources important for self-efficacy which can be targeted in 
interventions: performance accomplishments, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion and 
physiological states. Maddux and Lewis (1995) claim that a combination of different sources is 
best for enhancing self-efficacy and a combination of all four is most effective. The current 
study will focus on two sources (performance experiences and verbal persuasion) as these were 
deemed most appropriate to target within the motivational component. Previous self-efficacy 
based interventions for protective online behaviour have been shown to be effective, even when 
targeting only one source of self-efficacy (enactive mastery) (Wirth et al., 2007).  
6.2.1.1 | Performance accomplishments 
Self-efficacy is enhanced through the successful enactment of the behaviour by the individual. 
Performance accomplishments are regarded as the most influential source of self-efficacy 
because they are personal experiences and, therefore, provide greater authenticity to the 
individual (Bandura, 1997). This involves the individual learning to master the task, increasing 
their self-efficacy as they develop their ability to undertake the task. Rapid successes are 
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beneficial for building self-efficacy, whereas failures reduce self-efficacy. Repeated failures are 
particularly problematic for self-efficacy when they cannot be linked to adverse external factors 
(Bandura, 1986) and can lead to states of helplessness (Anderson & Jennings, 1980). On the 
other hand, linking failures to adverse external factors can enhance self-efficacy (Bandura, 
Blanchard, & Ritter, 1969). Disappointments in performance at an early stage may reduce self-
efficacy. Therefore it is important that the task or behaviour be broken down into small 
achievable components to build up confidence (van de Laar & van der Bijl, 2001). It is also 
important to allow people to experience a success and interpret it as their own achievement 
(Maddux, Brawley, & Boykin, 1995).  
In the motivational component, participants are given a practice exercise to train themselves on 
the main behaviour of interest (detecting suspicious links). Only one training exercise was 
provided to prevent fatigue and to keep in-line with recommendations to keep the task in 
achievable components (van de Laar & van der Bijl, 2001). However, participants were also 
provided with feedback on their performance on the phishing detection task, giving them the 
opportunity to experience multiple accomplishments (Maddux et al., 1995).  
To further enhance levels of self-efficacy, alternative ways to cope with checking URLs were 
provided. Participants were told that if they were unsure a link was safe, they could use an 
online link scanner that checked the authenticity of it. They were provided with details of such 
websites and how to use them.   
6.2.1.2 | Verbal persuasion 
Gaining positive feedback from professionals or others is an important reward to motivate 
individuals to carry out and maintain a specific behaviour (Bandura, 1997). People who are 
persuaded that they have the capability to behave in a certain way are more likely to expend 
energy and persevere with it. Self-efficacy increased through persuasion leads people to try 
harder to succeed and can promote the development of skills and a sense of self-efficacy 
(Bandura, 1986). However, if not done correctly, can also lead to decreases in self-efficacy 
(Bandura, 1997).  
In the motivational component, participants were given feedback and encouragement on their 
performance on two occasions. Firstly, for the main behaviour of interest (not clicking on links 
in suspicious emails), they were trained to detect genuine domain names and provided with 
feedback on their performance on a test in which they identified whether the web address was 
genuine or fake. The second exercise, during the second phishing test, also provided feedback 
and encouragement on their performance. Written feedback was provided as it has been shown 
to be more effective than feedback provided verbally (Ashford, Edmunds, & French, 2010).  
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An important aspect of effective verbal persuasion is the reliability and credibility of the 
educator (Bandura, 1997). In particular, individuals give consideration to the perceived 
reliability, skill, expertise, and ability of the persuasive source (Holloway & Watson, 2002). 
People trust the educator more when they are seen to have in-depth knowledge and experience 
of assessing and judging the ability of others (Bandura, 1982). The intervention appeared 
reliable and credible by telling participants that a computer security company prepared the 
information and that the training they received was part of a larger “computer hub”. The content 
was kept professional and designed to appear credible, which has been shown to facilitate trust 
(Sillence, Briggs, Fishwick, & Harris, 2005).  
Raising unrealistic beliefs can discredit the persuader and undermine individuals’ beliefs in their 
capabilities (Bandura, 1997). Realistic feedback was therefore designed around their 
performance on the suspicious link training and the email legitimacy task. Participants were 
provided with feedback that was framed around their results. For example, for the phishing test 
participants were presented with how many phishing and genuine emails they correctly 
identified. Performers achieving above 70% correct were told “WELL DONE. You clearly have 
the capable skills and knowledge to detect phishing emails”, whereas those scoring less than 
70% were told “Good attempt but could do with improvement” and were provided with a recap 
of the detection rules from the training. This was to ensure that that the programme was not 
raising unrealistic beliefs and potentially undermining participants’ self-efficacy beliefs. 
6.2.2 | DECEPTION INDICATORS 
The motivational component used principles from the Theory of Deception (Johnson et al., 
1992) to help users detect cues that indicate deception by highlighting message content and the 
need to inspect emails for emotional triggers that get users to react quickly: greed, urgency, 
curiosity, and fear. Design heuristics to look out for and spelling and grammar issues were also 
highlighted to the user. To equip users with the skills to cope with this particular threat, the 
training dealt with the two main ways users can get malware from emails: downloading and 
opening attachments or clicking on suspicious URLs. Users were educated about the different 
file types and how to behave when receiving emails with attachments. More attention was given 
to training users how to detect fake URLs, as discussed above. Participants were also informed 
about the dangers of shortened URLs and were provided with information about how to check 
the authenticity of these.   
6.2.3 | THREAT AND COPING MANIPULATIONS 
The following additional factors were also targeted by the intervention but were given less 
attention than self-efficacy.  
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Perceived susceptibility was manipulated by highlighting the role employees play in 
information security breaches and the likelihood of receiving malware-based phishing.  
Experience was manipulated by getting participants to reflect on times when they may have 
experienced the negative consequences caused by security breaches. Participants were also 
persuaded that engaging in security behaviours will reduce the likelihood of these events 
happening again.  
Response efficacy and response costs were also manipulated. Response efficacy outlined the 
effectiveness and response costs emphasising that the behaviours being outlined only take a 
small amount of time.  
6.2.4 | THE VOLITIONAL COMPONENT: IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS HELP 
SHEET 
Two approaches can be used in the formation of implementation intentions; the first is 
participant-generated in which they are given instructions and develop their own 
implementation intentions. The second is research-guided in which the research team identify 
critical situations and strategies based on research and the evidence-base. The first opens a 
degree of variability as choices will be driven by participants which do mean they may be more 
salient to the individual. However, existing research has shown that a proportion of participants 
find this difficult with between 20-40% not forming a single plan (Skår, Sniehotta, Molloy, 
Prestwich, & Araújo-Soares, 2011, Michie, Dormandy, & Marteau, 2004, Rutter, Steadman, & 
Quine, 2006). The second approach provides participants with pre-defined critical situations and 
responses; an approach recommended by Hagger and Luszczynska (2014) in their review of 
implementation intentions literature.  Studies in other domains have adopted this approach (e.g. 
Bell, Toth, Little, & Smith, 2015; Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005). However, the critical 
situations chosen in the implementation intentions need to be appropriate for the target 
population as there is likely to be between-person variation in exposure and salience of critical 
situations and the strategies depicted in them. Providing participants with many implementation 
intentions to choose from is, therefore, a more effective solution and can be implemented with 
volitional help sheets.  
Volitional help sheets require participants to link critical situations with responses by selecting 
the situations and responses that they feel are most appropriate for them. The critical situations 
used are evidence-based, guided by existing research on situations that lead to the undesired 
behaviour. The goal-directed responses are theory-based, using the processes of change 
(Prochaska et al., 1994) from the trans-theoretical model and aim to help overcome the 
situations as they reflect strategies that individuals use to try to initiate or sustain behaviour 
change.  
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Volitional help sheets have been found to be successful for a variety of behaviours including 
quitting smoking (Armitage, 2008), increasing physical activity (Armitage & Arden, 2010), 
reducing binge drinking (Arden & Armitage, 2012) and reducing speeding (Brewster et al., 
2015). They are seen to be more effective than a purely user-guided or researcher-guided 
approach, as they can account for more between-person variation in exposure to critical 
situations and sensitivity to behaviour change techniques (Brewster et al., 2015). 
The design of the volitional help sheet (see Appendix Z) was based on the approach used by 
Brewster et al. (2015). The 20 critical situations were identified from existing phishing literature 
and the research team’s knowledge and experience. They covered situations in which people are 
known to or are likely to habitually click on links without checking their legitimacy. They were 
identified as critical cues that are relevant and salient to the individual. Like the Brewster paper, 
the 20 goal-directed responses were based on the processes of change from the transtheoretical 
model (Prochaska & DiClemnte, 1983) and 2 responses were provided for each of the processes 
of change. Where appropriate these responses were adapted from the existing volitional help 
sheet literature (Armitage & Arden, 2010, 2012; Armitage, 2008; Brewster et al., 2015). 
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6.2.5 | CONTROL CONDITION 
The control group information consisted of an overview of the history of computers and email 
use based on information available at http://www.webcitation.org/6dfr7Nboz  
6.2.6 | INTERVENTION SUMMARY 
To summarise, the intervention is unlike existing approaches on improving phishing protection 
behaviour because it utilises factors identified from previous work with the population and the 
target behaviour. The motivational component combines training alongside threat and coping 
manipulations. The intervention also benefits from the use of implementation intentions to help 
bridge the gap between increased motivation caused by the motivational component and actual 
behaviour change. Additional benefits of the intervention include that it is a short programme 
(15 minutes), low cost and can be easily distributed across companies. Furthermore, it focusses 
on the context of malware-based phishing threat rather than accidental disclosure of information 
threat.  
The intervention was checked for validity by three other security researchers and piloted with 6 
participants who were not security-based. The intervention materials are provided in Appendix 
Y. 
6.3 | HYPOTHESES 
The behaviour change approach as outlined in Chapter 2 (section 2.3) and principles of RCTs as 
outlined in Chapter 2 (section 2.4.5) led to the formation of the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis1: Those who receive the motivational component will have better performance on 
an email legitimacy task than the control and the implementations intention-only groups, 
immediately post intervention (T2) and at 1-week follow-up (T3). 
Hypothesis2: The combination of a motivational and volitional intervention will lead to the 
reporting of more email-security behaviours immediately post intervention (T2) and at 1-week 
follow-up (T3) than the other 3 conditions (PMT-only, implementation intentions-only and 
control). 
Hypothesis3: The effects of the motivational component on the email legitimacy task will be 
greater for participants with lower baseline security behaviour scores than those with higher 
baseline security behaviour scores.  
Hypothesis4:  Those exposed to the motivational component will significantly increase their 
susceptibility, self-efficacy and response efficacy perceptions and reduce their perceptions of 
response costs immediately post intervention (T2) and at 1-week follow-up (T3).  
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6.4 | METHOD 
6.4.1 | DESIGN 
The study adopted a 2 (implementation intentions: yes/no) x 2 (PMT: yes/no) independent 
groups design in which participants were randomly allocated to one of the four intervention 
groups: protection motivation theory and implementation intentions (IMP + PMT), protection 
motivation theory-only (PMT-only), implementation intentions-only (IMP-only) and control 
(CTRL). They completed measures at baseline before allocation (T1), immediately post-
exposure to intervention (T2) and at 1-week follow-up (T3). The intervention group represented 
the independent variable. The dependent variables were the score on the email legitimacy tests, 
self-reported primary email and secondary security behaviours and PMT measures - perceived 
severity, susceptibility, response efficacy, response costs and self-efficacy.  
6.4.2 | PARTICIPANTS 
An opportunity sample of 59 participants took part in the study (Age, M= 33.86, SD= 10.08). 
All recruited participants were currently in full time or part time employment, were not from a 
computing profession and used an email and computer daily as part of their job role. 21 males 
and 38 females took part with an average organisational tenure of 5.04 years (SD=5.49) and job 
tenure of 3.28 years (SD=3.87). 6.8% were from a microenterprise, 3.4% from a small 
enterprise, 6.8% from a medium-sized enterprise and 83.1% from a large organisation. 39% had 
read the information security policy of their organisation, 35.6% had never read the policy, 
23.7% indicated that they did not know if they had read the policy and 1.7% stated that their 
organisation did not have a policy. For those that had read the policy, 6.3% read it within the 
last month, 15.6% 1-6 months ago, 11.9% 6-12 months ago, 15.3% more than 12 months ago 
and 15.3% were unsure when they last read the policy. Participants were provided with £10 for 
reimbursement of their time.  
6.4.3 | MATERIALS 
An online questionnaire hosted on Qualtrics was used to deliver the questionnaires and the 
intervention content was delivered using Microsoft PowerPoint.  
6.4.3.1 | Phishing tests 
The email task was designed using phishing emails that were obtained from millerscams.co.uk 
and myonlinesecurity.co.uk. For each role-play task, participants were presented with 10 
fake/spam emails (see Appendix AA for example) and 10 genuine emails (see Appendix BB for 
example) from the inbox of a fictional Lisa Thompson and were asked to identify which emails 
were genuine and which were not. Participants were also requested to complete the task as 
quickly as possible. Each test was balanced with half of both fake and real emails containing 
half links and half with attachments. To ensure sufficient difficulty and to mimic sophisticated 
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spam, the number of real and fake emails was varied in which some were addressed to Lisa and 
had the correct sender email. All emails had correct spelling and grammar to mimic spam 
representative of that received in organisations in 2015. The content of these emails included 
invoices, newsletters, password resets, security concerns and generic file sharing emails.  
The emails were presented as a static image so participants were not able to interact with the 
emails. They were asked if they thought the email was genuine and were given a 4 point rating 
scale from “Definitely, probably, probably not to definitely not’ from Blythe, Petrie, and Clark, 
(2011).   
6.4.3.2 | Measures 
Unless otherwise stated, all items were measured on a 5 point likert scale that ranged from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree in which participants indicated the extent to which they 
agreed with the statement. 
6.4.3.2.1 | Protection motivation theory variables 
Measures of PMT variables were the same at all three time points and were the items used 
within Chapter 5. 4 items measured Perceived Susceptibility (see Appendix M) and 13 items 
measured Perceived Severity (see Appendix M) which was comprised of four sub-constructs 
based on the previous study: organisational consequences, consequence severity, personal and 
productivity consequences.  
To overcome difficulties of the double negative wording used in the previous version, the 
wording of the behaviour was changed to allow the measurement of a number of anti-phishing 
email behaviours. For the response appraisal measures, the behaviour was therefore changed to 
“Checking an email is genuine before clicking on a link within it”. Response efficacy (see 
Appendix P) was measured with 13 items, Self-efficacy (see Appendix Q) was measured with 4 
items and Response costs (see Appendix R) were measured with 4 items.  
Self-reported primary email behaviour  was measured using a 10 item scale to measure security 
behaviour in the context of malicious spam over the last 7 days (e.g. In the past 7 days, I check 
the sender email before clicking on links from within emails), this was taken at T1 and T3. 
Intention was measured at T2 and was the same items but worded to reflect their motivation to 
perform the behaviour in the next 7 days (e.g. In the next 7 days, I intend to check the sender 
email before clicking on links from within emails). See Appendix CC for scale. 
Self-reported secondary security behaviour  was measured using the same scale used in Chapter 
5 comprised of 16 items (see Appendix I). This measure was only taken at T1 and T3. 
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6.4.3.2.2 | Other measures 
Past experience at work was self-developed and consisted of 6 items which measured 
employees’ direct personal experience of the consequences of security breaches and the 
breaches in the workplace. An example of an item: “My work device has been infected by 
malicious software (e.g. viruses, Trojans, worms)”. Items were measured on a 3-point scale 
consisting of yes, no and I don’t know (see Appendix O). This measure was only taken at T1. 
Personality constructs: Impulsivity was measured with 12 items from the Dickman (1990) scale 
in which 6 items measure functional impulsivity (e.g. “People have admired me because I can 
think quickly”) and 6 items to measure dysfunctional impulsivity (e.g. “I often say and do 
things without considering the consequences”). Participants rated themselves on a 5-point scale 
of “Very inaccurate” to “Very accurate”. This measure was only taken at T1. This measure was 
used to mask the true aim of the study.  
Readiness to change was measured with 5 statements to assess how ready to change their 
security behaviour employees felt they were. These statements were adopted from Armitage's  
(2006) measure of readiness of change and aimed to reflect the five stages of change (Prochaska 
& DiClemnte, 1983): (1) the pre-contemplative stage (I currently do not always check that all 
emails are genuine before clicking on links within them), (2) the contemplative stage (I 
currently do not always check that all emails are genuine before clicking on links within them 
but I am thinking about starting), (3) the preparation stage (I currently check that all emails are 
genuine before clicking on links within them but not always), (4) the action stage (I currently 
check that all emails are genuine before clicking on links within them but have only begun to do 
so recently/in the last 6 months) and (5) the maintenance stage (I currently check that all emails 
are genuine before clicking on links within them and I have done so for a long time/longer than 
6 months). Participants were required to identify which stage they felt most represented their 
current behaviour.  
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6.4.3.2.3 | Scale reliabilities  
Table 41. Scale reliabilities, means and standard deviations for each time point 
Variables Time Items α M SD 
Threat appraisal      
Perceived susceptibility T1 
T2 
T3 
3* 
3* 
3* 
.69 
.69 
.71 
2.35 
2.64 
3.71 
.68 
.64 
.70 
Perceived severity – total T1 
T2 
T3 
13 
13 
13 
.84 
.92 
.91 
3.46 
3.75 
3.71 
.59 
.68 
.70 
Perceived severity - (organisational  consequences) T1 
T2 
T3 
5 
5 
5 
.80 
.93 
.90 
3.50 
3.82 
3.79 
 
.67 
.78 
.75 
Perceived severity - (consequence severity) T1 
T2 
T3 
3 
3 
3 
.95 
.96 
.92 
3.51 
3.76 
3.81 
1.00 
.91 
.90 
Perceived severity - (personal consequences) 
 
T1 
T2 
T3 
2 
2 
2 
.78 
.81 
.89 
2.80 
3.15 
3.09 
1.00 
1.03 
1.13 
Perceived severity - (productivity consequences) T1 
T2 
T3 
2 
2 
2 
.82 
.81 
.76 
3.82 
4.00 
3.92 
.62 
.64 
.69 
Coping appraisal      
Response efficacy 
 
T1 
T2 
T3 
13 
13 
13 
.87 
.92 
.93 
3.88 
4.11 
4.07 
.45 
.52 
.54 
Self-efficacy 
 
T1 
T2 
T3 
4 
4 
4 
.90 
.81 
.79 
3.86 
4.00 
3.99 
.89 
.70 
.69 
Response costs 
 
T1 
T2 
T3 
4 
4 
4 
.93 
.90 
.89 
2.06 
2.02 
1.97 
.88 
.72 
.69 
Other measures      
Intention 
 
T2 10 .90 4.49 .48 
Email security behaviour 
 
T1 
T2 
T3 
10 
- 
10 
.83 
- 
.85 
3.52 
- 
4.07 
.79 
- 
.60 
Secondary security behaviour 
 
T1 
T2 
T3 
16 
- 
16 
.78 
- 
.83 
3.05 
- 
3.22 
.56 
- 
.61 
Functional impulsivity 
 
T1 6 .84 2.93 .86 
Dysfunctional impulsivity T1 
 
6 .83 2.40 .90 
Readiness to change T1 1 n/a 3.98 1.41 
*was reduced to 3 items as one item was unreliable due to reverse-wording 
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6.4.4 | PROCEDURE 
Participants were asked to attend a session at the university that would last around 45-50 
minutes. Participants were told that they were taking part in a study looking at “personality and 
email use in the workplace”; this was to mask the true aim of the study. Participant information 
and consent were delivered via the online program. Following consent, participants were asked 
to generate their own code using a series of questions to anonymise data. Following this, they 
were then randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. They then completed the baseline 
questionnaires and the pre-intervention phishing test. Following this, participants either 
completed the control task, PMT-only, implementation intentions-only or PMT with the 
implementation intentions. After these tasks, participants were then presented with the post-
exposure phishing test and measures. Completion of the post-manipulation measures marked the 
end of the session and participants were presented with a final screen that asked them to refrain 
from discussing the study with colleagues in case they were also taking part. Participants were 
then sent a link to the follow-up questionnaire seven days after taking part and asked to 
complete in their own time. At the end of the follow-up, they were fully debriefed about the true 
nature of the experiment and those who were not exposed to the training, were given the 
opportunity to read the information.   
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6.5 | RESULTS 
Following data collection, 3 participants data had not been recorded due to a Qualtrics error so 
were removed from the analysis resulting in a final sample size of 56.  
6.5.1 | RANDOMISATION CHECK 
To verify that randomization to conditions had been successful, a MANOVA was run with 
intervention condition as the independent variable and baseline measures of the PMT measures, 
phishing test score and self-report primary (email behaviours), readiness to change and 
secondary security behaviours as the dependent variables. The MANOVA revealed that there 
was no significant differences between conditions at baseline F(24, 136.92)=1.02, p=.442; 
Wilk's Λ = .620, partial η2 = .15, indicating that participants had been successfully randomly 
allocated to conditions.  
6.5.2 | MAIN ANALYSIS 
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6.5.2.1 | Volitional help sheet 
Table 42. Critical situations and goal-directed responses from volitional help sheet and percentage 
of participants choosing each situation and response  
Critical situations/goal-directed responses %  
Critical situations (“If I am tempted to click on a link in an email without checking it’s 
genuine…”) 
  
…when the email is from a colleague  15 
…when the email is from somebody that I trust  13 
…when it’s from a well-known company  10 
…when a colleague tells me to click on it  8 
…when I am interested in what is on the link  6 
…when it’s not labelled as spam by my email client  6 
…when the email address from the sender looks real  6 
…when I need to as part of my job  6 
…when the email link looks real  5 
…when it has been addressed to me personally  5 
…when the email is urgent  3 
…when I have got lots of emails to get through  3 
…when I don’t have enough time  3 
…when the email message highlights a security issue  3 
…when I am busy  2 
…when I might suffer negative consequences if I don’t click on it 2 
…when it would require too much effort  2 
…when there is a financial reward for clicking  2 
…when it would disturb my work flow 0 
…when I have just started the working day  0 
Goal-directed responses (“Then I will…”) 
  
…seek out more information (e.g. from colleagues, IT, the internet) about the email (CR) 25 
…try to control my impulses to click on links without checking if they are real first (SC) 16 
…remind myself that I am not saving much time by not checking if its real (CR) 8 
…tell myself that I am capable of checking whether emails are genuine (SL) 8 
…remind myself that people in my organisation will be supportive of me checking emails before clicking 
on links (HR) 
7 
…make a concerted effort to ignore the urge/pressure to not check emails (CC) 5 
…tell myself that I am protecting my organisation from malware by taking extra steps to check if the 
email is real (RM) 
5 
…try to avoid putting myself in that situation again in the future (SC) 4 
…think about how irritated I will be if my computer is unusable due to malware (DR) 4 
…remind myself that I have a commitment to my organisation to protect its data (SL) 3 
…seek advice from others (e.g. colleagues, IT, those more experienced in computers) about how to avoid 
such situations in the future (HR) 
3 
…remember that when I have not checked whether the email is real, I will become concerned about my 
computer security (SE) 
3 
…think about the embarrassment I will suffer if I cause a security breach at work (DR) 3 
…remind myself that the government could fine my organisation up to £500, 000 for a security breach 
(SocLib) 
3 
…remember that I could spread malware onto my friends and colleagues computers (ER) 2 
…remember that not checking email authenticity contradicts the view I have of myself as a responsible 
person (SE) 
1 
…rather than viewing checking emails as simply another rule to follow, I will see it as my opportunity to 
help protect data (CC) 
1 
…remind myself that I will have a more efficient and secure computer (RM) 1 
…remind myself that I could get in trouble by my organisation/management for not checking whether 
emails are real (SocLib) 
1 
…think about how if I check whether emails are genuine, it will prevent me from becoming a burden to 
my organisation/ IT department (ER) 
0 
Note: Acronyms indicate the processes of change that the responses were designed to tap: CR: 
consciousness raising; ER: environmental reevaluation; DR: dramatic relief; SocLib: social liberation; 
SR: self-reevaluation; SL: self-liberation; HR: helping relationships; CC: counter conditioning; RM: 
reinforcement management; SC: stimulus control 
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Table 42 shows the most commonly selected critical situations and goal-directed responses. 
From the critical situations, the findings show that employees perceive that they are most likely 
to click on a link without checking its authenticity when it appears to come from a colleague or 
someone they trust. Situations such as “not checking when it would disturb work flow” and 
“when I have just started the working day” were not chosen by any employees. These scenarios 
reflect potential productivity costs but do not appear to be situations in which employees would 
be unlikely to check link authenticity.  Of the goal-directed responses, strategies relating to 
consciousness raising and stimulus control are the most commonly chosen by participants. The 
table shows that while the most appropriate barriers and goal-directed responses are unique to 
the individual, there appears to be some consensus in those chosen by participants.  
The effectiveness of the combined intervention on outcome measures will now be discussed.  
6.5.2.2 | Effects of intervention on phishing detection ability on the email legitimacy task 
 
Table 43. Means and standard deviations for phishing detection ability for each condition and time 
point 
 IMP + PMT  PMT-only  IMP-only  CTRL  
T1 – Phishing test 
percentage 
74.11 (10.92) 65.42 (14.73) 66.83 (11.52) 73.66 (9.55) 
T2 – Phishing test 
percentage 
76.43 (15.50) 77.33 (15.80) 70.77 (13.82) 63.57 
(14.47)  
T3 – Phishing test 
percentage 
74.29 (11.41) 66.33 (14.07) 63.08 (10.90) 65.00 
(10.19) 
N= 56 14 15 13 14 
 
To determine the effects of the intervention on post-manipulation phishing detection ability, 
participants overall percentage for correct detection was taken at time 1, time 2 and time 3. Data 
was analysed using a mixed 4 (condition; IMP+PMT/PMT-only/IMP-only/CTRL) x 2 (Time; 
T2/T3) ANCOVA, with the condition as the between-subjects factor and time as the within-
subject factor. Baseline phishing ability was the co-variate (to control for differences in pre-
intervention ability). The analysis revealed a significant main effect of condition on ability 
F(3,51)=3.456, p<.05 with a large effect size, partial η2 =.169. 
There was no significant main effect of time F (1, 51) =.906, p=.346, partial η2 =.017; and no 
significant interaction between time and condition, F (3, 51) =.1.233, p=.307, partial η2 =.068, 
demonstrating that the effect of condition was consistent across post-exposure and 1-week 
follow-up.  
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Pairwise comparisons revealed that there was a significant difference between the IMP + PMT 
condition and control condition (p<.01) and that the difference between the PMT-only condition 
and control condition was also significant (p<.05). There were, however, no significant 
differences between the other conditions. Therefore, those receiving IMP+PMT and PMT-only 
had significantly higher performance compared to the control condition when controlling for 
baseline performance, following exposure to treatment.  
Follow-up ANOVAs were conducted to further explore these differences and revealed that the 
difference between the IMP + PMT condition and the control condition at T2 was significant 
(p<.05) and the difference between the PMT-only condition and the control condition at T2 was 
also significant (p<.05). For T3, the difference between the IMP + PMT condition and control 
condition was significant (p<.05), and approaching significance for the IMP-only condition 
(p=.52). However, the difference in performance between the PMT-only condition and the 
control condition was no longer significant (p=.280). There were no significant differences 
between the other conditions.  
Additional ANOVAs explored a difference in performance between T2 and T3. No significant 
difference was found for the IMP + PMT condition (p=.622), IMP-only condition (p=.163) and 
control condition D (p=.710). However, PMT-only condition had a significant reduction 
(p<.05). 
 
 
Figure 33. The percentage performance on the email legitimacy for T2 and T3 for each condition 
 
As shown in the Figure 33,  post-exposure (T2) and 1-week later (T3) performance in the IMP + 
PMT condition and control condition remains relatively stable, with the IMP + PMT group 
performing significantly better than the control condition at both T2 and T3. The findings 
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indicate that the combined intervention (IMP + PMT) leads to sustained performance compared 
to training in isolation (PMT-only) which significantly reduces between T2 and T3.  
6.5.2.2.1 | Effects of intervention due to baseline differences 
As there was was an observed effect of condition on post-exposure and follow-up phishing 
detection ability, it was important to explore whether the intervention lead to better performance 
amongst individuals with poorer baseline performance. To explore this, a median split was 
conducted to categorise participants as either high or low performers (see Table 44). 
Table 44. Means and standard deviation for performance scores by time point for baseline 
groupings 
Condition Baseline 
grouping 
N Mean 
performance 
score at baseline 
(SD) 
Mean performance 
score at post-
manipulation 
Mean 
performance score 
at 1-week follow-
up 
IMP + 
PMT 
Low 7 65.18 (6.10) 75.71 (17.18) 71.43 (10.69) 
 High 7 83.04 (5.94) 77.14 (14.96) 77.14 (12.20) 
PMT-only Low 9 55.56 (9.60) 78.89 (17.64) 62.22 (16.60) 
 High 6 80.21 (4.70) 75.00 (13.78) 72.50 (6.12) 
IMP-only Low  9 61.11 (.814) 70.00 (14.14) 61.67 (10.61) 
 High 4 79.69 (5.98) 72.50 (15.00) 66.25 (12.50) 
CTRL Low 6 64.58 (5.10) 58.33 (9.83) 65.83 (9.17) 
 High 8 80.47 (5.22) 67.50 (16.69) 64.38 (11.48) 
 
A 2 (baseline group; low vs high baseline performance) x 2 (time; T2 vs T3) x 4 (condition; 
IMP+PMT/PMT-only/IMP-only/CTRL) mixed design ANCOVA was conducted with baseline 
performance as a covariate. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of condition on 
performance, F(3,47)=3.319, p<.05, partial η2 =.175. There was no main effect of baseline 
performance grouping on performance, F(1, 47)=1.965, p=.168, partial η2 =.040 and no 
significant interaction between condition and baseline performance grouping, F(3, 47)=.171, 
p=.915, partial η2 =.011. 
There was no significant main effect of time, F(1, 47)=.008, p=.929, partial η2 =.000, no 
significant interaction between time and condition, F(1, 47)=1.393, p=.257, partial η2 =.082, or 
between time and baseline grouping, F(1, 47)=.273, p=.604, partial η2 =.006 and no significant 
interaction between time and condition and baseline grouping, F(3, 47)=10.521, p=.268, partial 
η2 =.080. 
The findings indicated that the effects of condition were not greater for participants who had 
better or worse performance at baseline.  
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6.5.2.2.2 | Accuracy and precision of phishing detection 
Participants’ phishing detection ability was further broken down using principles of signal 
detection. When receiving a phishing or genuine email, there are a number of possible outcomes 
that are summarised in the table below from Blythe et al. (2011): 
Table 45. Possible outcomes resulting from receiving a phishing or genuine email 
 Respondents think the email is: 
Genuine Phish 
Bu
t i
t i
s 
a
ct
u
a
lly
: 
Genuine 
TRUE NEGATIVE 
Respondent correctly detects a 
real email 
FALSE POSITIVE 
Respondent is over cautious and 
thinks a real email is a phish 
Phish 
FALSE NEGATIVE 
Respondent is taken in and 
thinks a phish is a real email 
TRUE POSITIVE 
Respondent correctly detects a 
phishing email 
(Blythe et al., 2011) creates two measures from these four outcomes based on detection tasks: 
1. Accuracy measures the proportion of correct responses within the total set of responses. 
This is calculated with the following equation: 
Accuracy=  (Number of True Positives +  Number of True Negatives)/(Number 
of True Positives +  Number of True Negatives +  Number of False Positives +  
Number of False Negatives) 
2. Phishing precision measures the proportion of correct positives within all the positive 
responses. This is calculated with the following equation: 
Phishing Precision=  Number of True Positives/ (Number of True Positives +  
Number of False Positives) 
3. Genuine precision was also created within this study which measures the proportion of 
correct negatives within all the negatives responses. This is calculated with the 
following equation: 
Genuine Precision=  Number of True Negatives/ (Number of True Negatives +  
Number of False Negatives) 
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Table 46. Means and standard deviations for accuracy, phishing precision and genuine precision by 
condition and time point 
 IMP + PMT  PMT-only  IMP-only  CTRL 
T1 – Overall accuracy  .74 (.11) .65 (.15) .67 (.12) .74 (.10) 
T2 – Overall accuracy .76 (.15) .77 (.16) .71 (.14) .64 (.14) 
T3 – Overall accuracy .79 (.12) .71 (.14) .67 (.13) .69 (.10) 
T1 – Phishing Precision  .68 (.20) .59 (.21) .60 (.22) .71 (.21) 
T2 – Phishing Precision .76 (.27) .79 (.28) .76 (.30) .63 (.33) 
T3 – Phishing Precision .85 (.10) .74 (.16) .70 (.16) .75 (.16) 
T1 – Genuine Precision  .82 (.12) .73 (.21) .76 (.16) .78 (.20) 
T2 – Genuine Precision .79 (.18) .75 (.16) .70 (.15) .64 (.19) 
T3 – Genuine Precision .77 (.15) .74 (.18) .66 (.12) .68 (.09) 
N=56 14 15 13 14 
**Scores closer to 1 indicate better performance  
 
To determine the effects of the intervention on post-manipulation phishing detection, overall 
accuracy and phishing and genuine precision were taken at the three-time intervals. Data was 
analysed using a mixed 4 (condition; IMP+PMT/PMT-only/IMP-only/CTRL) x 2 (Time; 
T2/T3) ANCOVA, with condition as the between-subjects factor and time as the within-subject 
factor. Baseline phishing detection accuracy and phishing and genuine precision were the co-
variate (to control for differences in pre-intervention ability). The analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of condition on accuracy, F(3, 50)=3.691, p<.05 with a large effect size,  partial η2 
=.181 and on genuine precision, F(3, 50)=3.353, p<.05 with a large effect size, partial η2 =.168 
but no significant main effect of condition on phishing precision, F(3, 50)=1.343, p=.271, partial 
η2 =.075.  
There was no significant main effect of time on accuracy (F (1, 50)=3.753, p=.058, partial η2 
=.070), phishing precision (F (1, 50)=1.152, p=.288, partial η2 =.023) or genuine precision (F (1, 
50)=3.549, p=.065, partial η2 =.066). There was also no significant interaction between time and 
condition on accuracy, (F (3, 50)=1.049, p=.379, partial η2 =.059), phishing precision (F (3, 
50)=1.302, p=.284, partial η2 =.072) or genuine precision (F (1, 50)=.541, p=.656, partial η2 
=.031). 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparison on accuracy revealed that there was a significant 
difference between the IMP+PMT condition and control condition (p<.01) and between the 
PMT-only condition and control condition (p<.01). There were no significant differences 
between the other conditions.  
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparison on genuine precision revealed that a significant 
difference between the IMP+PMT condition and control condition (p<.01) and between the 
PMT-only condition and control condition (p<.05).  There were, however, no significant 
differences between the other conditions.  
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For phishing precision, there were no significant differences between conditions.  
This re-emphasizes the findings from the earlier analyses and shows that the observed 
differences were for accuracy, genuine precision detection but no significant changes for 
phishing precision. 
6.5.2.2.3 | Effects of intervention on primary self-report email security behaviour 
 
Table 47. Means and standard deviations for email behaviour for each time point and condition 
 IMP + PMT  PMT-only  IMP-only  CTRL 
T1 – Baseline email behaviour 3.46 (.93) 3.33 (.90) 3.58 (.57) 3.77 (.61) 
T2 – Email intention 4.66 (.39) 4.56 (.39) 4.34 (.66) 4.44 (.41) 
T3 – Follow-up email behaviour 4.04 (.63) 4.03 (.64) 4.17 (.45) 4.05 (.72) 
N= 56 14 15 13 14 
 
Behavioural measures were taken at T1 (baseline), T2 (intentions, post-exposure) and T3 (1-
week follow-up). Repeated measures 4 (condition; IMP+PMT/PMT-only/IMP-only/CTRL) x 3 
(Time; T1/T2/T3) ANOVA was conducted to explore the effects of the intervention on self-
report email behaviour. Condition was the between-subject factor and time (self-report email 
behaviour) was the within-subject factor. The ANOVA revealed that there was no significant 
main effect of condition on self-reported email security behaviours, F(3,52)=.153, p=.927,  η2 
=.009. There was a significant main effect of time, F (2, 104)=48.032, p<.05, partial η2 =.48 but 
no significant interaction between time and condition, F (6,104)=1.359, p=.238, partial η2 =.073. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that there was a significant increase in self-report email security 
behaviour between T1 and T2 (p<.001) and a significant decrease between T2 and T3 (p<.001). 
Follow-up email behaviour was still significantly higher at T3 compared to T1 (p<.001). These 
results suggest that participating in the intervention regardless of condition significantly 
increased self-report email behaviour. 
6.5.2.2.4 | Effects of intervention on secondary self-report security behaviours 
 
Table 48. Means and standard deviations for secondary security behaviour for time points and 
conditions 
 IMP + PMT  PMT-only  IMP-only  CTRL  
T1 – Baseline secondary 
 security behaviour 
2.85 (.53) 3.08 (.47) 3.06 (.56) 3.24 (.68) 
T3 – Follow-up secondary  
security behaviour 
3.24 (.69) 3.17 (.43) 3.30 (.63) 3.20 (.72) 
N= 56 14 15 13 14 
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A repeated measures 4 (condition; IMP+PMT/PMT-only/IMP-only/CTRL) x 2 (Time; T2/T3) 
ANOVA was conducted to explore the effects of the intervention on secondary security 
behaviours not covered within the intervention program. Condition was the between-subject 
factor and time (self-report security behaviour) was the within-subject factor. The ANOVA 
revealed that there was no significant main effect of condition on secondary security behaviours, 
F(3,53)=.310, p=.818,  η2 =.017.  
There was a significant main effect of time, F (1, 53)=4.939, p<.05, partial η2 =.085 but no 
significant interaction between time and condition, F (3, 53)=1.476, p=.232, partial η2 =.077. 
These results suggest that participating in the intervention regardless of condition significantly 
increased self-report secondary security behaviour.  
6.5.2.2.5 | Effects of intervention on PMT constructs 
Table 49. Means and standard deviations for PMT constructs for each time point and condition 
Measure IMP + PMT PMT-only IMP-only CTRL 
 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 
Perceived 
susceptibility 
2.12 
(.50) 
2.55 
(.66) 
2.64 
(.77) 
2.33 
(.78) 
2.76 
(.66) 
2.64 
(.84) 
2.59 
(.73) 
2.67 
(.76) 
2.92 
(.75) 
2.48 
(.65) 
2.57 
(.61) 
2.55 
(.55) 
Response 
efficacy 
3.91 
(.40) 
4.09 
(.54) 
4.35 
(.58) 
3.78 
(.55) 
4.35 
(.49) 
4.11 
(.55) 
3.99 
(.50) 
4.02 
(.45) 
4.09 
(.39) 
3.82 
(.36) 
3.96 
(.57) 
3.72 
(.50) 
Response 
costs 
1.98 
(.92) 
1.75 
(.54) 
1.86 
(.61) 
2.08 
(.990 
1.80 
(.54) 
2.13 
(.69) 
2.31 
(.92) 
2.35 
(.92) 
2.27 
(.82) 
1.86 
(.61) 
2.27 
(.82) 
1.93 
(.56) 
Self-efficacy 3.68 
(1.20) 
4.13 
(.73) 
4.04 
(.73) 
3.98 
(.97) 
4.18 
(4.18) 
4.18 
(.61) 
3.56 
(.67) 
3.83 
(.93) 
3.92 
(.74) 
4.16 
(.49) 
3.95 
(.54) 
3.88 
(.68) 
Perceived severity: 
Organisational 
Consequences 
3.51 
(.66) 
3.94 
(.77) 
3.87 
(.70) 
3.61 
(.70) 
4.09 
(.72) 
3.96 
(.70) 
3.68 
(.44) 
3.82 
(.47) 
4.03 
(.67) 
3.23 
(.81) 
3.41 
(.97) 
3.29 
(.81) 
Consequence 
severity 
3.26 
(.94) 
3.79 
(.85) 
3.98 
(.80) 
3.26 
(.94) 
3.76 
(.76) 
3.84 
(.87) 
3.64 
(1.06) 
3.92 
(.88) 
3.82 
(.92) 
3.64 
(1.07) 
3.57 
(1.19) 
3.60 
(1.09) 
Personal 
severity 
2.64 
(.82) 
3.39 
(.96) 
3.39 
(.94) 
2.70 
(1.15) 
3.10 
(1.26) 
2.97 
(1.32) 
2.85 
(.90) 
3.04 
(.83) 
3.38 
(1.12) 
2.79 
(1.01) 
3.00 
(1.09) 
2.64 
(1.10) 
Productivity 
severity 
3.93 
(.39) 
4.25 
(.55) 
3.96 
(.66) 
3.83 
(.65) 
4.13 
(.58) 
4.10 
(.63) 
3.69 
(.56) 
3.77 
(.44) 
4.04 
(.43) 
3.75 
(.85) 
3.82 
(.87) 
3.57 
(.90) 
 
Repeated measures 4 (condition; IMP+PMT/PMT-only/IMP-only/CTRL) x 3 (Time; T1/T2/T3) 
ANOVA was conducted to explore the effects of the intervention on PMT constructs. Condition 
was the between-subject factor and time (PMT constructs) was the within-subject factor.  
6.5.2.2.5.1 | Main effect of condition 
The ANOVA revealed that there was no significant main effect of condition on response 
appraisal; self-efficacy (F(3, 52)=.877,p=.459, partial η2 =.048), response efficacy (F(3, 
52)=.1.294,p=.286, partial η2 =.069) and response costs (F(3, 52)=1.536, p=.216, partial η2 
=.081), and on threat appraisal; perceived susceptibility (F(3, 52)=.569, p=.569, partial η2 
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=.038) and the sub-constructs of perceived severity; organisational consequences (F(3, 
52)=2.513,p=.069, partial η2 =.127), consequence severity (F(3, 52)=.132,p=.940, partial η2 
=.008), personal consequences (F(3, 52)=.391, p=.760, partial η2 =.022) and productivity 
consequences (F(3, 52)=.1.211, p=.315, partial η2 =.065).  
6.5.2.2.5.2 | Main effect of time on PMT constructs 
There was no significant main effect of time on; self-efficacy (F(1.737, 100.37)=.1.430, p=.245, 
partial η2 =.027), response costs  (F(2, 104)=.274,p=.761, partial η2 =.005) and productivity 
consequences (F(2, 104)=2.756,p=.068, partial η2 =.050). There was a significant main effect of 
time on; organisational consequences (F(1.723, 90.316)=9.210, p<.01, partial η2 =.150), 
consequence severity (F(1.695, 89.594)=4.921, p<.05, partial η2 =.086), personal consequences 
(F(2, 104)=6.058, p<.01, partial η2 =.086), response efficacy (F(2, 104)=7.617, p<.01, partial η2 
=.092), susceptibility (F(2, 104)=5.272, p<.01, partial η2 =.092) and response cost (F(2, 
104)=.274, p=.761, partial η2 =.005).  
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that there was a significant increase in 
organisational consequences between T1 and T2 (p<.05) but no significant difference between 
T2 and T3 (p=1.000). For consequence severity, the increase between T1 and T2 was not 
significant (p=.089) but the increase between T1 and T3 was significant (p<.05).  For personal 
consequences, there was a significant increase between T1 and T2 (p<.05) but no significant 
difference between T2 to T3 (p=1.000) and still significantly higher than T1 (p<.01). Response 
efficacy also significantly increased from T1 to T2 (p<.05), no significant difference between 
T2 to T3 (p=1.000) but still significantly higher than baseline (p<.01). Following Bonferroni 
correction, there was no significant difference in time points for response cost. 
6.5.2.2.5.3 | Interaction between condition and time 
The ANOVA revealed that there was no significant interaction effect between condition and 
time on response appraisal constructs; self-efficacy (F(5.211, 90.316)=1.130, p=.351, partial η2 
=.061), and response costs (F(6, 104)=.726, p=.629, partial η2 =.040), and on threat appraisal 
constructs; perceived susceptibility (F(6, 104)=.785,p=.584, partial η2 =.043) and the sub-
constructs of perceived severity; organisational consequences (F(5.169, 89.594)=1.028,p=.407, 
partial η2 =.056), consequence severity (F(5.084, 88.119)=1.227,p=.303, partial η2 =.066), 
personal consequences (F(6, 104)=.1.624, p=.148, partial η2 =.086) and productivity 
consequences (F(6, 104)=1.671,p=.136, partial η2 =.088).  
6.5.2.2.5.4 | The Interaction between condition and time on response efficacy 
The ANOVA revealed that there was a significant interaction effect between condition and time 
on response efficacy, (F(6, 104)=3.712,p<.01 with a large effect size, partial η2 =.176). 
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One-way ANOVAs were conducted to explore this interaction. There was no significant 
difference between conditions at T1 (F(3, 54)=.569, p=.638, partial η2 =.031) and T2  (F(3, 
53)=1.724, p=.173, partial η2 =.089). There was a significant difference between conditions for 
T3 (F(3, 53)=3.509, p=.021, partial η2 =.166). Pairwise comparisons revealed that there was a 
significant difference between the IMP+PMT condition and control condition (p<.05).  
 
Figure 34. Response efficacy perceptions across the three points for each condition 
Additional repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each condition. For the IMP+PMT 
condition, there was a significant main effect of time, F(2, 26)=5.250, p<.05, partial η2 =.288, in 
which there was no significant increase between T1 and T2 (p=.872) and T2 and T3 (p=.087), 
however, the increase from T1 to T3 was significant (p<.05). For the PMT-only condition, there 
was a significant main effect of time, F(2, 28)=7.659, p<.01, partial η2 =.354, in which there 
was a significant increase from T1 to T2 (p<.01) but no significant decrease from T2 to T3 
(p=.433). For the IMP-only condition, there was no significant main effect of time, F(2, 
24)=.595, p<.01, partial η2 =.047. For the control condition, there was also no significant main 
effect of time, F(2,26)=2.338,p=.117, partial η2 =.152.  
These results suggest that participating in the intervention regardless of condition significantly 
increased levels of organisational consequences, consequence severity, personal consequences, 
response efficacy, susceptibility, and response costs regardless of condition. There was only an 
observed effect of condition of response efficacy in which those exposed to the PMT 
intervention (IMP+PMT and PMT-only) had significant increase in their perceptions of 
response efficacy (although at different time points).  
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6.6 | DISCUSSION 
This study examined the effectiveness of an intervention based on PMT and implementation 
intentions to increase employees’ self-reported email security behaviour and objective phishing 
detection ability. The study found partial support for hypothesis 1; that those exposed to the 
motivational intervention (IMP+PMT and PMT-only condition) would have significantly higher 
performance at T2 and T3. Those exposed to PMT component only, and those exposed to a 
combined intervention had significantly better performance on the phishing detection task 
compared to the control after exposure to the intervention. Performance was sustained compared 
to control at T3 for those exposed to the combined intervention but not for the PMT only group. 
Further analyses revealed that these observed differences were for participants’ overall accuracy 
and genuine precision detection.  
Hypothesis 2 was not supported as those exposed to the combined intervention did not report 
more intentions to engage in email security behaviours (T2) or self-report engagement in the 
behaviours at 1-week follow-up (T3). The study found that participation in the intervention, 
regardless of condition, led to significant improvement in self-reported email security 
behaviour.  
Hypothesis 3 posited that the PMT component would lead to greater improvement in 
performance for participants who had lower baseline performance scores. The study found no 
interaction between condition and whether participants had lower or higher baseline 
performance suggesting that the intervention did not lead to greater improvement for 
participants with lower baseline performance.  
Hypothesis 4 was partially supported, the study found that there was significant improvement in 
some components of threat and coping appraisal perceptions regardless of condition (perceived 
severity, organisational consequences and personal consequences). Response efficacy was the 
only perception to significantly change as a result of the intervention in which the motivational 
intervention (IMP+PMT and PMT-only condition) had a significant increase in their perceptions 
of response efficacy. 
The current study further broke down participants’ performance to detection tasks. For those 
exposed to the PMT components, there were differences in participants’ overall accuracy and in 
their genuine precision but not for phishing precision. This suggests that the intervention led 
participants to be more accurate overall in identifying phishing and genuine emails, and more 
precise in identifying genuine emails by having more correct detections than false negatives 
(thinking a phish is a real email) for genuine emails.  However, there was no improvement in 
their precision for detecting phishing emails, suggesting that they did not have more correct 
detections compared to false positives (thinking a real email is a phish). This could be the result 
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of participants being overcautious and rating genuine emails as phishes leading to lower 
precision in phishing detection, therefore, no significant changes.    
The study partially supports existing studies that have used training approaches to improve end-
users phishing ability (Jansson & von Solms, 2011; Kumaraguru et al., 2009) which found 
improvements in reducing susceptibility to phishing emails. However, these have largely been 
“real-world” based where participants receive training following insecure behaviour (e.g. they 
click on a link on a simulated phishing attack by the organisation and are prompted with 
training); improvements at follow-up are thought to be reflective of the training they receive. An 
issue with “real-world” studies is that once participants have been told they behaved insecurely 
and are then given training, they may perceive that they are being monitored by their 
organisation which in itself has been shown to influence security behaviour (D’Arcy & Greene, 
2014) therefore having a post-exposure expectancy effect and possibly inflating these studies 
findings. The current study demonstrated the benefits of a motivational program with training 
components in a lab-based setting on an email legitimacy task. Participants’ role play activity 
was the same at all three-time points in which they were told to look for phishing emails 
therefore not introducing a bias at follow-up. Other studies adopting lab-based approaches and 
training programs for phishing have not found an effect on subsequent behaviour (Davinson & 
Sillence, 2010).    
The study suggests that the combination of implementation intentions alongside the PMT 
intervention led to more sustained performance and heightened perceptions of response efficacy 
at T3 compared to those only receiving the PMT intervention. Those exposed to the PMT 
intervention in isolation had a significant reduction in their performance from T2 to T3 whereas 
for those who were exposed to implementation intentions-only, their performance remained 
stable compared to T2.  For response efficacy, those exposed to the PMT component had 
significant increases in perceptions but at differing time points. The PMT-only group had a 
significant improvement from baseline at post-exposure whereas the combined intervention had 
a significant improvement from baseline at one-week follow-up. Similar to objective 
performance, the group difference at T3 was only between the combined intervention and 
control group. The motivational component of the intervention improves objective performance 
and makes individuals believe that the behaviour is effective. Supplementing this with 
implementation intentions leads to sustainable effects at follow-up on objective performance 
and response efficacy beliefs.  
Research has suggested that, although motivated, people fail to enact behaviour due to poor 
self-regulation strategies (Abraham et al., 1998). Existing research (Vishwanath, 2015) has 
argued that phishing detection education may only work in the short-term as they fail to address 
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users email habits and as such, users fall back into their existing email routines. Implementation 
intentions help to bolster the effects of motivational interventions by helping people to enact the 
behaviour (Chatzisarantis et al., 2010; Hagger et al., 2012; Milne et al., 2002; Prestwich et al., 
2008). The participants in the current study identified critical situations where they perceived 
they would be unlikely to behave securely in emails and then identified plans to help them deal 
with these situations. There were no observed differences in self-report email security behaviour 
across conditions but the sustained performance and heightened response efficacy of those in 
the combined intervention may be due to the additive effects of the implementation intentions. 
People who form plans to help cope with situations are more likely to act in the intended way 
(Luszczynska & Schwarzer, 2003; Sniehotta, Schwarzer, Scholz, & Schüz, 2005). Critical 
situations help individuals identify situational cues that lead to poor behaviour, these cues were 
from situations that may lead employees to engage in habitual email behaviours but they may 
have also enhanced employees’ ability to identify deception indicators in emails and their 
beliefs in the effectiveness of checking that emails are genuine before clicking on links. So 
although they may not have led to enhanced self-report security behaviour the implementation 
intentions may have helped to sustain the effects of the PMT component and one aspect of their 
coping assessment (response efficacy).  
The use of the volitional help sheet also allowed commonly chosen critical situations and goal-
directed responses to be explored. The critical situations allowed an understanding of frequently 
faced barriers to checking email authenticity and the goal-directed responses indicated 
frequently chosen strategies to help deal with barriers to checking email authenticity. These 
findings are useful for businesses to understand how best to support their employees in 
preventing phishing emails as the goal-directed responses help to reduce habitual clicking of 
links in emails and thus, reducing the likelihood of a security breach occurring from a phishing 
email.  
The PMT intervention aimed to increase levels of self-efficacy and response efficacy and reduce 
levels of response costs as the previous study found these to influence intentions to engage in 
email security behaviour. Response efficacy was the only construct that showed a significant 
change as a result of the motivational interventions, suggesting that the response efficacy 
manipulation was effective in changing employees’ perceptions of the efficacy of email 
behaviours (being cautious with links and attachments in emails). This is somewhat supportive 
of studies that have used fear appeals and found changes in response efficacy following 
exposure (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010, 2015).  
A large body of literature focussing on fear appeals manipulations focuses on severity and 
susceptibility (Boss et al., 2015; Jenkins et al., 2013; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010, 2015). The 
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lack of manipulation of severity may account for the lack of change in threat appraisal (severity 
and susceptibility) and coping appraisal (response costs and self-efficacy) as it may have 
indirectly influenced levels of these constructs. The relationship between severity and security 
behaviours is unclear as some studies suggest it may have a direct role (Chenoweth et al., 2009; 
Gurung et al., 2009; Siponen et al., 2014; Vance et al., 2012) whereas others have indicated an 
indirect role (Herath & Rao, 2009b; Liang & Xue, 2010; Mwagwabi et al., 2014; Ng et al., 
2009). An indirect role suggests that it may moderate the effects of other PMT constructs. The 
current study chose not to focus on severity as it was found not to relate directly or indirectly to 
intention in Chapter 5 and existing reviews of fear appeals have found that severity is often the 
most visible component of appeals and the least persuasive (Ruiter, Kessels, Peters, & Kok, 
2014).  
Furthermore, studies have suggested that threatening information should be used with caution in 
persuasive communications (Ruiter, Verplanken, Kok, & Werrij, 2003) and that personally-
relevant information alone may be sufficient instead of vividly presenting severity information 
to promote behaviour (Brug & de Vries, 1999). Future research, therefore, needs to fully 
understand the role of severity and whether it is a necessary component of fear appeals in 
security.  
The PMT intervention was primarily focused on self-efficacy however it did not lead to 
significant improvements in self-report self-efficacy compared to those who only received goal-
setting or control. However, compared to control, the experimental conditions did have marginal 
increases in their levels of self-efficacy. This goes against existing studies that have designed 
PMT interventions which have led to increases in self-efficacy (Wirth et al., 2007). However, 
the lack of change could reflect that participants levels of perceived self-efficacy were high at 
baseline (combined mean= 3.85), which left little room for improvement. The current study 
used a 4-item measure of self-efficacy covering the main behaviour of interest. It may have been 
more beneficial to further break down the target behaviour and cover a range of the email 
security behaviours within the instrument to understand their self-efficacy in relation to other 
behaviours and allow more scope for potential change. This would be similar to the 32-item 
Computer Self-efficacy scale which covers many computer-related knowledge and skills 
(Murphy, Coover, & Owen, 1989). This would allow greater exploration of self-efficacy in 
relation to a range of email security behaviours and allow more scope for change.  
6.6.1 | LIMITATIONS 
The study found that participation in the intervention, regardless of condition, led to significant 
improvement in self-report email security behaviour. The lack of difference between conditions 
could reflect that those within the control group were exposed to phishing information in the 
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form of the email legitimacy task. While they were not given any feedback on their performance 
or exposed to any persuasive manipulations, simply participating and looking for deception 
indicators may have prompted awareness and motivated users to engage in more email security 
behaviours. To overcome this, an additional control group should have been included, who are 
not exposed to the email legitimacy task, to explore whether engagement in these tasks also 
promotes greater awareness and to help isolate the potential effects of the intervention.   
The main limitation of the current study was the lack of effective standardisation of the phishing 
tests, although efforts were made to control for such effects during data analyses, a much more 
effective approach would be to randomise the test items across participants and conditions in 
which the task difficulty would be balanced out.  
6.6.2 | FUTURE RESEARCH 
Experience was another factor that influenced the behaviour within the survey. The current 
study required participants to reflect on security experiences they may have encountered, 
however a more effective approach may have been to simulate a security breach to participants 
such as a desktop simulation of what could happen if they get malware onto their computer and 
shown how to recover, this would also enhance self-efficacy as past experiences is one of its 
sources.  
The training aspects of the programme could be improved by being more interactive. Research 
has shown games to be effective for improving participants’ phishing detection ability 
(Arachchilage, Love, & Scott, 2012; Sheng & Magnien, 2007). Interactivity could also be added 
to the motivational components as interactive PMT interventions have been shown to enhance 
their effectiveness (Vance et al., 2013).   
The present study acted as a pre-cursor to dissemination within an organisation and 
demonstrated some promising findings, however it was lab-based and further work is required 
to improve the potential behaviour change implications of the programme. Future research 
could evaluate it within the employment setting, where it could be disseminated across a larger 
sample and explore its effects over a longer period of time.  
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7 CHAPTER 7: OVERALL DISCUSSION 
 
This discussion considers the findings from the four research studies reported in this thesis and 
highlights contributions to the understanding and promotion of security behaviour in the 
workplace. The work is summarised in relation to the original research questions and objectives. 
The discussion will reflect on the literature discussed in Chapter 2 and consider how the work 
documented in this thesis has added to the knowledge of security behaviour and security 
behaviour change interventions. The implications of these findings will be discussed both in 
terms of the intervention and in the wider context of organisational behavioural security. 
Limitations of this research will also be presented. Furthermore, recommendations for research, 
as well as practice, will be suggested, and finally, considerations for future research will be 
explored.  
7.1 | RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Two research questions were devised based on existing behavioural information security 
research with the aim to develop and evaluate an intervention to improve the security behaviour 
of employees. These questions were explored using a mixed-method approach across four 
organisational studies: 
1. What influences and prevents different security behaviours in the workplace? 
2. Does a theoretically-grounded intervention using motivational and volitional 
approaches lead to and sustain security behaviour change? 
7.2 | RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The specific objectives of thesis were to: 
 examine internal and environmental factors that motivate the different behaviours 
contributing to information security compliance (Study 1 & Study 3, Chapter 3 & 5);  identify barriers to security behaviours and consider them within the organisational 
context (Study 1, Chapter 3);  develop a qualitatively-driven framework to explain how factors influence information 
security behaviours (Study 1, Chapter 3);  understand how employees appraise the sensitivity of work information by developing 
and validating a scale to measure this (Study 2, Chapter 4); 
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 explore an extended PMT-model (driven by the qualitative work and existing literature) 
to identify factors that influence three specific anti-malware behaviours (Study 3, 
Chapter 5);  use the findings from the extended model to inform the motivational component of a 
behaviour change intervention (Study 3 & 4, Chapter 5 & 6);  assess the feasibility of an intervention that combines motivational and volitional 
components to promote anti-malware behaviour (Study 3 & 4, Chapter 5 & 6). 
7.3 | WHAT INFLUENCES AND PREVENTS DIFFERENT SECURITY BEHAVIOUR 
IN THE WORKPLACE? 
The first research question aimed to understand what motivates and prevents security 
behaviours in the workplace by understanding the psychological principles behind employees’ 
motivations to undertake protective security actions. An over-reliance on an IS policy 
compliance paradigm has led to a limited understanding of what motivates individual security 
behaviours. This question aimed to identify key determinants of security behaviours using a 
mixed-methods approach accumulating in evidence to design the final intervention.  
7.3.1 | STUDY 1 (CHAPTER 3)  
Chapter 3 utilised framework analysis to analyse interviews with employees from two 
organisations to develop a qualitatively-driven framework to explain information security 
behaviours. The interviews explored factors from PMT and the TPB on behaviours that 
contribute to IS policy compliance. The analysis allowed an exploration of components from 
these models but also for new themes to emerge that were not accounted for from these a priori 
models. The analysis indicated that there were seven themes pertinent to how information 
security behaviours are influenced: Response Evaluation (response costs, perceived benefits and 
response efficacy), Threat Evaluation (threat models, severity, information sensitivity appraisal, 
and susceptibility), Knowledge (of security risks and protective actions), Experience (of security 
breaches and work experience), Security Responsibility, and Personal and Work Boundaries. 
The findings suggest that these differ by security behaviour and by the nature of the behaviour 
(i.e. on- and offline). An additional theme of security behaviour suggested three forms of 
security hygiene informed by protective behaviours and security citizenship.  Levels of 
psychological ownership and organisational citizenship behaviour did not differ between 
organisations. Some of the findings were consistent with previous research, such as security 
responsibility, which had been previously suggested by Dourish et al. (2004) who found that 
individuals delegate responsibility onto one of four sources: technology, individuals, 
organisations and institutions.  
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The findings led to the development of a thematic framework of security behaviour; the 
framework consisted mainly of internal factors suggesting that environmental factors may play 
less of a role in driving employees’ security behaviour. TPB (attitude and social pressures) 
components were not found to play a role in security behaviours so were not incorporated in the 
final framework. This framework was modified to an extended-PMT model based on findings 
from the qualitative study and the literature review, and explored in more depth in Chapter 5. 
The findings provided greater clarity to existing literature as an important finding of this study 
was that these influencing factors played differing roles for security behaviours. PMT was an 
adequate theory to study security behaviour but its components (threat and coping) may have 
differing influence depending on the security behaviour and security threat of interest. In threat 
evaluation, susceptibility perceptions were found to differ, with online security threats perceived 
as more likely than offline threats. Severity perceptions were found to divide into four groups of 
consequences: technology, personal, organisational, and third parties. Within response 
evaluation, response costs findings was supportive of existing research discussing the impact of 
costly security in the workplace (Beautement et al., 2009). The study suggested that employees 
consider cognitive, monetary and productivity costs but do not view all security behaviours to 
be equally costly. For example, they considered passwords to have high costs but locking the 
computer to have minimal costs. Response efficacy perceptions were found to be limited and a 
potential barrier to security behaviour since employees do not receive feedback or information 
regarding their security actions and the effectiveness of these efforts.  
A key finding was personal and work boundaries and its role in risky behaviour. Moreover, the 
role of previous job experience and security breach experiences was found to impact on current 
employees’ security behaviour. Another important finding was the support of the role of 
information sensitivity appraisal in line with existing research (Adams & Sasse, 1999). 
However there is lack of quantitative studies exploring its link to security behaviour and tools to 
measure it. This highlighted the need to explore its role quantitatively and design a scale to 
measure this.  
The study emphasised the limitations of using a compliance approach to understand security 
behaviour as the findings indicated that factors may play differing roles, a finding that was also 
confirmed in chapter 5 for anti-malware behaviours.  
7.3.2 | STUDY 2 (CHAPTER 4) 
Study 2 validated a new measure of information sensitivity in the workplace, confirming its 
relationship to security behaviour and assessed differences in sensitivity appraisal of different 
information types that employees may be exposed to in the workplace. The content, 
discriminant and criterion-related validity and reliability were assessed. A key contribution was 
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that the scale was found to comprise of five subscales; Privacy, Worth, Consequences, Low 
proximity interest by others and High proximity interest by others. The WISA scale, alongside 
its five subscales was found to have strong factorial validity that was confirmed across 8 target 
information types.  The scale was found to have strong content validity and good criterion-
related validity as it was found to significantly predict security behaviour. Finally, the scale was 
found to have adequate discriminant validity as 3 of the 5 aspects of the WISA scale were found 
to be unrelated to organisational citizenship behaviour. Of the information types, financial 
information was found to have the highest ratings for sensitivity followed by health and HR. 
They were also found to be the highest for 3 of the 5 sensitivity subscales, in particular, privacy, 
worth and consequences. Information about individuals (e.g. personal, health and lifestyle) was 
considered to be significantly of interest to employees’ high proximity interest groups (i.e. 
family and friends) in comparison to organisational-focussed information. For low proximity 
interest, the opposite effect was apparent with organisational-focussed information (e.g. IP, day 
to day, commercial) perceived to be of interest to low proximity groups (i.e. criminals, fellow 
employees & business competitors). Finally, the findings indicated that the more an individual 
works with an information type did not mean they rated the information any more sensitive than 
employees who did not work with the information. 
The study contributed a new scale to measure information sensitivity to be used in a workplace 
setting with components to understand what constitutes information sensitivity. The study also 
showed that sensitivity appraisal was able to predict a range of security behaviours including 
passwords, secure Wi-Fi usage, physical security and avoiding security risks. This demonstrates 
the potential role of information sensitivity appraisal as a determinant of protective actions in 
the workplace.  
The study also shed further light on how employees evaluate the sensitivity of workplace 
information. The qualitative study and the study by Adams and Sasse (1999) indicated that 
employees consider information about individuals as more sensitive than commercially 
sensitive company information. Moreover, study 3 was in line with this as health, financial and 
HR information were considered most sensitive but the study suggested that employees do 
consider some forms of organisational information to be sensitive, particularly those pertaining 
to intellectual property. However, their appraisal process for the sensitivity evaluation for this 
form of information differs compared to that relating to living individuals. Overall, the study 
contributes five components to understanding how employees appraise the sensitivity of 
information.  
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7.3.3 | STUDY 3 (CHAPTER 5) 
Study 3 confirmed that security behaviours are influenced by different factors by assessing an 
extended-PMT model based on findings from existing research and the qualitative study. Three 
anti-malware behaviours were explored: scanning USB sticks with anti-malware software 
(AMS security), installing software updates (SU security), and not clicking on suspicious links 
in emails (ES Security). The threat appraisal (severity and susceptibility) and coping appraisal 
(response costs, self-efficacy and response efficacy) of the original PMT model were explored. 
The model was extended to further include psychological ownership, security breach 
experience, organisational citizenship behaviour, responsibility and WISA. 
Revising PMT using regression analyses allowed additional factors to be added to the model to 
provide greater insight into the influencers of anti-malware behaviours and to identify which 
factors can explain more variance in the target behaviour. For AMS security it was found that 
self-efficacy, response efficacy, response costs, WISA (consequences) and responsibility 
significantly predicted motivations to scan USB sticks for malware. For SU security it was 
found that, response efficacy, response costs, susceptibility and responsibility significantly 
predicted motivations to install software updates when prompted by devices. Finally, for ES 
security it was found that, self-efficacy, response costs, susceptibility and security breach 
experience at work were found to significantly predicted motivations to not click on links in 
suspicious emails. Response efficacy was partially supported for one of the two analyses. All 
revised models were found to be a good fit to the sampled data for four of the five fit indices 
using SEM. 
Response costs were one of the only factors to relate to all three anti-malware behaviours. 
Employees who perceive that anti-malware behaviours have low costs (such as productivity, 
effort and time) are more likely to intend to perform the behaviours, suggesting that (high) costs 
are a potential barrier to security behaviour.  These findings are in line with other research 
(Beautement et al., 2009; Chenoweth et al., 2009; Liang & Xue, 2010) and the qualitative study 
that found response costs prevented some security behaviours.  
Response efficacy was also shown to relate to all three behaviours. Understanding the 
effectiveness of security actions is a key influencer of motivation to follow anti-malware 
security. Response efficacy has been regarded as one of the worst predictors of compliance and 
IS misuse in the workplace (Sommestad et al., 2014). Response efficacy is important for driving 
security behaviour; if employees understand the effectiveness of anti-malware behaviours for 
reducing security threats, they are more likely to undertake security actions. This finding is 
consistent with the qualitative study that also found that response efficacy was a barrier 
inhibiting security behaviours. The lack of support for response efficacy in IS policy research is 
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due to the abstraction issue of requiring employees to evaluate the effectiveness of overall 
information security efforts, rather than focusing on specific behaviours. When investigating 
specific behaviours, response efficacy is a key driver such as anti-malware behaviours as 
studied in this thesis.  Study 1 and study 3 showed that low response efficacy is a barrier to 
security behaviour while study 4 showed that this barrier to security behaviour can be removed 
through a motivational intervention to increase perceptions of response efficacy. This effect can 
also be sustained at 1-week follow-up through a combined intervention with implementation 
intentions. The combined findings from study 1, 3 and 4 demonstrate that response efficacy is a 
barrier to security behaviour uptake, a key driver of motivation to perform three anti-malware 
behaviours and can be enhanced through motivational interventions and sustained through 
implementation intentions. Response efficacy is, therefore, an important factor of security 
behaviour.  
Self-efficacy was shown to be the strongest predictor for two of the behaviours but did not 
relate to the software update behaviour, suggesting that employees’ beliefs in their capabilities 
are not important for all behaviours. The importance of self-efficacy is well-documented in 
security research and, study 3 suggested that for some behaviours that require little input from 
the user (such as responding to dialog boxes to install updates), it plays little role compared to 
other factors. The qualitative study did not find self-efficacy to be important which was 
attributed to the difficulties of investigating the construct qualitatively. However, study 3 
showed that it plays a significant determining role for some behaviours that require input and 
skill from the user.  
Perceptions of the severity of consequences arising from malware were not found to relate to 
any of the behaviours. This does not support a wealth of research that suggests it has a key role 
in security behaviour.  This finding was also consistent across its four components that were 
explored in relation to the behaviours that were driven from the qualitative study. Susceptibility, 
on the other hand, had a complicated role. It was a significant predictor of software update 
intention and the cookie acceptance task, but a significant negative predictor for the email 
security behaviour. The findings suggest that threat evaluation may not play as important a role 
as coping evaluation for security behaviours specifically - anti-malware behaviour.  
Study 1 suggested that employees appraise the sensitivity of the information they work with and 
use this judgement to assess whether it needs protection. In study 2, this was further explored by 
developing the WISA scale, which has been shown predict a range of security behaviours. 
Study 3 further explored its role for anti-malware behaviours and found that one component 
predicted the AMS behaviour (WISA – consequences). This suggests that the information 
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sensitivity appraisal may be more important for some security behaviours (e.g. access control) 
than other protective behaviours (e.g. anti-malware).  
Responsibility, a theme that emerged from the qualitative study, was found to be important for 
anti-malware. Individuals with higher perceptions of personal responsibility for security had 
greater motivation to undertake anti-malware actions (AMS and SU). A sense of personal 
responsibility supports the qualitative study and existing research exploring personal 
responsibility in consumers (Boehmer et al., 2015; LaRose, Rifon, & Enbody, 2008). The thesis 
thus showed the importance of a sense of personal responsibility for security behaviour in the 
workplace setting.   
Psychological ownership and OCB were investigated as two potentially important factors that 
may influence security behaviour but had received little attention in previous literature. Study 1 
explored potential differences in the factors between the two recruited companies and found no 
significant differences in levels between employees. Study 3 sought to explore their direct 
influence on anti-malware behaviours and found they did not significantly predict any of these.  
Taken together, the three studies address the research question by identifying a number of 
factors that influence and prevent a range of security behaviours to develop an extended-PMT 
framework. A specific factor was then explored in-depth (information sensitivity) and the 
extended model was investigated with a specific subset of behaviours (i.e. anti-malware), to 
identify their key determinants.   
7.4 | DOES A THEORETICALLY-GROUNDED INTERVENTION USING 
MOTIVATIONAL AND VOLITIONAL APPROACHES LEAD TO AND 
SUSTAIN SECURITY BEHAVIOUR CHANGE? 
The second research question aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of an intervention to improve 
anti-malware behaviour. A lack of theory-based interventions with experimental validation has 
led to a limited understanding of how to promote and sustain behaviour change for security in 
the workplace. Study 4 sought to design, deliver and evaluate an intervention with motivational 
and volitional components.  
7.4.1 | STUDY 4 (CHAPTER 6) 
This study tested the intervention to increase the email security behaviour of employees in 
relation to malware mitigation. The motivational component of the intervention was driven by 
the findings of study 3 and the volitional component aimed to translate motivation into actual 
behaviour change through the use of implementation intentions. The motivational component 
primarily focussed on improving self-efficacy but also utilised security breach experience at 
work, susceptibility, response costs and response efficacy. The study looked at the effects of the 
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intervention on improving performance on an email legitimacy task, self-reported email and 
secondary security behaviour and enhancing levels of threat and response evaluation.  
The study found that those exposed to the motivational intervention either alone or in 
combination with implementation intentions had significantly better task performance compared 
to the control group post-exposure. The combined intervention had sustained performance 
compared to control at 1-week follow-up but there was a significant reduction in performance 
for the motivational-only group.  This suggests that the motivational intervention alongside the 
goal setting lead to sustained performance at 1-week follow-up compared to a control group. 
Further analyses revealed that these observed differences were for participants’ overall accuracy 
in detecting genuine and phishing emails and approaching significance for participants’ genuine 
precision detection ability but no effect on phishing precision ability. The study found no effect 
of the intervention on self-reported email security behaviour. The study found that there was 
significant improvement in some components of threat and coping appraisal perceptions 
regardless of condition. Response efficacy was the only factor to significantly change as a result 
of the intervention in which the combined and motivational-only group had a significant 
increase in their perceptions of response efficacy.  
Furthermore, there was no self-reported change in any other threat or coping appraisal 
constructs. Other research using fear appeals has found changes in severity, susceptibility, self-
efficacy and response efficacy (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010, 2015). However, these studies 
were exploring different behaviours (e.g. data backups and password theft), which may suggest 
that motivational behaviour change approaches may be more appropriate for some behaviours 
than others.  
The study supports existing research using self-efficacy based principles to enhance security 
behaviour (Shillair et al., 2015; Waddell et al., 2014), and anti-phishing training (Kumaraguru et 
al., 2009; Sheng & Magnien, 2007). However, this is the first study to demonstrate the effects of 
supplementing motivational interventions with volitional strategies to promote security 
behaviour and found they helped sustain behaviour change at 1-week follow-up. This effect is 
supportive of other research in non-security domains that has bridged the intention-behaviour 
gap with implementation intentions (Chatzisarantis et al., 2010; Hagger et al., 2012; Milne et 
al., 2002; Prestwich et al., 2008).  
However, the study found an increase in self-reported email behaviour and secondary security 
behaviours across time points independent of condition. The intervention was only successful in 
changing objective performance due to the limitations of self-report measures. The lack of a 
specific effect on self-reported behaviour is supportive of other phishing training studies that 
have found that intervention exposure, regardless of condition manipulation, leads to greater 
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intentions and self-report (Davinson & Sillence, 2010). This is line with the self-prophecy effect 
in which, simply asking individuals whether they intend to act in a desirable way is enough to 
increase the likelihood that they will (Sprott, Spangenberg, & Fisher, 2003). This highlights the 
importance of combining objective and subjective reports of behaviour.  
Overall, the study demonstrates promising findings for combining motivational and volitional 
approaches to changing security behaviour. However, the study did not find a change in self-
reported email security behaviour, enhancing threat and coping appraisal (except response 
efficacy) or additional effects on secondary security behaviour. There were only changes in 
performance on an email legitimacy task; the objective behavioural measure. Objective 
performance measures are considered a more reliable source of actual behavioural measures 
than self-report measures (Bommer, Johnson, Rich, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 1995) as they are 
not subject to social desirability bias. 
In relation to the second research question, the study demonstrated the benefits of grounding the 
intervention design in findings from the target population and based on behaviour change best 
practice. The study also benefitted from adopting a RCT design to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the intervention, highlighting the benefits of using best practice to inform the design, delivery 
and evaluation of behavioural information security efforts. The study is also one of the first to 
focus on email security behaviour change to prevent malware; most existing approaches largely 
focus on detecting phishing emails to preventing accidental information disclosure.  
7.5 | THESIS IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis has designed and tested a motivational and volitional intervention based on the 
findings from studies with the target population. This resulted in an intervention that is short, 
low-cost and easy to disseminate. The implications of this thesis are far reaching and discussed 
in respect to research and practice.  
7.5.1 | RESEARCH 
As outlined in Chapter 2, existing research has largely conceptualised and addressed security 
behaviour in the workplace as “compliance with the IS policy”. This thesis has shown that 
specific security behaviours are motivated by different factors and that behaviours need to be 
studied separately. The findings of the qualitative study resulted in an extended PMT-model that 
can be used to study security behaviour. Here, the extended model was examined for anti-
malware behaviours in which it was shown that factors played differing roles. The results from 
Chapter 5 have led to revised models that can be used to promote the specific anti-malware 
behaviours.  Research would benefit from focussing on specific security behaviours in an 
employment sample rather than using a compliance paradigm; this would provide the greatest 
benefit to the behavioural information security domain. This is only the start as the influencers 
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of each behaviour need to be explored independently and their relationships to behaviours 
understood prior to intervention - a process illustrated in this thesis.   
The thesis showed the benefit of a theory-based intervention evaluated with experimental 
methodologies. The approach outlined in this thesis, based on best practice from behaviour 
change literature, would provide a useful basis for other longitudinal projects exploring 
behaviour change for security.  
Threat evaluation is comprised of severity and susceptibility perceptions. The thesis provided 
greater insight into threat evaluation and found a complicated role. Chapter 3 showed that 
susceptibility perceptions are different depending on whether there was an online or offline 
threat. This is important to acknowledge when exploring online and offline security behaviours 
as information security practice in the workplace relies on both types of behaviours. As 
indicated by the qualitative data, employees perceive offline threats to be less likely and more 
opportunistic so it is important to acknowledge this distinction. Susceptibility was found to 
drive three behaviours (the software update behaviour, email security behaviour and cookie 
acceptance task) rather than severity of consequences. The qualitative study suggested that 
severity perceptions fall into different domains, and this factorial structure of severity was 
validated and further explored in Chapter 5. It found that employees consider organisational, 
personal, productivity and general consequence severity. None of these components were found 
to relate to anti-malware behaviours, suggesting that fear of the consequences of malware 
threats plays little role in driving behaviours but rather it is the perceived likelihood of getting 
malware that is more important. However, research may benefit from further exploring severity 
components with other security threats and behaviours.  
The thesis showed the benefits of a motivational and volitional intervention. Implementation 
intentions and goal setting for bridging the intention-behaviour gap has been relatively 
understudied in security. The findings provide promising results for their utility in driving 
security behaviour so more focus is needed on volitional behaviour change.  
The thesis also added to the growing body of research that extends or combines existing 
behavioural models in security (e.g. Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b; Ifinedo, 2011). The current 
study highlights the need for behavioural models that are specific to security. PMT was found to 
be useful in guiding the qualitative study and its findings. However, the threat appraisal 
component was found to have differing effects on security behaviour. In particular, severity was 
found not to relate to anti-malware behaviour and susceptibility was found to have significant 
relationships but with opposing effects. This highlights the need to validate behavioural models 
and modify them according to the behaviour and population under investigation.    
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7.5.2 | PRACTICE  
The thesis showed response efficacy plays an important role in security behaviour and is a 
potential barrier to behaviour but can be improved through motivational interventions.  These 
combined finding suggests a number of implications for information security practice. 
More work is needed on improving the feedback link between behaviour and result. The thesis 
achieved this by emphasising the effectiveness of an anti-malware behaviour and providing 
participants with feedback on their performance. However, some practical implications could 
improve this feedback link. Feedback and/or positive reinforcement needs to be provided to 
users on their security behaviour. Systems sometimes provide information on their employees’ 
reactive behaviour (e.g. weak password or non-updated system) but more attention needs to be 
given to providing feedback on their proactive security. In doing so, employees’ perceptions of 
response efficacy may increase. Furthermore, management in organisations need to provide 
employees with feedback on their information security efforts; this could be tied in with 
employees’ performance appraisal process or a regular report on their security behaviour. 
Presently, information security behaviours are given little attention in employees’ job 
performance.  
Perceived responsibility is also important for driving behaviour; organisations could focus on 
empowering responsibility in employees. Research has shown the benefits of enhancing 
responsibility perceptions in end-users (Boehmer et al., 2015; Shillair et al., 2015). 
Communicating to employees their personal responsibility and shared responsibilities for 
security actions may, therefore, help to enhance security behaviour.  
The findings of the thesis indicated that for anti-malware behaviours, a focus on coping 
appraisal may be more appropriate rather than threat appraisal. Coping appraisal components 
were more consistently related to the behaviours. Efforts may, therefore, benefit from focussing 
more on equipping users with a sense of ability (self-efficacy), understanding of effectiveness 
(response efficacy) and reducing the perceived costs associated with security (response costs). 
Presently, attention is often given to fear appeals or scare tactics by highlighting all the losses 
associated with a risk, but the findings of the thesis suggest that for anti-malware behaviours, a 
focus on coping appraisal may be more appropriate.  
It is important to consider the costly nature of security. While the qualitative study suggested 
that not all behaviours are perceived to be costly by employees, the survey indicated that high 
response costs will inhibit anti-malware behaviours. Attempts should be made to understand 
costs (such as effort and productivity) associated with specific security behaviours and, where 
possible, diminishing the cost for the employees through better system design, more usable 
policies or communicating the benefits vs. the costs towards the employee. 
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7.5.3 | PROCEDURE FOR INFORMATION SECURITY INTERVENTIONS IN THE 
WORKPLACE 
Organisations need to move away from considering IS policy compliance as the basis of their 
employees’ behaviour. Instead, organisations should consider the important subset of 
behaviours in their policy, and target these appropriately in intervention efforts by considering 
what motivates and prevents them. The multi-stage process adopted in this thesis can also be 
used in organisational IS practice.  Below is a recommended process for identifying specific 
security behaviours, modifying interventions and evaluating their utility in the workplace. This 
process should be followed by intervention designers to further develop interventions in the 
workplace.  
 
Figure 35. Process chart for security behaviour interventions in the workplace 
Baseline measures 
First, create user profiles for baseline security behaviour for all staff from objective and self-
report measures where possible. This is to be used for identifying users requiring security 
intervention and to evaluate intervention success.   
 
 
Step 1: Identify 
insecure behaviours  
Step 2: Identify key 
influencers of single 
or sub-set of secure 
behaviours 
Step 3: Adjust 
intervention content 
to suit population 
and security 
behaviour  
Step 4: Pilot 
intervention 
Step 5: Disseminate 
intervention across 
company  
Step 6: Evaluate 
intervention impact 
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Step 1: Identify insecure behaviours 
Prior to intervention, it is necessary to identify specific problematic behaviours within the 
organisation and measure this appropriately. Where possible these should be identified using 
objective data from systems such password logs. However, organisations could also gather data 
from their organisations using surveys or interviews to identify poorly performed security 
behaviours. 
Step 2: Identify key influencers of secure behaviours 
On identifying the specific security behaviours of interest, the extended-PMT model can be 
used to identify the key influencers of the behaviour. This can be achieved by surveying a 
portion of the workplace and matching participant data with objective or self-reports of their 
security behaviour.    
Step 3: Adjust intervention content to suit population and security behaviour  
The key influencers identified from step 2 can be targeted in a motivational intervention, 
focussing on those that influence the behaviour the most. If the behaviour is habitual and open 
to volitional control, implementation intentions can be used to help translate intentions into 
actual behaviour.  If the behaviour is not habitual, the motivational intervention can be used in 
isolation.  
Step 4: Pilot intervention  
Upon development of the intervention, it then needs to be piloted with employees to assess 
whether it leads to behaviour change. Conduct a formative evaluation of the intervention with 
target users through evaluation of the content, objectives and ease of use of the intervention.  
Step 5: Disseminate intervention across company 
Identify users from profiles who currently do not engage in desired behaviours and randomly 
allocate to conditions in step 6. 
Step 6: Evaluate intervention impact 
Conduct a summative evaluation of the intervention by assessing the extent to which behaviour 
has changed as a result of the intervention. This can be best assessed by adopting principles of 
RCTs to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention with an experimental and control 
conditions. The control condition could be a waiting list of users who will receive the 
intervention following evaluation. The use of RCT will identify whether a change in behaviour 
results from the intervention; this is achieved through comparison to baseline behaviour (from 
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user profiles).  Effective evaluation will measure behaviour at multiple time points that include 
immediately after exposure to the intervention and at a follow-up interval (e.g. 1 month later) 
On completion, continually monitor and gain feedback on the intervention to identify lessons 
learnt for future interventions and then repeat the process for other security behaviours.  
7.6 | LIMITATIONS 
The thesis has contributed novel and useful findings but some limitations need to be 
acknowledged. The final intervention acted as a feasibility study however its final sample was 
relatively small and would benefit from further testing with a larger sample. This should not 
detract from the significant results in the study with the target population.  
Within behavioural information security, there is a lack of validated instruments for a number of 
constructs investigated in this thesis. Where possible, the self-report measures of the thesis were 
taken from existing studies or adapted from existing tools in other domains such as health. It 
should be recognised that these adapted instruments have not undergone validity assessment for 
security but were assessed for reliability. Validity is important as it legitimises the content of the 
tools ensuring that what is perceived to be measured is actually being measured. Attempts were 
made to overcome this limitation by using previously validated instruments from non-security 
domains but caution should be taken as these may not be entirely appropriate for non-health 
domains such as security.  
The thesis relied on self-report measures of security behaviour in study 3 and study 4. Self-
report measures are open to social desirability bias; individuals may report what they think they 
should be doing rather than their actual behaviour. The intervention may have raised 
individuals’ awareness of what they should be doing, rather than creating an actual change in 
their behaviour. The lack of significant result for self-report email security behaviour may have 
resulted from this as there was an increase in all participants regardless of condition. The 
intervention tried to overcome issues of self-report by including an objective performance task, 
in which behaviour change was actually observed. Study 3 relied on self-report measures on 
behaviour as objective measures were not available. Future research would benefit from 
approaches such as that by Workman et al. (2008) who used computer logs as indicators of 
actual behaviour. Methods such as these remove limitations of self-report bias and allow more 
precise measurement of the influence of determinants on behaviour (rather than relying on 
intention as a proximate indicator).  
7.7 | FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter has touched on some areas for future research, namely, investigating the 
complicated role of threat perception for different security threats and behaviours and more 
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focus on the role of volition in behaviour change efforts.  However, there are additional 
directions that future research could take.  
Chapter 3 identified factors that may influence security behaviour. However, not all factors 
were explored in later studies. Namely, personal and work boundaries were identified as a factor 
that may play a role in risky behaviour. Future research could explore this boundary in more 
depth with quantitative methods to explore whether weak boundaries are more correlated with 
risky behaviour. 
Chapter 4 developed and validated the WISA scale driven by the findings of Chapter 3, and 
showed that it predicted a range of security behaviours. Chapter 5 showed that only one 
component of the scale was important for AMS security behaviours. Informed by Chapter 4, the 
scale had better predictive value for access control behaviour. Further exploration of the scale in 
relation to this form of security behaviour is needed as information sensitivity appraisal may be 
more important for behaviours that are more directly related to information control. 
Additionally, further validation of the scale is required to enhance its potential utility in the IS 
domain. 
This thesis explored the extended-PMT framework for anti-malware behaviours; future research 
should explore the model for other security threats and behaviours. There is a lack of research 
systematically exploring specific security behaviours in an employment sample, so the current 
thesis provides a promising baseline for further research to examine the model’s utility for other 
security threats.  
Further work is also needed to explore factors longitudinally. This thesis demonstrated the 
benefits of exploring response efficacy qualitatively, then through regression analysis to identify 
its influence on behaviour, and using experimental manipulations to enhance the factor.  More 
work needs to be done like this for other security behaviours and behavioural determinants.  
Finally, the intervention could be further enhanced by incorporating other principles from 
behaviour change practice such as individually-tailored communications. In particular matching 
the intervention to an individual’s stage of change is effective in helping participants transition 
through change and lead to more sustainable behaviour change (Velicer, Prochaska, & Redding, 
2006). A participant’s current stage of change has also been shown to moderate the 
effectiveness of implementation intentions with greater effectiveness for the preparation stage 
compared to pre-contemplation and contemplation stages (Armitage & Arden, 2008). 
Individually tailoring the intervention to the employee may therefore further enhance its 
effectiveness.  
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7.8 | FINAL CONCLUSION  
This thesis has presented an understanding of what motivates and prevents security behaviour in 
the workplace. The main aim to develop and evaluate an intervention to improve the security 
behaviour of employees has been achieved. The influencers of security behaviour in the 
workplace were identified and then explored more specifically for three anti-malware 
behaviours. This has identified potential barriers to employees’ uptake of protective security 
actions. Furthermore, a new scale has been developed that allows measurement of employees’ 
information sensitivity appraisal. Implementation intentions have been successfully applied to 
supplement a motivational approach to improve and sustain performance on an email legitimacy 
task. In doing so, the thesis has highlighted the benefits of using volitional approaches to 
enhance security behaviour.  Organisations are persistently targeted by security threats putting 
their employees and information assets at increasing risk; incorporating the findings from this 
thesis into future research and practice will help enhance the human defence of information 
security.  
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8 APPENDICES 
 
8.1 | APPENDIX A: OCB SCALE  
Please use the 7-point scale to indicate how often you engage in the following behaviours in 
your workplace. Please read each statement carefully, and then select the response from the 
rating scale.    
 Never  Very 
Rarely  
Rarely  Sometimes Often Very 
Often 
Always 
I attend functions that are not 
required but that help the 
organisational image  
              
I keep up with developments in 
the organisation                
I defend the organisation when 
other employees criticise it                
I show pride when representing 
the organisation in public                
I offer ideas to improve the 
functioning of the organisation                
I express loyalty toward the 
organisation                
I take action to protect the 
organisation from potential 
problems  
              
I demonstrate concern about the 
image of the organisation                
8.2 | APPENDIX B : PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP ITEMS 
Please use the 6-point scale to answer the following questions. Please read each statement 
carefully, and then select the response from the rating scale 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
I feel a high degree of 
ownership for the device              
I feel a high degree of 
ownership for the data stored 
on the device  
            
I feel as though the device is 
MINE              
I feel as though the data on 
the  device is MINE              
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8.3 | APPENDIX C : SECURITY BEHAVIOURAL CATEGORIES AND EXAMPLE 
VIGNETTES 
Category Description Vignette 
Remote 
working 
Actions for working 
on mobile devices and 
in external locations 
Miles is a merchandiser for a large menswear store and constantly travels to other stores 
within the local area.  One of the benefits of Miles's job is that he is given a company 
laptop as he is constantly mobile. Miles has a 15 year old daughter, who he lets use his 
laptop when he doesn't need it as his laptop is of much better quality than his daughter's 
PC. Mile's daughter uses the laptop for playing computer games, however she often 
disables the anti-virus software as it slows down her favourite game. 
Removable 
media 
Portable storage 
devices that can be 
connected to and 
removed from a 
computer (e.g. USB 
sticks) 
Mary works as a Lecturer at the local university, she has an important presentation at a 
national conference in London, 300 miles away from her home. Due to the long train 
journey and therefore intermittent internet connection, Mary decides to store her work 
on a USB stick so that she can continue working on the train from her laptop. The 
documents stored on the device include assignment results, presentation notes and an 
excel document listing the names and addresses of the students enrolled on one of her 
classes. After exiting the train and arriving at the conference location, she realizes that 
she has lost the USB stick. 
User access 
management 
How access controls 
are allocated and 
managed e.g. 
passwords 
Matthew is staying late to work on an important assignment which is due the next day, 
Matthew has limited security access to confidential information stored on a company 
password-protected server but he requires a certain document to finish this report. 
Normally, Matthew would have to get authorization from the information owner who 
accesses the file for Matthew but instead the owner gave Matthew their password to 
access the server so that he could do it himself.   
Prevention 
of malicious 
software 
Actions to prevent 
malicious software 
The updates for the anti-virus on Laura's work computer are controlled by her 
organization; however she has to occasionally restart her computer to allow the updates 
to install. Laura is regularly prompted by the anti-virus software to restart the computer 
however Laura keeps postponing this task as she is too busy to wait for her computer to 
restart and for her to re-open the documents she was working on. 
Breaches of 
security 
Steps for recovering 
and reporting security 
incidences 
Chris is about to go on a two weeks holiday from work and on his last day his computer 
starts acting strangely. For example, the cursor on his computer screen would start to 
move around on its own and new files would appear on his desktop. Chris only realizes 
that something peculiar is going on later that day, rather than reporting it to IT, he 
decides to switch off his computer and deal with the issue on his return. 
Physical 
security 
Strategies to 
physically protect 
infrastructures, 
information and 
information resources 
Kimberley works as a secretary in a busy open plan office. Kimberley's work computer 
has access to a number of highly confidential documents. She is normally stationed at 
her desk however at lunch she leaves to have her break in the staff room. During this 
time, Kimberley leaves her computer unlocked. 
Information 
control 
Responsibility in 
protection, storage and 
processing of 
information 
Lee is disposing of old records which contain sensitive information about clients. His 
office has two bins for disposing of waste: one for confidential waste and the other for 
general waste. The confidential waste bin is full so Lee puts the old records in the 
general waste bin. 
Software & 
Systems 
Software and system 
acquisition, 
installation and 
maintenance 
Anna requires the latest photo editing software for one of her work tasks, the department 
has no budget to purchase any new software, however Anna knows a website where she 
can download an unofficial version of the software. Her work computer allows Anna to 
download and install it. 
Acceptable 
usage 
Appropriate usage of 
information systems, 
email and the internet 
Beth is a call centre employee and during her work breaks she uses her work computer 
for personal use. She has just booked a holiday to Tenerife which required her to enter 
her personal information and credit card details. 
Continuity 
planning 
Outlines prevention 
and recovery from 
internal and external 
threats 
Michelle’s work computer is run by Windows Vista, however she prefers to use her own 
personal laptop which has Windows 8 installed as its operating system.  She brings her 
laptop into work on a daily basis and does all her work tasks on her laptop.  However, 
Michelle does not back up the data that is stored on her personal laptop.  
Compliance 
with 
legislation 
Compliance to 
legislation acts such as 
the Data Protection 
Act (1998) 
Sam is a medical doctor and part of this job role requires him to write notes about 
patients during his sessions which contain sensitive and personal information that is 
covered under the DPA (1998). Sam often leaves his notes on his desk in his office.  
Whilst Sam has an office to himself, other staff such as the cleaners can gain access 
when required. 
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8.4 | APPENDIX D : FULL INTERVIEW GUIDE AND PROCEDURE  
 
Interview opening: 
 Focus of session explained to participant   Participant provided with an information sheet  and informed consent granted from participant  Emphasize that participants responses will not be shared with their management/company 
 
Participant to complete demographic questionnaire 
For each topic area for the policy categories: 
 Provide description of category (e.g. for user access management - Businesses have a number of computer 
systems to store and process data which employees use. Users have to identify themselves with a user ID 
and a password to gain access. Employees may have restrictions on their user access to both computer and 
information)  Present participant with vignette   Ask participant to imagine, drawing on his or her own experience, how they would react in that scenario  Optional questions 
o What advice would you give? / What should they (the character) be doing to protect themselves? 
<Researcher to then go back to the topic area> 
 Within your workplace, how do you maintain security when/with <topic area>  Which security behaviours do you perform? / How do you ensure data security?  What security behaviours do you not perform? / What do you find difficult to do? 
For behaviours discussed by participants, the following elicitation questions were used: 
Determinant Example elicitation questions 
Self-efficacy If you want to perform these behaviours, how certain are you that you can? 
Experiential Attitude What do you like/dislike about these behaviours? 
Instrumental Attitude What are the advantages and disadvantages of performing these behaviours? 
Social pressures Who would encourage/ discourage you to perform these behaviours? 
Response efficacy How effective do you think these behaviours are in reducing threats and why? 
Response cost What are the costs in terms of monetary, time and effort in performing these 
behaviours? 
Perceived susceptibility How vulnerable to a threat are you by not performing these behaviours? 
Perceived severity What are the potential consequences of not performing these behaviours? 
 
Closing questions 
 Anything else that you feel you contribute to security that hasn’t been discussed?  What are the top three security behaviours you think are most important? 
 
<Participant provided with debrief sheet and thanked for their participation> 
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8.5 | APPENDIX E: STUDY 2 – ORGANISATION SECTOR DEMOGRAPHICS 
Table 50. Study 2: Organisational sectors from recruited sample 
Organisational Sector Percentage of participants from sector 
Accountancy and business services 1% 
Advertising, marketing and PR 2% 
Armed forces and emergency services 1% 
Banking, investment and insurance 0% 
Charity and development work 1% 
Creative arts 1% 
Education 37% 
Energy and utilities 1% 
Engineering 2% 
Government and public administration 3% 
Health 12% 
Hospitality 7% 
Human resources and recruitment 2% 
Information technology 5% 
Legal services 1% 
Manufacturing 1% 
Media 2% 
Property 0% 
Retail 10% 
Science 3% 
Social care 2% 
Sport and leisure 1% 
Tourism 0% 
Transport and logistics 0% 
Telecommunications 1% 
Research 1% 
Other (Unclassified) 3% 
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8.6 | APPENDIX F: KNOWLEDGE OF ORGANISATIONAL AND LEGAL 
REGULATIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
< information type>   Personal information about other people (e.g. address, gender, date of birth, marital 
status)  Health information about other people (e.g. physical and mental health history, weight, 
family medical history)  Lifestyle information about other people (e.g. shopping habits, hobbies, interests)  Financial information about other people (e.g. banking details, credit rating, loan 
history)  Information about or relating to intellectual property (e.g. trade secrets, creative ideas 
that could lead to patents, copyrights, new products)  Day-to-day business operation information (e.g. current customer & supplier details, 
quotes, purchase history, call records)  Commercial business information (e.g. strategic plans, financial business data)  Personnel / HR information (e.g. appraisal, disciplinary info, salary, sickness records) 
 
I think < information type>  is: 
 Yes  No  I Don't Know  
publicly available outside of my organisation        
access restricted by my organisation        
regulated by law         
 
  
Instructions 
The following statements consider what you know about the availability of the information and 
how it is regulated. 
Read each statement carefully and select the appropriate response. If you cannot answer the 
question, please select the option ‘don’t know’. 
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8.7 | APPENDIX G: FINAL WISA SCALE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
< information type>   Personal information about other people (e.g. address, gender, date of birth, marital 
status)  Health information about other people (e.g. physical and mental health history, weight, 
family medical history)  Lifestyle information about other people (e.g. shopping habits, hobbies, interests)  Financial information about other people (e.g. banking details, credit rating, loan 
history)  Information about or relating to intellectual property (e.g. trade secrets, creative ideas 
that could lead to patents, copyrights, new products)  Day-to-day business operation information (e.g. current customer & supplier details, 
quotes, purchase history, call records)  Commercial business information (e.g. strategic plans, financial business data)  Personnel / HR information (e.g. appraisal, disciplinary info, salary, sickness records) 
 
I think < information type>  is... 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
secret            
private            
insignificant            
humiliating            
of interest to fellow 
employees            
privileged            
meaningless            
worthless            
of interest to business 
competitors            
of interest to criminals            
embarrassing            
discreditable            
confidential            
of interest to my family            
of interest to my friends            
restricted            
compromising            
Instructions 
The following statements are about different types of information that may be stored by your 
organisation. 
 
Read each statement carefully and please rate the extent to which you agree with the 
statements using a rating scale from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'.” 
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8.8 | APPENDIX H: STORAGE AND PROCESSING OF INFORMATION  
How regularly do you use a computer as part of your daily work tasks? 
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes Often  Always  
Personal information about other people (e.g. address, 
gender, date of birth, marital status)           
Health information about other people (e.g. physical and 
mental health history, weight, family medical history)           
Lifestyle information about other people (e.g. shopping 
habits, hobbies, interests)           
Financial information about other people (e.g. banking 
details, credit rating, loan history)           
Information about or relating to intellectual property 
(e.g. trade secrets, creative ideas that could lead to 
patents, copyrights, new products) 
          
Day-to-day business operation information (e.g. current 
customer & supplier details, quotes, purchase history, 
call records) 
          
Commercial business information (e.g. strategic plans, 
financial business data)           
Personnel / HR information (e.g. appraisal, disciplinary 
info, salary, sickness records)           
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8.9 | APPENDIX I: SECURITY BEHAVIOUR ITEMS 
For the following questions think about how you behave within the workplace and rate how 
regularly you do the following behaviours 
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Often  Always 
I share passwords with other people at work            
I use complex passwords at work            
I use different passwords for  different work accounts            
I personally run the security software including anti-
virus, anti-spyware and firewalls at work            
I ensure I run the latest and official version of software 
(including operating system) at work            
I personally scan work devices for available software 
updates and install them at work            
I log out of websites when I finish at work            
I use trusted and secured connections, and devices 
(including Wi-Fi) when at work            
I use trusted and secure websites and services at work 
and connect securely            
I stay informed about security risks online and in the 
workplace            
I avoid security risks online and in the workplace            
I am aware of my physical surroundings when online at 
work            
I report suspicious or criminal activities in the 
workplace            
I personally back up data stored on my workplace 
devices            
I adjust account settings on websites that I use at work            
I lock my computer when I leave my workstation            
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8.10 | APPENDIX J: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
What is your gender?  Male   Female   Prefer not to say  
 
What is your age? 
_____________ 
 
Do you have managerial responsibilities?  Yes   No  
Are you responsible for data protection in your organisation?  Yes   No  
 
How long have you worked for your company? 
In years: ____________ 
and months: _________ 
 
How long have you worked in your current position? 
In years: ____________ 
and months: _________ 
 
Is your organisation:  A micro enterprise (less than 10 staff)   A small enterprise (less than 50 staff)   A medium-sized enterprise (less than 250 staff)   A large organisation (more than 250 staff)  
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In what sector do you classify your main occupation?  Accountancy and business services   Advertising, marketing and PR   Armed forces and emergency services   Banking, investment and insurance   Charity and development work   Construction   Creative arts   Education   Energy and utilities   Engineering   Environment and agriculture   Fashion and design   Government and public administration   Health   Hospitality   Human resources and recruitment   Information technology   Legal services   Manufacturing   Media   Property   Publishing   Retail   Science   Social care   Sport and leisure   Tourism   Transport and logistics   Other (PLEASE STATE):  ____________________ 
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8.11 | APPENDIX K: STUDY 3 – ORGANISATION SECTOR DEMOGRAPHICS 
Table 51. Study 3 - Organisational sectors from recruited sample 
Organisational Sector Percentage of participants from sector 
Accountancy and business services 2.5% 
Advertising, marketing and PR .7% 
Armed forces and emergency services .2% 
Banking, investment and insurance .7% 
Charity and development work 4.7% 
Creative arts .7% 
Education 46.5% 
Engineering 1.7% 
Fashion and design .2% 
Government and public administration 1.7% 
Health 6.5% 
Hospitality 2.5% 
Human resources and recruitment 1.0% 
Information technology 7.2% 
Legal services .5% 
Manufacturing .5% 
Media .7% 
Property .2% 
Retail 4.5% 
Science 3.7% 
Social care 1.2% 
Sport and leisure 1.7% 
Telecommunications 3.2% 
Tourism .2% 
Transport and logistics .2% 
Other (Unclassified) 6.0% 
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8.12 | APPENDIX L: DEVICE USAGE IN THE WORKPLACE  
 
Which of the following devices (personally-owned or company-owned) do you use MOST 
for work-related tasks? (SELECT ONE)    
Work-related tasks are activities you may do on devices such as accessing emails, editing work 
documents, accessing company information etc.   
 Desktop PC   Laptop   Smartphone   Tablet   Other [please state]: ____________________ 
 
Is this device: 
 Company-owned   Personally-owned  
 
What is the operating system for this device? 
 Microsoft Windows   Mac OS X  Linux   iOS   Android   Other [please state]: ____________________ 
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8.13 | APPENDIX M: PERCEIVED SUSCEPTIBILITY AND SEVERITY ITEMS 
 
Please answer the following questions using a rating scale of Strongly Disagree to Strongly 
Agree  
Perceived Susceptibility Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
My work device is at risk of 
becoming infected with malware             
I am unlikely to infect my work 
device with malware in the future             
My chances of infecting my work 
device with malware in the future are 
high  
          
It is likely that my work device will 
become infected with malware            
 
 
Perceived Severity Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree 
If my work device were infected by 
malware… 
…the consequences would be severe  
     
…the consequences would be serious            
…the consequences would be 
significant            
…it would run significantly slower            
… my organisation’s computer 
network could be severely disrupted            
…I could be severely disciplined            
…I would be seriously embarrassed            
…my personal information and data 
could be severely at risk            
…it could significantly reduce my 
productivity            
…there would severe complications 
for my organisation's service 
users/customers  
          
…it could lead to my organisation 
having severely dissatisfied service 
users/customers 
          
…there could be severe consequences 
to company data and files            
…the organisation's image could be 
seriously damaged            
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8.14 | APPENDIX N: SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY ITEMS 
The following question is about your opinions on who is responsible for certain activities in the 
workplace. Using the slider below and for each statement please indicate whose responsibility 
you feel it is to undertake the activity with a rating scale from 1 to 5. Scores closer to 1 indicate 
your company's responsibility whereas scores closer to 5 indicate your responsibility 
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8.15 | APPENDIX O: PAST EXPERIENCE ITEMS 
Please indicate whether or not you have ever experienced any of the following situations at 
HOME on your personally-owned devices (e.g. PC, laptop, mobile phone, tablet).  
 Yes  No  I don't 
know 
Not 
Applicable  
My personal device has been infected by malicious software (e.g. 
viruses, Trojans, worms)          
My financial information has been stolen from my computer         
My personal account (e.g. email, social media) has been used by 
someone without my permission          
My device resources (computer, internet, software, hardware) 
have been inaccessible/unusable because of computer security 
problems  
        
I have been tricked into giving away my personal information 
online          
Files on my personal device have been lost due to security 
problems          
 
Please indicate whether or not you have ever experienced any of the following situations at 
WORK on your company-owned devices (e.g. PC, laptop, mobile phone, tablet).   
 Yes  No  I don't 
know  
Not 
Applicable  
My work device has been infected by malicious software  (e.g. 
viruses, trojans, worms)         
Information has been stolen from my work device          
My work account (e.g. email, computer logins) has been used by 
someone without my permission          
My work device resources (computer, internet, software, hardware) 
have been inaccessible/unusable because of computer security 
problems  
        
I have been tricked into giving away information about work online          
Files on my work device have been lost due to security problems          
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8.16 | APPENDIX P: RESPONSE EFFICACY ITEMS 
< Security behaviour>  (Using the anti-malware software to scan suspect USB sticks for 
malware/ Installing software updates on my work device/ Not clicking on URL links in 
suspicious emails)..... 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
...is effective in preventing problems for 
my organisation’s service 
users/customers  
          
...works in preventing malware            
...reduces the likelihood of getting 
malware            
...works in ensuring that my work 
device runs as efficiently as possible            
...works in securing my organisation's 
data and files            
...is effective in ensuring that I don’t get 
embarrassed due to infecting my work 
device with malware  
          
...is effective in protecting the 
organisation’s network from the 
spreading of malware  
          
...reduces the likelihood of my 
productivity getting affected by 
malware  
          
...reduces my chances of being 
disciplined            
...works in protecting the reputation of 
my organisation            
...is effective in preventing malware            
...reduces the likelihood of dissatisfied 
service users/customers for my 
organisation  
          
...is effective in protecting my personal 
information and data            
8.17 | APPENDIX Q: SELF-EFFICACY ITEMS 
For the following questions, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the statements 
using a rating scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
I am discouraged from < security 
behaviour>  because I feel unable to 
do so  
          
I feel confident in my ability to 
< security behaviour>            
It would not be difficult for me to 
< security behaviour>            
< security behaviour> would be easy 
for me            
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8.18 | APPENDIX R: RESPONSE COSTS ITEMS 
Using the anti-malware software to scan suspect USB sticks for malware… 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree 
...would slow my work device down            
...would reduce my productivity            
...can lead to non-malicious files 
being identified as infected with 
malware  
          
...would be time consuming            
...could lead to important files being 
destroyed            
...would require considerable effort            
...would have a considerable 
financial cost for me            
 
Installing software updates on my work device... 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
...could lead to important files being 
destroyed            
...would reduce my productivity            
...would slow my work device down            
...could lead to a less reliable or 
'buggy' software version being 
installed  
          
...would require considerable effort            
...would be time consuming            
 
Not clicking on URL links in suspicious emails... 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
...would require 
considerable effort            
...would reduce my 
productivity            
...would slow my work 
device down            
...would be time consuming            
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8.19 | APPENDIX S: PROTECTION MOTIVATION ITEMS 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
Email security 
I intend to not click on URL links in 
suspicious emails 
          
If I receive a suspicious email, I will 
not click on the URL links           
I plan to not click on URL links in 
suspicious emails 
 
SU security 
          
I intend to install software updates on 
my work device as soon as I am 
prompted to do so 
          
If I was prompted to install software 
updates on my work device, I would 
do it immediately 
          
I plan to install software updates on 
my work device as soon as I am 
prompted to do so 
 
          
AMS security           
I intend to use the anti-malware 
software to scan suspect USB sticks 
for malware 
          
If I had a suspect USB stick, I would 
scan it for malware using the anti-
malware software 
          
I plan to use the anti-malware 
software to scan suspect USB sticks 
for malware 
          
8.20 | APPENDIX T: IMPLICIT SECURITY TASK 
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8.21 | APPENDIX U: INSTRUCTIONS 
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8.22 | APPENDIX V: INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
WISA Privacy (1) -                           
WISA Consequences (2) .086 
  
                        
WISA Worth (3) .314** -.341** 
 
                        
WISA Low proximity (4) .079 .126** .166** 
 
                       
WISA High proximity (5) -.176** .205** -.249** .183** 
 
                      
Perceived susceptibility (6) -.070 .211** -.218** .021 .193** 
 
                     
PS Organisational (7) .180** .151** .106* .153** .004 .074 
 
                    
Ps consequences (8) .160** .078 .128** .084 -.044 .074 .480** 
 
                   
Ps personal  (9) .141** .092 .053 .056 -.062 -.085 .506** .376** 
 
                  
Ps Productivity (10) .054 -.048 .126** .139** -.098* -.113* .302** .271** .180** 
 
                 
OCB (11) .046 -.081 .154** .230** .061 .031 .163** .125** .110* .121**                  
Personal security experience 
(12) -.020 -.042 .016 -.007 .138** -.016 -.038 -.028 .009 -.108* -.040                 
Work security experience (13) -.016 .036 -.119* -.075 .117* .000 -.038 -.068 -.039 -.129** -.197** .302** 
 
              
Psych ownership – Data (14) .054 -.042 .056 -.037 -.026 .013 -.187** .035 -.033 .057 .132** -.032 -.039 
 
             
Psych ownership – Tech (15) .028 -.028 .008 .078 .038 .041 -.141** -.010 -.106* .053 .189** .012 .043 .656** 
 
            
Responsibility (16) .063 -.014 .046 .031 .030 .042 -.206** -.085 .025 -.101* .089 .027 -.047 .286** .351** 
 
           
Self-efficacy (AMS) (17) .014 -.180** .173** .116* -.049 -.199** -.098 -.027 .027 .012 .095 -.040 -.118* .094 .167** .288** 
 
          
Response efficacy (AMS) (18) .137* -.059 .075 .055 -.117* -.090 .134* .149** .199** .156** -.009 -.209** -.064 .117* .068 .067 .282** 
 
         
Response costs (AMS) (19) -.029 .270** -.182** -.011 .291** .150** .040 .082 .048 -.095 .064 .016 .065 -.053 .010 -.096 -.303** -.186**          
Self-efficacy (ES) (20) .069 -.213** .272** .109* -.212** -.233** .067 .097 .078 .168** .017 -.028 -.086 .005 -.118* .012 .209** .138* -.185** 
 
       
Response efficacy  (ES) (21) .208** -.003 .211** .081 -.116* -.142** .205** .143** .181** .251** .141** -.146** -.106* .062 .022 -.008 .159** .506** -.115* .360** 
 
      
Response costs (ES) (22) -.120* .294** -.295** -.058 .250** .254** -.022 -.029 .031 -.119* -.079 .041 .051 -.050 .046 -.003 -.179** -.081 .299** -.576** -.300** 
 
     
Self-efficacy (SU) (23) -.074 -.150** .088 .058 -.054 -.117* -.191** -.091 -.090 .022 .039 -.021 .015 .125** .183** .245** .463** .191** -.148** .121* .085 -.169**      
Response costs (SU) (24) .102* .145** -.050 -.021 .092 .143** .185** .117* .068 .096* .008 -.023 -.025 -.117* -.067 -.121* -.264** -.061 .389** -.098 .017 .234** -.398** 
 
   
Response efficacy (SU) (25) .020 .022 .040 -.019 -.115* -.057 .135** -.002 .092 .087 .105* -.135** -.039 .050 .055 .083 .209** .459** -.183** .070 .255** -.042 .182** -.294** 
 
  
AMS intention  (26) .030 -.022 .133* .124* -.048 -.070 -.050 -.050 .003 .018 .053 -.009 -.087 .095 .161** .316** .545** .326** -.348** .155** .165** -.065 .254** -.216** .287** 
 
 
SU intention (27) .012 .000 .049 .052 -.020 .084 -.019 .029 -.024 .069 .083 -.058 -.052 .177** .159** .231** .204** .170** -.214** .015 .029 .047 .256** -.360** .398** .337** 
 
ES intention (28) .083 -.179** .254** .026 -.206** -.255** .031 .100* .033 .157** .061 -.069 -.143** .068 -.058 .016 .166** .109 -.174** .665** .335** -.520** .114* -.086 .024 .146** -.009 
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8.23 | APPENDIX W : RESPONSE EFFICACY PAIRWISE COMPARISONS 
Table 52 showing mean differences for response efficacy items for all behaviours and p values 
resulting from Bonferroni corrected repeated measures t tests 
Response efficacy item Mean Difference  
...is effective in preventing problems 
for my organisation’s service 
users/customers 
AMS SU .408*** 
ES -.283*** 
SE AMS -.408*** 
ES -.691*** 
ES AMS .283*** 
SU .691*** 
...works in preventing malware AMS SU .469*** 
ES -.328*** 
SE AMS -.469*** 
ES -.797*** 
ES AMS .328*** 
SU .797*** 
...reduces the likelihood of getting 
malware 
AMS SU .402*** 
ES -.277*** 
SE AMS -.402*** 
ES -.678*** 
ES AMS .277*** 
SU .678*** 
...works in ensuring that my work 
device runs as efficiently as possible 
AMS SU .051 
ES -.373*** 
SE AMS -.051 
ES -.424*** 
ES AMS .373*** 
SU .424*** 
...works in securing my organisation's 
data and files 
AMS SU .318*** 
ES -.338*** 
SE AMS -.318*** 
ES -.656*** 
ES AMS .338*** 
SU .656*** 
...is effective in ensuring that I don’t 
get embarrassed due to infecting my 
work device with malware 
AMS SU .328*** 
ES -.550*** 
SE AMS -.328*** 
ES -.878*** 
ES AMS .550*** 
...is effective in protecting the 
organisation’s network from the 
spreading of malware 
AMS SU .280*** 
ES -.222*** 
SE AMS -.280*** 
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Response efficacy item Mean Difference  
ES -.502*** 
ES AMS .222*** 
SU .502*** 
...reduces the likelihood of my 
productivity getting affected by 
malware 
AMS SU .347*** 
ES -.325* 
SE AMS -.347*** 
ES -.672*** 
ES AMS .325*** 
SU .672*** 
...reduces my chances of being 
disciplined 
AMS SU .383*** 
ES -.196** 
SE AMS -.383*** 
ES -.579*** 
ES AMS .196** 
SU .579*** 
...works in protecting the reputation of 
my organisation 
AMS SU .206*** 
ES -.267*** 
SE AMS -.206*** 
ES -.473*** 
ES AMS .267*** 
SU .473*** 
...is effective in preventing malware AMS SU .415*** 
ES -.344*** 
SE AMS -.415*** 
ES -.759*** 
ES AMS .344*** 
SU .759*** 
...reduces the likelihood of dissatisfied 
service users/customers for my 
organisation 
AMS SU .264*** 
ES -.228*** 
SE AMS -.264*** 
ES -.492*** 
ES AMS .228*** 
SU .492*** 
...is effective in protecting my 
personal information and data 
AMS SU .280*** 
ES -.473*** 
SE AMS -.280*** 
ES -.752*** 
ES AMS .473*** 
SU .752*** 
*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001  
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8.24 | APPENDIX X: RESPONSE COSTS PAIRWISE COMPARISONS 
 
Table 53 showing AMS security mean differences for response cost rating for all items and p values 
resulting from Bonferroni corrected repeated measures t tests 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(1)...would slow my work device down - -.14** .361*** .228*** -.194* -.309*** -.630*** 
(2)...would reduce my productivity  - .503*** .370*** -.052  -.167* -.488*** 
(3)...can lead to non-malicious files being 
identified as infected with malware   - -.133  -.556*** -.670*** -.991*** 
(4)..would be time consuming    - -.423*** -.537*** -.858*** 
(5)...could lead to important files being 
destroyed     - -.114  -.435*** 
(6)...would require considerable effort      - -.321*** 
(7)...would have a considerable financial cost 
for me       - 
*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001  
Table 54 showing SE security mean differences for response cost rating for all items and p values 
resulting from Bonferroni corrected repeated measures t tests 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
(1)...could lead to important files being destroyed - -0.078 -.159* -.422*** 0.092 -.332*** 
(2)...would reduce my productivity  - -0.081 -.344*** 0.171 -.254*** 
(3)..would slow my work device down   - -.263*** .251*** -.173** 
(4)...could lead to a less reliable or 'buggy' software 
version being installed 
   - .514*** 0.09 
(5)...would require considerable effort     - -.424*** 
(6)...would be time consuming      - 
*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001    
Table 55 showing ES security mean differences for response cost rating for all items and p values 
resulting from Bonferroni corrected repeated measures t tests 
 
1 2 3 4 
(1)... would require 
considerable effort  -.1078 -.131* -.061 
(2)... would reduce my 
productivity  - -.023  .047  
(3)..would slow my work 
device down   - .070  
(4)... would be time consuming    - 
*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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8.25 | APPENDIX Y: MOTIVATIONAL INTERVENTION MATERIALS 
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8.26 | APPENDIX Z: VOLITIONAL HELP SHEET 
  
265 
 
8.27 | APPENDIX AA: EXAMPLE PHISHING EMAIL  
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8.28 | APPENDIX BB: EXAMPLE GENUINE EMAIL  
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8.29 | APPENDIX CC. EMAIL SECURITY BEHAVIOUR ITEMS 
In the past 7 days, I have.. 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Most of 
the Time 
Always 
...checked the sender’s email address 
before opening attachments           
...looked out for strong emotional tones in 
emails           
...un-shortened reduced URLS (e.g. 
tinyURL, bit.ly) within emails before 
clicking on them 
          
...checked an email is genuine before 
clicking on links from within it           
...not clicked on links in suspicious emails           
...checked that the website domain of links 
within emails is genuine before clicking on 
them 
          
...hovered over links in emails to check if 
they are genuine           
...checked an email is genuine before 
opening attachments           
...not downloaded attachments in 
suspicious emails           
...checked the sender's email address 
before clicking on links from within it           
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